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The aim of this PhD project is to design profit scorecards for a revolving credit 
using alternative measures of profit that have not been considered in previous 
research. The data set consists of customers from a lending institution that 
grants credit to those that are usually financially excluded due to the lack of 
previous credit records.  
 
The study presents for the first time a relative profit measure (i.e.: returns) for 
scoring purposes and compares results with those obtained from usual 
monetary profit scores both in cumulative and average terms. Such relative 
measure can be interpreted as the productivity per customer in generating cash 
flows per monetary unit invested in receivables. Alternatively, it is the coverage 
against default if the lender discontinues operations at time t.  
 
At an exploratory level, results show that granting credit to financially excluded 
customers is a profitable business. Moreover, defaulters are not necessarily 
unprofitable; in average the profits generated by profitable defaulters exceed 
the losses generated by certain non-defaulters. Therefore, it makes sense to 
design profit (return) scorecards. It is shown through different methods that it 
makes a difference to use alternative profit measures for scoring purposes. At a 
customer level, using either profits or returns alters the chances of being 
accepted for credit.  At a portfolio level, in the long term, productivity (coverage 
against default) is traded off if profits are used instead of returns. Additionally, 
using cumulative or average measures implies a trade off between the scope of 
the credit programme and customer productivity (coverage against default). 
 
The study also contributes to the ongoing debate of using direct and indirect 
prediction methods to produce not only profit but also return scorecards. Direct 
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scores were obtained from borrower attributes, whilst indirect scores were 
predicted using the estimated probabilities of default and repurchase; OLS was 
used in both cases. Direct models outperformed indirect models.   Results show 
that it is possible to identify customers that are profitable both in monetary and 
relative terms. The best performing indirect model used the probabilities of 
default at t=12 months and of repurchase in t=12, 30 months as predictors. This 
agrees with banking practices and confirms the significance of the long term 
perspective for revolving credit. Return scores would be preferred under more 
conservative standpoints towards default because of unstable conditions and if 
the aim is to penetrate relatively unknown segments. Further ethical 
considerations justify their use in an inclusive lending context. Qualitative data 
was used to contextualise results from quantitative models, where appropriate. 
This is particularly important in the microlending industry, where analysts’ 
market knowledge is important to complement results from scorecards for credit 
granting purposes. 
 
Finally, this is the first study that formally defines time-to-profit and uses it for 
scoring purposes. Such event occurs when the cumulative return exceeds one. It 
is the point in time when customers are exceedingly productive or alternatively 
when they are completely covered against default, regardless of future 
payments. A generic time-to-profit application scorecard was obtained by 
applying the discrete version of Cox model to borrowers’ attributes. Compared 
with OLS results, portfolio coverage against default was improved. A set of 
segmented models predicted time-to-profit for different loan durations. Results 
show that loan duration has a major effect on time-to-profit. Furthermore, 
inclusive lending programmes can generate internal funds to foster their 
growth. This provides useful insight for investment planning objectives in 
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Traditionally, lending institutions have used default scorecards to manage credit 
risk. The objective has been to design scorecards to grant credit to customers 
based on their predicted probability of default (Thomas, 2000). Default status 
can be measured once a definition is agreed regarding missed payments; 
banking standards usually define it as three missed consecutive payments 
(Thomas, 2009). Academic research has extended the design of scorecards from 
default to profit scoring since the 1990’s; scoring customers according to their 
profit profiles has gained more relevance (Hopper and Lewis, 1992; Thomas et 
al., 2005).  
 
There is no consensus on the measure to use to design profit scorecards. Various 
monetary measures have been used in previous studies (Stepanova and Thomas, 
2001; Andreeva et al., 2007; Finlay, 2008; Banasik and Crook, 2009; Ma et al. 2009; 
Finlay, 2010; Stewart, 2011). All of these measures quantify profits only in 
monetary terms, whilst the performance of lending institutions is assessed not 
only with monetary but also with relative profit measures (Rasiah, 2010). This 
was the initial motivation for conducting this research project. By definition, 
profits and profitability ratios are not the same; the former quantifies the total 
profit yielded per customer whereas the latter accounts for the investment per 
customer and hence expresses monetary profits in relative terms (i.e.: as a ratio). 
This required defining and implementing a measure of customer returns and 
comparing it with traditionally used profits. Therefore, the first aim of this study 
is to define and implement return scores for the first time in consumer revolving 
credit. 
 
Regarding the design of profit scorecards, direct methods (Finlay, 2008; Finlay, 
2010; Stewart, 2011) and indirect methods (Andreeva et al, 2007) have been used 
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to design monetary profit scorecards. Under direct methods, profits are 
predicted directly from customer attributes. Indirect methods require an 
additional step where intermediate variables such as probabilities of default and 
repurchase are predicted; these predicted values are then used as predictors of 
profits. This follows a similar rationale to that suggested for default scoring (Li 
and Hand, 2002). These methods have been used separately in profit scoring; 
their performance has not been compared for monetary profit scorecards. As 
expected, direct and indirect return scorecards have not been designed yet. 
Consequently, the second aim of this study is to design and compare direct and 
indirect profit (return) scorecards as of portfolio results for revolving credit. 
Additional insight could be gained from the use of both types of scorecards. 
 
A topic suggested previously is the design of time-to-profitability scorecards 
(Finlay, 2008), so far this does not seem to have been tackled. Building on the use 
of return scorecards for the first time, the third aim of this study is to define and 
implement time-to-profit scorecards for revolving credit. This required defining 
a return-based event, which does not necessarily agree with profit thresholds 
used previously (Finlay, 2008). The usefulness of time-to-profit scorecards was 
assessed through their performance at a portfolio level, compared with profit 
and return scorecards. A distinctive feature of time-to-profit scorecards is that 
they facilitate the planning of investment schemes of credit programmes; this is 
presented for the first time in this study. 
 
In order to address the research aims presented above, qualitative and 
quantitative methods were used. Specifically, qualitative data was collected 
through interviews administered to 10 credit managers from various utility, 
lending and education institutions. Such data were analysed through 
thematic analysis. Where appropriate, findings from qualitative data were 
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used to contextualise some of the findings from quantitative methods. This is 
particularly useful in microcredit programmes, where not only scorecards 
but also qualitative data are used by analysts for credit granting (Van Gool et 
al., 2009). 
 
The first research aim was addressed through the exploratory analysis of 
alternative profit and return measures that could be used for scoring 
purposes. Cumulative profits are the accumulated cash flows generated per 
customer at t=12, 24 and 30 months. Cumulative returns are the accumulated 
cash flows scaled by the outstanding balance per customer. Such returns are 
defined for the first time as the productivity per customer. Alternatively, it 
can be defined as the coverage against default if the lending institution 
discontinues operations at each point of time. Average profits and returns 
were calculated accordingly for comparison purposes. 
 
Results show that not all defaulters are loss-makers. Moreover, in average 
the profits generated by profitable defaulters are exceedingly greater than the 
losses generated by certain non-defaulters. Therefore, it makes sense to score 
customers according to their profits (returns). Regarding the use of profit or 
return measures to score customers, the ranks analysis and Chi-Square tests 
showed that each measure leads to different results at a customer level. This 
was further confirmed at a portfolio level as portfolio profits (returns) are 
improved when profits (return) scores are used. An opportunity cost analysis 
was useful to choose between cumulative and average measures for scoring 
purposes. Cumulative profits and returns are preferred to average measures 
as they provide opportunities to improve a portfolio’s coverage against 
default. Such analysis also shed light on the importance of monetary profits 
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in the short term (t=12 months) and coverage against default in the mid and 
long term (t=24, 30 months). 
 
In order to tackle the second research aim, direct and indirect cumulative 
profit and return scorecards were produced through the use of OLS 
(Ordinary Least Squares) (Panik, 2009). Direct scorecards were predicted 
directly from customer attributes, whereas indirect scorecards had as 
predictors the probabilities of default and repurchase at t=12 and 30 months. 
Results from direct models show that even though the dilemma between 
improving portfolio profits or returns can not be solved through a single 
profit or return scorecard, customers with certain attributes can improve 
profits and returns simultaneously. Models were compared in terms of the 
error rate and according to their impact on portfolio results. Direct models 
outperformed indirect models according to both criteria. Indirect models 
were useful, however, to understand the impact that the probabilities of 
default and repurchase have on profits and returns for a revolving credit as 
the one under analysis. Furthermore, the joint use of direct, default and 
repurchase scorecards shed light on the significance of some attributes on 
profits and returns, in connection with default and repurchase. 
 
Finally, the third research aim was addressed through the definition of time-
to-profit as the moment when a customer is covered against default for the 
first time (i.e.: when cumulative returns exceed one); that is when the 
accumulated cash flows are enough to cover the outstanding balance for the 
first time. The initial exploratory analysis was conducted through the 
analysis of survivor and hazard functions (Hosmer et al, 2008; Allison, 2010). 
As time went on, the hazard of being covered against default for the first 
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time increased. The discrete version of the Cox model (1972) was used to 
produce application scorecards. It was shown that survival time-to-profit 
scorecards outperformed OLS cumulative profits and returns scorecards in 
terms of their impact on portfolio coverage against default. An alternative 
use of predicting time-to-profit was to plan investment activities. Results 
show that segmented models by loan duration outperform a generic model 
in terms of classification accuracy and monetary impact on the investment 
scheme. Such models identified internal funding opportunities from the 
profits generated by existing customers of the credit programme under 
analysis.  
 
The following two sections aim at providing the reader with an initial 
understanding of the credit programme under analysis. Background 
information and further profitability considerations are presented to achieve 
such objective. 
 
a) The credit programme under analysis 
The data set used in this research project was extracted from a credit programme 
in Colombia offered by a utility company. The programme operates within a 
business unit that is independently accountable for financial results. 
 
The programme was launched in 2007 and offers a pre-approved revolving 
credit to customers that have not been at arrears in the payment of utility bills 
and/or connection charges during the previous two years; this is the sole 
criterion considered when deciding if to offer customers this product. Some of 
these customers cannot access traditional lending institutions given that they 
lack a previous record with credit bureaus.  
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The salesforce pays a visit to inform customers about their credit limit, which is 
based on the customer’s socio-economic stratum. Customers can not withdraw 
cash and can only purchase products from partner retail shops. The credit limit 
can only be used to buy products that improve the quality of life of individuals 
(e.g.: television/audio sets, desktops, building materials, furniture, home 
appliances, among others).  
 
Lending rates charged to customers are regulated by the Colombian Financial 
Superintendent. Specific legislation prevents lending institutions in Colombia 
from charging usury rates (Prior and Argandoña, 2009). A single rate is used for 
all customers. Customers decide on the duration of their loans, which range 
from 12 to 61 months. Therefore, longer term loans should be more profitable as 
total paid interests are greater in the long term. No credit limit usage restrictions 
exist unless customers are in arrears in the payment of current loans. 
 
Loans are paid through monthly instalments together with the utility bill. 
Customers can pay the full amount of the instalment in various collection points 
that include supermarkets, banks and customer service facilities. Utility supply 
is suspended after two missed consecutive payments; therefore being at arrears 
for two months before suspension is a possibility. Furthermore, some customers 
prefer to make partial payments to cover first the utility bill and then the credit 
instalment. They are entitled to do this by law. This can only be done, however, 
in person at the lender’s headquarters. Additional interests are charged to 
customers that are in arrears, following traditional lending practices. No 
additional charges result from early repayment. 
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b) Profitability considerations 
In order to be financially sustainable, some microlending institutions may 
decide to serve the marginally-poor and non-poor individuals to achieve 
financial self-sufficiency (Brau and Woller, 2004).  The credit programme under 
analysis is considered a microcredit initiative; it reaches customers who do not 
meet usual credit granting requirements but who can actually access the utility 
service provided by the lender. It relies on external funding (e.g. loans) and 
shareholders’ equity to fund its operation. The credit programme should be 
profitable to contribute towards its self-sustainability and therefore to its 
continuity in the long term. 
 
The earnings potential from customers that take micro credits derives from the 
interest rates charged to them. They exceed the usual consumer lending rates 
but are significantly lower than those charged by informal lenders. Solo and 
Manroth (2006) found rates of 150% charged by such informal lenders. A survey 
of  a sample of Colombian households from low income socioeconomic stratums 
(e.g. 1 to 3) showed that 79% of them have used at least once informal credit 
services provided by pawn shops, cash lenders, friends and relatives 
(Econometria, 2008 cited in Colombian Treasury et al., 2010).   
Figure I1.1 shows that interest rates of the credit programme under analysis are 
greater than those usually charged for consumer loans. Apart from the first 
quarter, they are usually set at the legal cap defined by the Government. This is 
a result of the higher risk associated with the served segment, as they would 







Figure I1.1: Comparison of interest rates of the cr edit programme versus 
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Source: Official figures (Superintendence, 2012)  
 
The facts mentioned above suggest that microcredit programmes can be 
profitable, provided that their cost structures are appropriate (Terberger, 2003). 
In the case under analysis, important cost savings are obtained from the existing 
infrastructure of the lender, which is also used to provide administrative 
support to the utility business unit.   
 
Previous scoring studies for consumer loans in a microcredit context have 
focused on credit scoring (Schreiner, 2000; Forster and Wilkinson,2010). Results 
show, however, that in general default rates in microcredit programmes are low 
(Brau and Woller, 2004); this is also the case in Colombia (Serrano, 2009). This 
contrasts the view of traditional commercial banks that classify them as high 
risks (Prior and Argandoña, 2009). Furthermore, given the previous positive 
payment record on utility bills, one should be aware of default but priority 
should be given to profit scoring.   
 
A profit scorecard is therefore useful in identifying customers that contribute 
towards the financial sustainability of the microcredit programme, given that 
 22 
they have not defaulted in the payment of utility bills.  This is equally applicable 
to credit programmes from traditional commercial banks. 
 
The thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 1 presents the literature review 
conducted to identify the research gaps and the research questions defined in 
Chapter 2. Chapter 3 introduces the suggested measures and approaches to 
tackle the research questions. Chapter 4 presents the methodology used to 
collect and analyse qualitative data; it also describes how quantitative data were 
prepared and analysed, per research topic. Chapter 5 presents the analysis of 
results for the chosen dataset. Chapter 6 presents the conclusions per research 
topic. Chapter 7 includes the limitations of this study; it also includes extensions 
that would further expand research on return scoring. An appendix and 
references are presented at the end of the document.    
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1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to critically review the existing literature on profit 
measures (Section 1.2), predictive methods (Section 1.3) and survival techniques 
(Section 1.4) used for scoring purposes. This review includes elements from 
financial accounting, marketing and statistics that are essential to identify 
potential gaps in the profit scoring literature.  
 
1.2 Profit measures 
Since the 1990’s, the initial objective of scoring models, predicting the default of 
customers, has been extended to the optimization of other business objectives: 
response, attrition, and particularly profits (Thomas et al., 2005).  
 
A major challenge in the design of profit scorecards is the identification of 
revenues and expenses at a customer level, as figures are usually presented at a 
portfolio level and approximations are required. For instance, if some expenses 
are omitted due to lack of information, they are considered relative and 
decisions among accounts should be regarded as relative as well (Hopper and 
Lewis, 1992). The advance in information systems has facilitated the 
measurement of profits per customer even though some assumptions and 
approximations are usually made. Once a profit measure is selected, it can be 
predicted through explanatory variables to produce scorecards. 
 
This section critically reviews previous measures that have been suggested and 
used for profit scoring purposes.  It also presents alternative profit measures that 
could be used for scoring purposes. 
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1.2.1 Monetary measures 
1.2.1.1 Customer Lifetime Value measures 
These measures quantify profits as the discounted cash flows (anticipated or 
actual) per customer and are usually expressed in monetary units at the 
application time. They are closely related to the concept of customer lifetime 
value (CLV).  
 
CLV is defined as the net present value of the anticipated cash flows per 
customer over time (Berger and Nasr 1998; Collings and Baxter 2005; Pfeifer et 
al., 2005). Customers can be considered the most valuable asset of a Company 
and hence, CLV is useful to value companies (Gupta and Lehmann, 2003). 
 
In the simplest scenario, CLV is quantified (Berger and Nasr, 1998) as: 
                                                            
                                             (1.2.1),  
 
where: 
GC= Expected annual gross contribution margin per customer; 
M= Relevant annual promotion costs per customer; 
n= Projected cash flows period; 
r= Annual retention rate; 
d= Annual discount rate; 
i= Year 
n= Observation period, in years 
In this particular case it is assumed that promotion expenses approximately 
occur at the middle of the purchase cycle and n depends on the type of industry.  








































In a scoring context, the aim is to design a scorecard to select customers that will 
generate more value to the Company at an individual level. This requires 
defining an outcome period to assess a customer’s contribution to future profits 
(Lucas, 2001). This is different to valuing the lifetime relationship with a lender, 
where time horizon can be infinite. 
 
An approach suggested initially was to quantify profit at application time as the 
difference between the cumulative discounted installments adjusted by the 
survival probability at time t and the initial amount of the loan (Stepanova and 
Thomas, 2001) as 
 
                                                             
                                                         (1.2.2),  
 
where: 
Si= Survival probability that the customer has not fully repaid the loan and has 
not defaulted at month i; 
a= Monthly instalment; 
L= Loan amount; 
T= Loan term; 
r= Monthly lending rate. 
 
Alternatively, expected profits result from deducting expected losses from 
default and early repayment from potential inflows from the loan (Banasik and 
Crook, 2009): 
 
E (Profits) = Potential profits – E (Lost potential from default) – E (Lost potential  















The conditional expected profit for a fixed term loan has been quantified as a 
result of four income sources (Ma et al., 2009), as presented below. 
 
The summation of expected monthly payments in the absence of default and 
early repayment is 
 
                                                                                              
                                                                    (1.2.4); 
 
the expected balance repaid early, given that default had not occurred before 
that date is 
                                                                                                                                     
                                                                          (1.2.5); 
 
the expected recovery amount, given that the customer defaults and has not 
repaid early before that date is 
                                                                                                                        
                                                              (1.2.6); 
 
and the expected inflows from insurance premia 
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The measures presented above are based on anticipated cash flows and therefore 
require adjustments for default and repayment. Alternatively, actual payments 
during the observation period can be used to calculate the dependent variable to 
be predicted for scoring purposes. 
 
The net revenue of a revolving German store card account has been calculated as 
the difference between the net present value of the actual discounted total 
payments and the amount written off from accounts at default (Andreeva et al., 
2007): 
                                                                                                                                              
                                                                        (1.2.8), with 
 
rit=bit-bit+1 if rit>0 and rit=0 if rtj ≤ 0,   
where: 
bit= Outstanding balance at the end of month t, customer i; 
vri= Present value of net revenue at the end of month 0, customer i; 
li= Amount written off during period T for each customer; 















T= Month of account closure/end of observation period. 
Data availability has a major role on decision between using anticipated or 
actual figures. If only the payment plan agreed at the application time is 
available, instead of actual payments per customer, anticipated values should be 
used. This assumes that behavioural data on default and early repayment are 
available as well. In the case of revolving credit, the probability of repurchase 
needs to be considered to reflect properly sources of additional income.  
 
On the other hand, if actual payments per customer are available, these figures 
should be used instead. An advantage is that measures reflect directly the actual 
profits generated per customer (Hopper and Lewis, 1992). Additionally, actual 
payments reflect the overall payment behaviour resulting from default, 
repayment and repurchase (where applicable).  
 
1.2.1.2 Customer profitability measures 
A second group of measures that have been used for profit scoring purposes are 
related to customer profitability (CP). Customer profitability is the difference 
between revenues and accrued costs resulting from the relationship with 
customers during a specific period. Profits do not need to be discounted and 
include accrued expenses that not necessarily imply cash outflows (Pfeifer et al., 
2005).  
 
A measure that has been used to score customers is their worth. It is the profit 
per customer net of bad debt provisions (only for accounts in arrears) and 
average fixed costs of managing each account (Finlay, 2008). It is a cumulative 










ikii YYYY                                                    (1.2.9),  
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where: 
Y1i= Payments made over the outcome period to account i; 
Y2ik= Balance at arrears status k; k=0 to n at the outcome point for account i;
α= Average profit proportion of payments; 
βkt= Provision percentage for account balances of accounts at arrears status k; 
δ= Average fixed cost of managing each account during the outcome period. 
A similar measure (i.e.: contribution per customer) quantifies the worth per 
customer as the profits after deducting losses for bad accounts (Finlay, 2010): 
 
Ci = αNi – βKi = Ri-Li                                                                                                                 (1.2.10),  
 
where: 
αNi = Fixed proportion of N (gross payments received from customer i over the 
outcome period) ; 
βKi = Fixed proportion of outstanding balance account K. 
 
More recently, spend and charge-offs, were used as proxies for revenues and 
costs, respectively. Instead of producing a single profit measure, each 
component was modeled and used in conjunction for strategic decision making 
(Stewart, 2011).  
 
1.2.2 Relative measures 
The monetary measures presented above are useful to assess business units as 
profit centres accountable for generating revenues and covering costs. 
Alternatively, they could be considered investment centres that should 
maximize profits considering the investment base (Ezzamel, 1992; Drury, 2000). 
Relative measures (ratios) are used instead of monetary measures to scale profits 
or cash flows by the investment made.  
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1.2.2.1 Profit-based ratios 
Usual return measures include return on equity capital employed (ROE) and 
return on total assets (ROTA). ROE is the return to shareholders; ROTA 
quantifies the profit before interest and tax generated per monetary unit 























ROTA                                              (1.2.12). 
 
Several variations of these ratios exist, depending on the accounts used for 
calculation. Both of them are useful to assess the productivity of resources 
invested in a business unit. These relative measures are widely used by 
commercial banks (Rasiah, 2010) and microlending institutions to assess their 
profitability (CGAP, 2009; SEEP, 2010).  
 
It has been suggested that ROE can be calculated at a customer relationship level 
for pricing decisions (Komar, 1997). The rationale behind assessing customers’ 
performance through the relative measures explained above is that profit 
generation occurs at a customer level. Likewise, resources are allocated at a 
customer level to generate profits. Consequently, return measures are a natural 
alternative to monetary profits. 
 
1.2.2.2 Cash -flow-based ratios 
Various cash-based ratios have been suggested to assess the performance of 
companies: Cash ROCE, portfolio yield and operating cash flow ratio.  
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The cash return on capital employed (cash ROCE) measures the net cash flow 
from operations generated per monetary unit invested in the capital employed, 
which include the operational assets used to generate such cash flows (Davies 












operations from flow cash Net
ROCE Cash                                           (1.2.13). 
 
The portfolio yield is a cash-based measure, gross of interests and expenses. It 
has been defined in a microlending context for standardized reporting purposes. 
It measures the ability of a microfinance institution to generate cash from 












portfolio loan gross Average
portfolio loanin scommission and fees ,Interests
yieldPortfolio  (1.2.14). 
 
Another measure used to assess the liquidity of a Company is the operating cash 
flow ratio. It compares the cash flow from operations with current liabilities. It 
quantifies the ability of a Company’s operations to repay short term liabilities 










operations from flow Cash
 ratio flow cash Operating                     (1.2.15). 
 
 
The measures explained above or similar metrics could be used at a customer 
level for profit scoring purposes.  
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A cash-flow based ratio has been suggested to assess the creditworthiness of 
applicants of fixed loans and revolving credits. The rationale behind it differs 
from return ratios (i.e.: scaled profits), as it compares actual and expected cash 
flows. Results from this study are solely based on simulated data (Quirini and 
Vannucci, 2009).  
 
Until now, only monetary measures (either cash flow or profit-based) have been 
used for profit scoring purposes. Ratios that scale monetary results by the 
investment per customer have not been suggested. This presents a research 
opportunity to explore alternative measures that could provide useful insight 
for profit scoring purposes. 
 
1.3 Profit scorecard prediction methods 
Once a proxy measure of profit is obtained, different methods can be used to 
predict it through explanatory variables.  
 
Default models are constructed by using binary measures as the predicted 
variable. Direct or indirect methods that use predictor variables can be used to 
produce scorecards. Within each category, specific statistical and/or heuristic 
techniques can be used for predictive purposes (Li and Hand, 2002). Statistical 
and non-statistical techniques have been used in a binary context (Hand and 
Henley 1997; Baesens et al., 2003; Thomas et al., 2005). 
 
A similar rationale can be used in the case of non-classification contexts (Li and 
Hand, 2002). In particular, profit scoring predictive methods can be broadly 
classified as direct or indirect, depending on the steps used to generate 
predicted values. The following section presents the methods that have been 
used to produce profit scores.  
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1.3.1 Indirect methods 
Under this approach, intermediate variables are predicted from individual 
attributes through statistical models. These variables are then used to predict 
classes deterministically. That is, the bank characterises good customers in terms 
of intermediate variables such as balance, excess and credit turnover and then 
classifies customers as goods or bads based on predicted values of intermediate 
variables. The underlying principle of these methods is that intermediate 
variables capture valuable additional information from the data that are related 
to default (e.g.: balance). An advantage of these methods is that they are flexible 
as a classification threshold is not required. Such threshold might be changed 
throughout time. This allows redefining classes without changing the model (Li 
and Hand, 2002). Figure 1.3.1 depicts the process followed when indirect 
predictive methods are used. 
 




       
 
Source: Li and Hand (2002) 
 
In a non-classification context, instead of using indirect models as defined 
above, models that include an intermediate structure are used to separate 
processes that explain predicted variables. Individual attributes are used to 
predict intermediate variables. Intermediate variables are then used to predict 
the final measure per individual (Li and Hand, 2002). 
 






Indirect methods have not been used widely in a profit scoring context because 
of the continuous nature of the predicted variable. It is natural to think in terms 
of predicting profit, which is a continuous variable, instead of defining binary 
models based on profit classes.  Even though it is possible to define goods and 
bads in terms of profits, it is not a straightforward task. Lending institutions 
may define profitable and unprofitable customers in alternative ways; therefore 
they are more likely to be inclined towards using direct models to predict profit 
as a continuous measure. 
 
Until now, intermediate structures have only been used once for profit scoring 
purposes of a revolving credit in Germany (Andreeva et al., 2007). Profit scores 
were regressed on the probabilities of default and second purchase and amount 
borrowed.  A previous step was completed to predict time to second purchase 
and time to default through survival models. Time to second purchase and time 
to default were modelled with an exponential model, using application and first 
purchase data (Andreeva et al., 2007). This study built on previous research 
where purchase propensity was modelled through survival techniques 
(Andreeva et al., 2005). 
 
The “survival combination score” yielded higher values of mean and total net 
revenue than those obtained with a typical logistic regression model. However, 
the bad rate among accepts and the total amount written off were higher. 
 
1.3.2 Direct methods 
 Predicted values are obtained by using observed variables per customer 
directly. Techniques include logistic regression and discriminant analysis, 
among others (Li and Hand, 2002).  Figure 1.3.2 shows the process followed 
when direct predictive methods are used. 
 35 






                                                     
Source: Li and Hand (2002) 
 
Within this category of methods, profits are modeled directly (Finlay, 2008). 
Alternatively, profit components are modeled and subsequently used to obtain 
an expected profit value (Finlay, 2010; Stewart, 2011). 
 
In the case of a revolving credit in the United Kingdom where customers are 
charged higher prices for products instead of an explicit interest charge, binary 
and continuous models were produced to score customers. Logistic regression 
was used to produce two binary scores: one that defined goods as nondefaulters 
and another in which goods were customers with a positive worth.  Continuous 
models predicted directly profit per customer (Finlay, 2008). 
 
Binary models outperformed continuous models in terms of classification 
accuracy (i.e.: identifying goods from bads). The contrary occurs in terms of 
impact on corporate profits. It should be noted, however, that this was not the 
case for all acceptance deciles (Finlay, 2008). These results were expected, since 
binary and continuous models are designed using different types of measures 
and hence should be assessed according to the appropriate criteria. 
 
In a different study, alternative profit scores were obtained for the product 
described above. The first approach was modelling the probability of default 
Predictor variables Class 
Statistical model 
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through logistic regression and assuming a single value for losses and profits. 
The second approach was to model separately the probability of default and 
profits and losses for defaulters and non-defaulters through Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) and neural networks. An expected value of profit per customer 
was then used as profit score in both cases. The third approach was to model 
directly the expected profit per customer through OLS and neural networks 
(Finlay, 2010). 
 
Models were assessed through the ratio between the profit captured by the 
model and the maximum profit if the model was perfect, for different acceptance 
deciles. Results showed that approaches 2 and 3 should be preferred to 
approach 1. Overall, approach 2 should be preferred (Finlay, 2010). These results 
confirm the general rationale that using traditional default scorecards does not 
benefit portfolio profits; two different objectives are being pursued through 
default and profit scorecards. 
 
Regarding the better performance of models that predict profit components 
compared with those that produce a single profit prediction, it could be partly 
due to the benefits obtained from segmenting the sample into defaulters and 
non-defaulters. Separate models were obtained for the expected profits from 
non-defaulters and for the expected profits and losses from defaulters. This 
contrasts with the use of a generic model to produce alternative scores.  
 
More recently, revenue scores based on spend were produced through a general 
linear model in which the error term was assumed to follow a Gumbel 
distribution. Hence spend was assumed to follow an exponential distribution. In 
order to reduce correlation effects between default and revenue, segments were 
built according to a default score. Revenue scores were then produced, 
excluding those variables that were correlated with default. Even though results 
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varied across segments, the bad rate was not constant within the same default 
segment; a limited correlation between default and revenue was evident 
(Stewart, 2011).  
 
These results show that even though variables were selected with the aim to 
reduce correlation between default and revenue, still it is not possible to avoid it. 
Predictor variables continue to be correlated perhaps by other variables that are 
not readily distinguishable in a scoring model.  
 
Further research is required regarding the use of continuous modelling or 
binary classification for profit scoring purposes of interest accruing products 
such as revolving credit (Finlay, 2008). Results from direct and indirect methods 
have not been compared until now.   
 
1.4 Survival techniques for scoring purposes  
A central concept in survival techniques is the hazard function. Given that the 
observed individual has survived until time t, it is the instantaneous potential 
per unit time that the event will occur (Kleinbaum and Klein, 2012). This “time-
to-event” concept can be applied in a credit scoring context to forecast default 
levels depending on time and hence to provision bad debts. Other uses are 
predicting repayment time and the inclusion of changes in economic conditions 
in predictive models (Banasik et al., 1999). 
 
The most common survival model used in a scoring context is the proportional 
hazard model (Cox, 1972). This model assumes that the hazard function, h (t, x) 
can be split into two components: a baseline hazard function, (h0(t)) and a term 
that contains covariates, g (β,x) in form 
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h(t, x)=h0(t) g(β,x)                         (1.4.1), 
 
where: 
 x= vector of characteristics of individuals and β is a set of coefficients. 
Often g(β,x) is expressed as }'exp{ xβ . This latter function can have time varying 
covariates. 
The aim is to find the weights of the attributes that maximize the partial 
likelihood function L (β): 
 
                                                                                 (1.4.2), 
                                                                                                        
 
where: 
β= covariate weights 
xi= characteristics of borrower i 
xj= characteristics of borrower j 
Di= binary censoring variable 
{ }=iR  set of customers in the sample just before time ti (time at which a default 
occurs).  
 
These weights are then used to calculate survival scores (Thomas, 2009). The 
likelihood function presented above applies to continuous time events, which is 
not always the case in a scoring context. This requires either approximations to 
handle ties (Stepanova and Thomas, 2002) or the use of the discrete version of 
the proportional hazard model (Cox, 1972).  
 
Survival techniques have been used in previous studies initially for default 
scoring purposes (Banasik et al, 1999; Stepanova and Thomas, 2002). In terms of 





















proportional hazard models during the first year; this was not the case for the 
second year. Proportional hazard models outperformed those obtained from 
logistic regression for early repayment models (Banasik et al., 1999). Default 
models based on survival techniques were later improved by including time-by-
characteristic interactions to allow for time dependency of covariates (Stepanova 
and Thomas, 2002). 
 
As a consequence of the growing interest towards profit scoring, survival 
techniques have also been used to design profit scorecards (Stepanova and 
Thomas, 2001; Andreeva et al., 2007; Ma et al., 2009). The survival probability of 
repaying a loan was initially included as a component of expected profits; it has 
been suggested that expected profits increase as default risk decreases at 
different points of time (Stepanova and Thomas, 2001); see (1.2.2). These 
components were further expanded to allow for competing risks of default 
and/or early repayment in expected profit calculations (Ma et al, 2009); see (1.2.4 
to 1.2.6). An alternative approach was to use the probabilities of surviving 
default and second purchase as predictors of actual profits. It was demonstrated 
that actual profits and times to default/repurchase are related; profits can be 
improved if survival probabilities are used instead of a static default probability 
obtained from logistic regression. It was found, however, that additional risk has 
to be taken if profits are to be increased (Andreeva et al, 2007). This was 
explained in Section 1.3.1. 
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2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the gaps identified in the literature review conducted in 
Chapter 1 and the corresponding research questions of this research project. 
 
2.2 Gaps in the literature 
The discussion presented in the previous chapter is useful to identify research 
challenges related to profit scoring regarding profit measures, predictive 
methods and time-to-profit, as explained below. 
 
First, there is no consensus on the adoption of a single metric to quantify profit 
per customer for scoring purposes. Cash flows and profits are indistinctively 
used to design monetary profit scorecards. In some cases proxies are mixed 
measures that include accrual and cash-based figures.  
 
Regardless of the underlying accounting principles, profit proxies are useful to 
rank customers and therefore are useful to design scorecards that aim to 
maximise portfolio results. Special caution is required for interpretation 
purposes, as each measure represents a different concept that is not necessarily 
comparable with alternative metrics. Accrual and cash accounting lead to profit 
and cash flow measures respectively, which do not necessarily coincide. 
 
The lack of relative measures (in particular, return measures) for profit scoring 
purposes is evident in the existing literature. This implies that the required 
investment per customer to achieve certain profits or cash flows is being 
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overlooked. Alternative measures should therefore be explored to tackle this gap 
in the profit scoring literature. 
Second, it is clear that Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and other regression 
techniques are the most commonly used to produce profit scorecards. This is a 
natural course of action, given the continuous nature of profit measures. Results 
of previous studies are not conclusive as of the use of direct or indirect 
predictive methods; the debate is still open.  
 
Previous studies have not compared direct and indirect methods to produce 
both profit and return scores for revolving credit that accrues interests and other 
revenue income sources. This offers the opportunity to expand the literature on 
predictive methods for profit scoring purposes and to gain additional insight 
from the joint use of methods that predict profit measures directly from 
borrowers’ attributes and those that contain intermediate structures that account 
for profit drivers of a revolving credit. 
 
Third, the use of scorecards based on predictions of binary or continuous profit 
measures is a topic under development too. Profit-based categories need to be 
identified in alternative ways to formally define time-to-profit for the first time 
in a scoring context.  
 
Indirect OLS models and those that use survival probability components are 
based on a binary rationale resulting from default, repurchase and/or early 
repayment. Time-to-profit scorecards based on a profit-related binary event 
have not been implemented and compared against other regression techniques. 
Furthermore, lending institutions could use time-to-profit predictions to 
schedule investment activities in credit units through the liberation of internal 
funds from existing customers at different points of time. 
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2.3 Research questions 
In order to address the academic gaps presented above, the following research 
questions were identified: 
 
• What are return scores and what additional insight do they offer 
compared with traditional profit scores?  This question is addressed in 
Sections 3.2, 4.3.3.1 and 5.3. 
• How can direct and/or indirect methods be used to model profit and 
return scores for revolving credit? Sections 3.3, 4.3.3.2 and 5.4 address 
this question. 
• What is time to profit in a scoring context and how can it be modelled?  










3. SUGGESTED MEASURES AND APPROACHES 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the suggested profit and return measures (Section 3.2) and 
predictive approaches to produce monetary and relative scorecards (Section 3.3). 
It also defines time-to-profit (Section 3.4). This provides a starting point to tackle 
the research questions stated in the previous chapter.  
 
3.2 Alternative profit measures 
Some of the measures presented in this section could be predicted by using 
borrowers’ attributes. These predicted values can then be used as profit (return) 
scores.  
 
3.2.1 Basic measures 
Figure 3.2.1 shows that from the inception of the programme the lender 
expanded the programme gradually. New customers per month, n, were 
accumulated into CUMn, which gradually increased to 35,565 customers. This 
resulted in 15 monthly consecutive cohorts of accepted applications: y=0 to 14.  
 
As of the observation period per customer, profit scoring usually requires longer 
observation periods (i.e.: more than two years), compared with default scoring 
(Finlay, 2008; Stewart, 2011). A long term stance has also been taken to project 
customer lifetime duration (Reinartz and Kumar, 2003). In total, data was 
obtained for 44 months. However, all customers could not be observed during 




In order to exceed the minimum observation period suggested above, each 
customer was followed during 2.5 years (30 months): t=1 to 30; the first purchase 
occurred in month 1. An alternative observation period would have been 36 
months, but this would have resulted in the exclusion of 20% of the customers 
from the sample.  
 
Figure 3.2.1: Cohorts of borrowers 
 
 
A performance measure was calculated per period: z=t+y month; z Є [1, 44].  In 
order to address the research questions stated in Section 2.3, two monthly 
performance measures are suggested per customer: OPCASH and CASHROA.  
 
OPCASH is the operational cash flow generated per month, after deducting 
operational expenses in cash from cash inflows per customer. It measures the 
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potential that a customer has to generate operational liquidity to the lender. It 
does not take into account financing decisions and country tax regimes.  
In the case under analysis, payments received from sales and insurance net 
commissions and interests were added; only cash fixed overheads were 
subtracted. This was done to produce a cash-flow based measure, which is not 
based on accrual accounting (Lee, 1984; Lee, 1986; Elliot and Elliot, 2006). Hence, 
non-cash expenses such as depreciations and amortizations were excluded to 
calculate OPCASH : 
zzzz OverheadsInterestsionNetcommissOPCASH −+=                                   (3.2.1). 
Net commissions include payments received from partner retailers and those 
made to the sales force per closed deal. It also includes commissions from 
insurance payments made by customers. Contractual and/or additional interests 
because of arrears are charged to customers.  
 
Given the level of detail of the information received from the Company, fixed 
overheads in cash were included in the calculations. These expenses were 
allocated based on the total customers with credit records per month. The 
management team agreed that it was reasonable to assume that all customers 
demand the same effort to be served. Customer service is considered to start 
from the first purchase throughout the collection process. Consequently, 
overheads were allocated from month 1 onwards.  
 
CASHROAz is the relative cash return generated per monetary unit of receivables 
at the end of each month. It measures the monthly productivity of the funds 




OPCASHCASHROA =                                                          (3.2.2), 
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where: 
finalbalancez= Outstanding balance at month z 
This measure scales operational cash flows to account for the investment per 
customer. This was the only asset considered to calculate this measure given that 
the credit programme shares premises with the Utility Company and hence 
specific fixed assets used by the credit programme are not identified as such by 
their information systems.  
 
The two basic measures presented above provide a monthly snapshot that does 
not reflect borrowers’ behaviour throughout the observation period. Four 
measures were obtained from them to reflect borrowers’ behaviour throughout 
time in cumulative (OPCASHcum and CASHROAcum) and average terms 
(OPCASHav and CASHROAav).  
 
3.2.2 Cumulative measures 
The total operational cash flow generated per customer by month t will be 
referred as OPCASHcumt. It quantifies the cumulative operational liquidity per 
customer as time goes on. Various steps were completed to calculate this 
measure, as explained below. 
 
First, the month in which the credit programme was launched was chosen as the 
base period. Apart from OPCASHz for that month, the rest were adjusted by a 
deflation factor to express figures in real terms and relative to the base month:  
zzz dfOPCASHOPCASHdef ×=                                                                     (3.2.3), 
where dfz=monthly deflation factor obtained from the monthly inflation rate. 
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Second, in order to define a single starting point for the observation period, 
monthly deflated figures of each y cohort were discounted during y periods 
using r, a real discount rate. This discounted measure accounts for the time 
value of money and is useful to tackle with customers joining the sample in 
different cohorts: 
y
zt rOPCASHdefOPCASHdisc )1/( += ; t Є [1, 30]                                               (3.2.4).   
Finally, the total (i.e.: cumulative) operational cash flow was obtained by 









)()1(                                                      (3.2.5); 
The monthly cumulative return per customer was then obtained by scaling 




OPCASHcumCASHROAcum =                                  (3.2.6), 
where  finalbalancedeft= deflated and discounted final balance at time t. 
 
CASHROAcumt is the cumulative operational cash flow until month t, relative to 
the outstanding balance at month t. The outstanding balance at month t was 
used instead of average balances to properly reflect the cumulative nature of 
cash flows and the updated book value of receivables as time went on. This 
measure can be interpreted as the productivity per customer in terms of the 
cumulative cash flow generated until month t, given that by that month, funds 
were still invested in receivables. This is a similar rationale to that adopted for 
ROE, ROTA, Cash ROCE and the portfolio yield, explained in Sections 1.2.2.1 
and 1.2.2.2.  
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Alternatively, it can be interpreted in a similar way to the operating cash flow 
ratio explained in Section 1.2.2.2. By time t, the outstanding balance is an asset 
for the Company but a liability for the customer. Consequently, this ratio is the 
number of times that the cumulative operational cash flow covers the 
outstanding receivables per customer. It is the coverage against default if the 
Company discontinues operations at time t. 
 
3.2.3 Average measures 
Average measures are a natural alternative to benchmark results from 
cumulative measures per customer. They are usually easy to interpret and are 
stable throughout time. They are also useful to compare results from longer and 
shorter observation periods, which in the case of cumulative figures, increase 
throughout time. Average measures could smooth extreme values as time goes 
on, though. 
 
OPCASHav and CASHROAav (average cash flows and returns, respectively) 









=                                              (3.2.7),  
where X= OPCASHdisc or CASHROA. 
 
Given that in the scoring context it is acceptable to use the term “profit” 
regardless of the fact that either profits or cash flows are used (Stepanova and 
Thomas 2001; Andreeva et al., 2007; Finlay 2008; Banasik and Crook 2009; Ma et 
al., 2009; Finlay 2010), OPCASHcumt and OPCASHavt will be referred from here 
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onwards as the “cumulative profits” and “average profits”, respectively. 
Likewise, the terms: “cumulative returns” and “average returns” will be used to 
refer to CASHROAcumt and CASHROAavt, respectively. This does not change the 
interpretation of these measures, which are completely cash-based. 
 
3.3 Direct vs. Indirect predictive approaches 
3.3.1 Suggested approach 
Direct and indirect approaches are suggested to predict monetary and relative 
profit measures.  
 
Under the direct approach, profit measures are regressed on application and 
first purchase variables from borrowers through OLS.  This is the usual practice 
in profit scoring. Figure 3.3.1 shows the suggested prediction scheme.  
 





Regarding the indirect approach, it is important to note that the term “indirect” 
actually refers to “intermediate” models in which the probabilities of default 
and of repurchase are first predicted by using application and first purchase 
variables through logistic regression. Predicted values of such intermediate 
variables are then used to predict profit measures through OLS. Figure 3.3.2 
shows the suggested prediction scheme. A novel feature of the suggested 
indirect approach is that the probabilities of default and of repurchase in the 
short and long term (t=12 and 30, respectively) can be used to predict monetary 






and relative measures to account for the effect of changing behaviour of 
customers over time. This has not been done before for revolving credit. 
 







t=12 or 30 
 
On the other hand, instead of predicting these probabilities for specific segments 
(e.g.: based on default) to calculate an expected profit value (Finlay, 2010), they 
are used as predictors of profit measures for the complete sample (Andreeva et 
al., 2007). This approach does not require the definition of segments in a unique 
way. A single indirect model can be then compared with other direct generic 
models. 
 
Finally, Figure 3.3.3 shows schematically the joint use of direct scorecards and 
default (repurchase) scorecards. The models used to predict probabilities of 
default and repurchase could be further used to understand results from direct 
models via the joint analysis of significant variables in both direct and default 
(repurchase) models. This could provide additional insight to the profit score 
obtained per customer. As expected, this requires a predictor to be significant in 
both direct scorecards and default (repurchase) models.   
 
 






Pr (repurchaset) Logistic 
regression 
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t=12 or 30 
 
3.4 Time-to-profit 
In the previous sections, scores were based on profits or returns.  An alternative 
approach for profit scoring purposes is to rank customers according to their 
probability of experiencing a profit-related event clearly defined within time 
period t: 
 
Pr (CASHROAcumt ≥ 1) ≈ Pr (OPCASHcumt ≥ Final balancedeft)                        (3.4.1). 
 
The probability of reaching the event shown in (3.4.1) implies that a customer is 
profitable (i.e.: he/she has exceeded the threshold) defined in a microlending 
context (Sinha, 2011). This can be defined as the probability that a customer 
breaks even (i.e.: cumulative profits completely cover the outstanding balance; 
the customer is completely covered against default). In the event of future 
default, the outstanding debt is already covered by cumulative profits. 
 
It is important to note that a ROA-based measure (return on assets) is suggested 
instead of ROI (return on initial investment) as the initial investment can change 








throughout time given the revolving nature of the product under analysis. ROI 
would be more convenient in a fixed loan context.  An advantage of using 
CASHROAcumt is that when the event occurs, the initial investment is already 
covered, together with any other outstanding charges. 
 
The suggested threshold takes into account the high risk associated with 
customers excluded from traditional financial services. This is a more 
conservative standpoint than that taken to define goods (i.e.: those that exceeded 
the natural threshold of profits=0) in a previous study (Finlay, 2008). The event 
shown in (3.4.1) not only scales monetary profits by the outstanding balance 
through a return measure; it also redefines good customers as those that are 
completely covered against default, with returns of at least 1. As explained 
below, such event can be used to design application scorecards or for investment 
planning objectives. 
 
3.4.1 Time-to-profit application scorecards 
Time-to-profit is defined as the time required for a customer to be covered 
against default. It makes sense to use a survival model to predict the probability 
that a customer is covered against default and use this as a score for credit 
granting purposes. In contrast with a binary model, survival techniques are 
useful to produce time-to-profit application scorecards, based on when a 
customer will be covered against default rather than if the event will occur at all. 
This is a similar rationale to that presented by Banasik et al. (1999) for default 
purposes.  
 
Knowing when a customer reaches the event can be useful to identify customers 
that require less time than others to be covered against default. This is 
particularly important in high risk credit programmes as the one under analysis 
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if the objective is to recover the initial investment as soon as possible. 
Application scorecards can be designed for such purpose. These scorecards 
should be assessed in terms of classification accuracy and impact on portfolio 
profits (returns). The former is consistent with usually implemented practices in 
credit scoring; goods and bads are clearly defined. The latter aims to improve 
portfolio returns through the use of application scorecards; this is a benchmark 
to compare results of time-to-profit scorecards with those obtained when using 
an OLS model.  
 
3.4.2 Time-to-profit prediction for investment plan ning objectives 
When cumulative profits cover the outstanding balance the initial investment 
(i.e.: principal, initial loan resulting from first purchase) has already been 
recovered via the payment of instalments and the cumulative cash flows 
generated by customers. This means that the initial working capital already 
invested in these customers via receivables has already been recovered. The 
lending institution has already received these payments and needs to decide 
how these funds will be allocated. It would not make sense to hold cash flows 
generated by these customers just in case they default and hence incur in 
opportunity costs. This rationale is based on managing efficiently the liquidity 
generated by customers of the credit programme. 
 
Time-to-profit could be used to identify the minimum point in time in which 
existing customers should be contacted to make further purchases. This builds 
on previous studies related to time-to-repurchase models (Andreeva et al, 2005). 
In contrast, time-to-profit could be useful to identify internal funding growth 
opportunities of credit programmes. That is, when is it safe to grant further credit 
to new customers with the profits generated by existing customers? Given the 
inclusive lending nature of the credit programme under analysis, it makes sense 
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to adopt this stance. If more customers are served, the impact of the credit 
programme improves and more customers could benefit from it.  
 
Therefore, predicting time-to-profit could be useful for lending institutions to 
plan the expansion of the credit programme (the monetary value of the initial 
loan is known at the application time when the first purchase occurs). 
Accordingly, periods where internal or external funding is expected to occur can 
be planned ahead. At the moment, 90% of receivables from the credit 
programme are being funded by bank loans; internal funding opportunities are 
not being identified at a customer level. A time-to-profit model promotes an 
ordered growth strategy and sheds light on particular features of inclusive 
lending programmes as the case under analysis.   
 
Predicting time-to-profit is therefore useful to plan sales campaigns to target 
new customers. Moreover, since the objective of the credit programme is to 
assist customers to purchase products that improve their quality of life, 
accurately predicting time-to-profit makes a difference in social terms.  
 
Models that predict time-to-profit for investment planning objectives should be 
assessed in terms of the mean absolute error (Wooldridge, 2009; Zhang and 
Thomas, 2012) as well as classification errors (in customer and monetary terms). 
This is explained in more detail in Section 4.3.3.3.6.  
 
It is important to note that it would be unrealistic to assume that being covered 
against default leads to potential time savings from bad debt provisions, as 
banking practices require them. Moreover, given the high risk nature of the 
inclusive lending programme under analysis, it is more likely that lending 
institutions are willing to provision against default. Such provisions will 





This chapter presents the qualitative (Section 4.2) and quantitative methods 
(Section 4.3) used in combination to collect and analyse the data in order to 
address the research questions. Qualitative methods provide context to some of 
the results and are useful to explain some of the relationships between variables 
from quantitative models (Bryman, 2012). Qualitative data provides additional 
insights in interpreting profit scores obtained through statistical techniques. This 
is a common practice within microlending institutions, which continue to use 
jointly general market knowledge and statistical scorecards (Schreiner, 2000; Van 
Gool et al., 2009). 
 
4.2 Qualitative methods 
 4.2.1 Data collection 
Qualitative data were collected through interviews as they are useful to gather 
information regarding a person’s values, attitudes (Cohen and Manion, 2000; 
Gray, 2009), which are not captured by quantitative data. 
 
Purposive sampling (Gray, 2009) was used, because the aim was to obtain 
context information of the credit programme under analysis through a 
meaningful comparison with other institutions that offer similar services in the 
Region.  In total, ten managers from various companies that provide financing 
services in the Region were interviewed. Table 4.2.1 outlines the companies 
included in the sample in terms of the industry, a brief description, the acronym 
used per company and informant position. 
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Various reasons justify the chosen sample. Firstly, the manager of the credit 
programme was interviewed to gain a closer insight of the case under analysis. 
Secondly, the direct competitor (i.e.: a credit programme offered by another 
utility Company) and managers from other utility companies were interviewed 
as well given the similarities and close relationship with credit programmes 
such as the one under analysis. Thirdly, managers from traditional commercial 
banks were included in the sample to contrast their practices with those of 
alternative credit programmes. These Companies are major actors at the national 
and local levels. This is particularly important, given the heterogeneity between 
regions in Colombia. 
 
Semi-structured interviews were used to collect the data (Gray, 2009). The 
objectives of the interview were to: 
• Explore the reasons that make customers choose a specific credit supplier. 
• Understand the criteria used by credit suppliers to grant credit or to offer 
additional financing services to customers. 
• Explore the reasons behind default. 
• Understand the policies related to payments and explore the reaction of 
customers towards them. 











Table 4.2.1: Interviewed Companies 
Industry Description Company (Acronym) Informant 
position 





A utility company grants 
credit limits to customers 
with a positive credit 
history. Credit limit can 
only be used to purchase 
specific products or 
services. Customers pay 
monthly instalments 
through the utility bill. 
Competitor (CO) Manager 
Education (ED) Credit 
Manager 














These companies first 
provide the service and 
then customers make 
monthly payments. 
Utility companies may 
finance as well the 
payment of minor 
hardware associated with 
the service. 
























This group includes 
traditional commercial 
banks that offer saving 
products and/or credits. 





4.2.2 Data analysis methods and techniques 
Data was analysed through thematic analysis. This was done in two stages: 
Analysis and interpretation. The analysis phase included inductive and 
deductive categorisation (i.e.: identifying themes based on previous themes and 
others emerging from the interviews), abstraction (defining broader categories) 
and dimensionalisation, which was useful to cross-compare companies. Each 
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category or central theme was then interpreted (Spiggle, 1994). Special emphasis 
was given to the credit programme under analysis.  
 
A first step was transcribing the interviews. Coding was initially done directly 
on printed transcripts and then by using specialised software NVivo. Codes 
were redefined if required as the coding process went on.  This was done to 
guarantee the use of standardised codes for analysis purposes; categories were 
then used to group codes. Companies were compared by using dimensions 
across categories. Further code reclassifications were conducted if required.  
 
4.3 Quantitative methods 
4.3.1 Data preparation 
4.3.1.1 Borrower records 
Various raw files were provided by the lender to build the data set. Each 
borrower was assigned a single ID to facilitate tracking.  
 
A single file containing borrower attributes was provided, as this data was 
collected by the sales force once the first purchase occurred. The lender 
generated monthly files for purchase and payment behaviour from the first time 
that borrowers were included in the accounting books onwards (i.e.: from April 
2007 to November 2010). The first purchase could include more than one 
product; therefore the same ID could have more than one purchase and credit 
record. Multiple records per customer were concatenated and arranged to obtain 
a single longitudinal string per month, per borrower. This facilitated the 
longitudinal tracking of borrowers from the first purchase onwards and 
calculating totalised figures per customer.   
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4.3.1.2 Sociodemographic attributes and purchase ch aracteristics 
Table 4.3.1a shows explanatory variables 1 through 15 which were requested 
from the lender. These variables are sociodemographic attributes and first 
purchase characteristics that are commonly used in default and profit scoring 
models (Andreeva et al., 2005; Andreeva et al., 2007; Finlay 2008; Ma et al., 2009; 
Finlay 2010).  
 
An initial step was to transform existing categories for location and activity into a 
more manageable and stable number of categories for subsequent treatment. 
Borrowers living in the state capital city were classified as “urban” and the rest 
were considered to live in “rural” areas. This was done based on the clear 
differences that exist between urban and rural areas in sociodemographic terms 
in the Colombian region under analysis. More than 100 different types of 
activities were reported in the original data set; the universal industry 
classification defined by the Colombian Government (DANE, 2006) was used to 
reduce categories to a more manageable level. Age in years and years at address 
were obtained from date of birth and months at address, respectively.  
 
A second step was handling missing values and outliers, where applicable.  The 
aim was to preserve all cases instead of deleting them for modelling purposes. A 
“missing” category was created to identify missing values of categorical 
variables (i.e.: studies, job, contract, marital status, type of first product purchased and 
first loan duration).  
 
Given that the data set was entered manually, outliers were identified for age, 
years at address and dependants.  This occurred most likely because of typing 
errors from the sales force at time of the first purchase. Specifically, borrowers 
with more than 12 dependants, younger than 18 years (lending to young people 
is illegal in Colombia) or with years at home exceeding age fell in this category. 
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Months at address had missing values as well. In both cases, values were 
replaced by the mean. This was done to preserve the average performance of 
individuals that is aimed with a scoring model. It is worthy noting that the 
participation of outliers varied between 0 and 1.8% of the total sample; therefore 
this decision should not have a major impact on the models.  
 
Missing values of loan duration accounted for 14% of the total sample. No 
imputation was conducted given its relevance on profits. Accrued and actual 
payments directly depend on this feature and therefore can not be assumed to 
take a mean value. These customers also had missing values in the value of loan. 
Instead of imputing the mean, missing values were replaced for the outstanding 
balance after the first purchase was entered in accounting books. Credit limit 
usage was then calculated as the ratio between value of first loan and approved 
credit limit as it provides a relative comparison among borrowers, regardless of 
their socioeconomic stratum. 
 
4.3.1.3 Borrowers’ repurchase and payment behaviour  variables 
Table 4.3.1b shows the set of interval variables that provided the basic figures to 
calculate cumulative (average) profits and returns. It also includes indicator 
variables of default and repurchase. See variables 16 to 22. 
 
Net sales commission was the only variable with missing values; this is related to 
missing values in some first purchase characteristics. This figure was calculated 
by using the average net sales commission provided by the Company (5%) and 
value of loan.  
 
Default status was defined as three missed consecutive payments. A repurchase 
indicator was activated with each additional purchase. 
Table 4.3.1a: Borrowers’ attributes and first purch ase variables 




% sample Outliers % sample DUMMY VARIABLES
1 ID Categorical Individual ID per customer 0 0.00% N.A. N.A.
2
Location Categorical Urban or rural If customer lives in capital city then 
urban. Otherwise, rural
0 0.00% N.A. N.A.
3
Stratum Categorical Socioeconomic segmentation assigned 
by law to borrowers' address
0 0.00% N.A. N.A.
4 Studies Categorical Education level 2,825 7.95% N.A. N.A.
5 Job Categorical Occupation 929 2.61% N.A. N.A.
6
Activity Categorical Industry Economic activity according to 
colombian standards
0 0.00% N.A. N.A.
7 Contract Categorical Type of contract related with job 29,930 84.24% N.A. N.A.
8 Marital status Categorical Marital status 1,892 5.33% N.A. N.A.
9
Date of birth Interval Age= Date of first purchase- Date 
of birth 
Age in years 0 0.00% 646 1.8%
10
Months at address Interval Years at address=(Months at 
address/12) 
Years at address 2,111 5.94% 75 0.2%
11 Dependants Interval Number of dependants 0 0.00% 15 0.0%
12 Type1 to Type4 Categorical Type of first product purchased 4,936 13.89% 0 0.0%
13
Approved credit limit (in 
COP)
Interval 0 0.00% 0 0.0%
14 Value of loan (in COP) Interval 4,936 13.89% 0 0.0%
15
Loan duration (in months) Categorical Duration of loan taken to purchase first 
product
4,936 13.89% 0 0.0%
Credit limit usage=Value of 
loan/Approved credit limit 
Percentage of the approved credit limit 







Table 4.3.1b: Repurchase and payment behaviour vari ables 




% sample Outliers % sample
16
Net sales commission (in 
COP)
Interval Sales commission paid by retailer 
shops-Sales commission paid to sales 
force
4,936 13.89% 0 0.0%
17 Paid interests (in COP) Interval 0 0.00% 0 0.0%
18
Paid moratory interests (in 
COP)
Interval 0 0.00% 0 0.0%
19
Received insurance net 
commission (in COP)
Interval 0 0.00% 0 0.0%
20
Outstanding balance (in 
COP)
Interval Total outstanding balance including 
principal, interests (contractual and 
moratory) and insurance
0 0.00% 0 0.0%
21
Days at arrears Interval Default=1 if days at arrears ≥ 90    
otherwise, default=0
Defaulters= Customers with at least 
three missed consecutive payments 
0 0.00% 0 0.0%
22
Repurchase indicator Categorical Repurchase=1 if further purchases 
were made during observation period. 
Otherwise, 0.
0 0.00% 0 0.0%
Total payments=Paid interests+Paid 








4.3.1.4 Fixed overheads 
A two-step fixed overhead allocation was conducted. A proportion of central 
overheads from the utility Company were first allocated to the credit 
programme based on the proportion of receivables that it is accountable for (i.e.: 
other credit programme units coexist within the same Company). These 
overheads, together with own fixed overheads of the credit programme, were 
totalised to produce a single figure per year. This value was then allocated per 
month among all active customers. 
Cumulative and average profits and returns were then calculated per customers 
as explained in Chapter 3. 
 
4.3.1.5 Sample considerations 
Figure 3.2.1 shows that 35,565 customers gathered in 15 monthly cohorts. A total 
of 35 frauds were excluded from that sample (i.e.: customers that disappeared 
permanently from the data set without fully paying the outstanding balance). 
Table 4.3.2 is a frequency table per loan duration of the portfolio of loans in the 
data set; 96% of loan durations were 60 months or less. Therefore, 35,530 
customers were observed during t=30 months, as explained in Section 3.2.1 
allowed for tracking the behaviour of profits for at least half of the duration of 











                    Table 4.3.2: Loan duration freq uencies 
                       Loan                             Cumulative     Cumulative                                                      
duration Frequency   Percent     Frequency      Percent                       
ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ                                                      
12         158        0.52           158         0.52                                                       
13           1        0.00           159         0.52                                                        
18         298        0.97           457         1.49                                                        
19           1        0.00           458         1.50                                                        
24        1987        6.49          2445         7.99                                                        
25          67        0.22          2512         8.21                                                        
30         974        3.18          3486        11.39                                                        
31          46        0.15          3532        11.54                                                     
36        4924       16.09          8456        27.64                                                        
37         395        1.29          8851        28.93                                                        
42        1752        5.73         10603        34.66                                                        
43         208        0.68         10811        35.34                                                        
48        1896        6.20         12707        41.53                                                        
49         169        0.55         12876        42.09                                                        
54         204        0.67         13080        42.75                                                   
55          22        0.07         13102        42.83                                                        
60       16223       53.03         29325        95.85                                                        
61        1269        4.15         30594       100.00                                                        
                                                                                                                                       
                     Frequency Missing = 4936     
 
Cumulative and average profits and returns were then calculated according to 
the deflating/discounting/compounding rationale explained in Chapter 3. This 
allows all customers to start at the same point of time (i.e.: month in which the 
credit programme was launched). 
 
An additional consideration was to test the hypothesis that mean profits and 
returns (in cumulative and average terms) of the two most distant cohorts (i.e.: 1 
and 15) at t=30 were equal. It was assumed that if any, major differences 
between individuals would happen between these cohorts: 
 
Ho: μ1- μ15 = 0                                                                                                          (4.3.1); 
 
Ha: μ1- μ15 ≠ 0                                                                                                          (4.3.2). 
 
Table 4.3.3 shows the p-values obtained per hypothesis test. It can be inferred at 
a 5% significance level that mean cumulative and average profits and returns of 
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cohorts 1 and 15 are not different in the long term. Consequently, 35,530 
customers from cohorts 1 through 15 were gathered in a single cohort for 
subsequent analyses.  
 







4.3.2 Coarse classification 
Explanatory variables were coarse-classified using dummy coding (Anderson, 
2007) before producing predictive models. Separate bins were initially created 
per categorical variable and per decile of interval variables. The overall criterion 
was that at least 5% of the observations should be included per bin in order to 
produce stable results (Thomas, 2009). Categories of interval variables were 
collapsed based on their inherent order; categorical variables were collapsed 
according to general knowledge of the market. Table 4.3.4 shows the 
explanatory variables, the reference category and dummy variables created per 
explanatory variable.  
 
This binning alternative was preferred to using weights of evidence (WOE) as it 
provided single categories that could be used for direct and indirect models, 
regardless of default and repurchase classes. It is also useful to represent non-
linear relationships and to provide appropriate decision making for high 
volume portfolios (Anderson, 2007).  
 
Table 4.3.4: Dummy coding, explanatory variables 
 
AGE 18<Age ≤ 35 years 
dumAGE3: 35< Age ≤ 43.5 years                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
dumAGE4: 43.5< Age ≤ 52 years                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
dumAGE5: 52< Age ≤ 60.5 years                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
dumAGE6: 60.5< Age ≤ 69 years                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
dumAGE7: 69< Age ≤ 103 years   
LOCATION rural (different to the capital city) dumCITUR : urban (capital city)
CONTRACT missing, other, or not applicable dumCONTCON : Any type of contract (permanent, temporary)
JOB employed
dumJOBRET : retired                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
dumJOBSELF: self-employed                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
dumJOBNOIN : housewife, student, unemployed, missing
MARITAL STATUS single
dumMARMAR : married                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
dumMARCOH :  cohabitators
dumMARWID :  widow(er)
dumMARDIV: divorced
dumMARMIS: missing
STRATUM stratum 1 (poor segments) dumSTRA35: stratum>1
EDUCATION missing
dumSTUPRI :   primary                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
dumSTUSEC:   secondary                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
dumSTUCOL : college
dumSTUHIG:   higher





Table 4.3.4: Dummy coding, explanatory variables 
DURATION FIRST LOAN durloan ≤ 31 months
dumLOAN3637: duration=36 or 37 months                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
dumLOAN4243: duration=42 or 43 months                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
dumLOAN4855: 48≤ duration ≤55 months                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
dumLOAN6061: duration=60 or 61 months                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
dumLOANMIS : missing loan duration 
YEARS AT ADDRESS YAH ≤ 8.5 years
dumYAH2 :    8.5< YAH ≤ 18 years                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
dumYAH3 :  18< YAH≤ 27.5 years                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
dumYAH4 :  27.5< YAH ≤ 37 years                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
dumYAH510 :  37< YAH ≤ 94 years      
DEPENDANTS No dependants
dumDEP1  : 1 dependants                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
dumDEP2  : 2 dependants                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
dumDEP3  : 3 dependants                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
dumDEP4  : 4 dependants                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
dumDEP510  : 5 or more dependants   
CREDIT LIMIT USAGE Low
dumLOANPR2     :  intermediate                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
dumLOANPR310 :  high
ACTIVITY Services
dumactNA       : Not applicable                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
dumactOTH     : Other industries                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
dumactPROD  : Manufacturing
FIRST PRODUCT PURCHASED traditional products 
dumprod1  : Non-traditional category 1                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
dumprod2  : Non-traditional category 2                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
dumprod3  : Non-traditional category 3                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
VARIABLE REFERENCE CATEGORY DUMMY VARIABLES
 
 
4.3.3 Data analysis methods and techniques 
4.3.3.1 Profit and return measures 
The first part of this section presents the exploratory framework to justify the 
use of profit (return) measures versus the traditional default criterion to rank 
customers. Various methods are then presented to assess the impact of using 
profit and return measures at customer and portfolio levels. 
 
4.3.3.1.1 Profit and return measures versus default  criterion 
4.3.3.1.1.1 Characterization of portfolio results 
Prior to characterising portfolio profits and returns, borrowers’ profits and 
returns were ranked in ascending order. Cumulative portfolio measures were 
then produced as customers joined the sample according to their ranks. This was 






                                                                            (4.3.3),  
where:  
 
Ci,t = OPCASHcum or OPCASHav for borrower i at t=12, 24 or 30;  
n= total number of customers; 
ni= total customers until customer i; 





wRreturnPortfolio i ,1 , ×=∑ =                                                                         (4.3.4),  
where: 













Finalbalancedefi,t= deflated and discounted final balance of customer i at time t. 
A weighed portfolio return was preferred to a crude average return to reflect the 
contribution of each borrower to portfolio results. 
 
A first approach used to characterise portfolio profits and returns of the 
complete sample, defaulters and non-defaulters was to calculate and analyse 
two ratios suggested in the marketing literature: the Stobachoff coefficient (STC) 
and vulnerability factor (VF) (Storbacka, 1995; Helgesen, 2007).   
 
STC quantifies the dependence of portfolio results on a group of customers. Low 
STC values imply less dependence (i.e.: close to 0). Figure 4.3.1 depicts portfolio 






=                                                                                              (4.3.5); 
(A+B) was calculated through the graphical (rectangle) method to approximate 
the area under a curve.  The height of each rectangle corresponds to portfolio 
profits (returns) until customer i. Each rectangle has unitary width as the 








)(               (4.3.6), 
where: 
 
Yi= Portfolio profits or weighed returns  
B was calculated using the triangle area formula: 
2
nYnB
×=                                                                                                                 (4.3.7);  






















                                                (4.3.8). 
 
On the other hand, VF measures loss subsidisation between segments of 










VF                                                               (4.3.9).  
 
STC and VF are used for risk assessment purposes in terms of profit dependence 
and to make various decisions related to specific segments (Van Raaij, 2005; 
Helgesen, 2007). They are useful to shed light on the profitability features of 
defaulters and non-defaulters. 
 










4.3.3.1.1.2 Opportunity cost analysis 
A second approach to highlight the additional information profit scoring can 
provide was to conduct an opportunity cost analysis. This is a common practice 




ni (cumulative customers) 
 




An impact ratio was used to compare the mean profits (returns) from profitable 
defaulters with mean losses from unprofitable non-defaulters. It is useful to 
assess the relative impact of profitable defaulters versus unprofitable non-
defaulters. Defaulters were identified as customers that were at arrears during at 





IMPACT =                                                                                              (4.3.10),  
where: 
dX = Mean profits (returns) of defaulters; 
ndY = Mean losses (returns) of non-defaulters at 
t=12, 24 and 30 months. 
 
This measure was calculated for cumulative and average measures.  
 
4.3.3.1.2 Profit versus return measures 
Prior to producing profit and return scores through predictive models, various 
methods were used to explore the effect of using either profits or returns to rank 
customers. Spearman correlations and Chi Square tests were used at a customer 
level. Acceptance rate and opportunity cost analyses were conducted at a 
portfolio level. 
 
4.3.3.1.2.1 Ranks analysis 
A closer comparison between profit and return measures for credit scoring 
purposes was conducted through the use of customer ranks according to these 
measures. The aim was to verify whether a borrower’s rank changed depending 
on what measure was used. Relative attractiveness of a borrower to the lender 
depends on the rank provided by profits (returns). 
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Spearman’s rank-order correlation test was used to compare different scores 
obtained per customer. A perfect correlation between scores indicates that no 
additional value is provided by an alternative scorecard versus the original one 
(Anderson, 2007). Results obtained from this measure were complemented with 
those from the Chi Square Test (Freund, 1992; Freedman and Pisani, 1998) of 
scores’ independence: 
Ho: Scorex and Scorey are independent         








This test was applied to rank decile bands per month.  
4.3.3.1.2.2 Acceptance rate analysis 
The impact of using profit (return) ranks on portfolio results was also assessed 
at various acceptance rates (between 50 and 95). Customers were initially ranked 
according to cumulative or average profits (returns). Then it was assumed that 
customers up to each acceptance rate were accepted for credit. Portfolio profits 
and returns were calculated according to (4.3.3) and (4.3.4), respectively for 
“accepted” customers. This was useful to analyse the behaviour of portfolio 
measures across a range of acceptance rates. 
 
4.3.3.1.2.3 Opportunity cost analysis 
Finally, an opportunity cost analysis was used to quantify the marginal effect of 
using profit or return measures on portfolio results at t=12, 24 and 30 months. 
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This was done solely to choose between cumulative and average measures. A 
predefined acceptance rate defined n (i.e.: cumulative accepted customers). 
Let: 
c=cumulative (OPCASHcum) or average (OPCASHav) profits 
C= Portfolio profits 
r=cumulative (CASHROAcum) or average (CASHROAav) returns                                             
R= Portfolio returns 













 is the profit of customer i at time t if cumulative or average profits are used 
for credit granting purposes. 
 
Alternatively, if customers were ranked according to their returns, portfolio 













 is the profit of customer i at time t if cumulative or average returns are used 
instead of profits. 
Additional (foregone) portfolio profits may result from ranking customers based 
on profits instead of returns: 
rctC CCOC −=,                                                              (4.3.14). 
 

















           (4.3.16),  
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tititi cefinalbalancefinalbalanw . 
 
Using profits instead of returns may lead to additional (foregone) portfolio 
returns: 
tcrctR cefinalbalanRROC ,, )( ×−=                                                                        (4.3.17),  
where: 
finalbalancec,t is the outstanding debt of customers accepted according to profits. 
This product was calculated to obtain monetary results comparable to (4.3.14). 
 
In total, if profits are used instead of returns to rank customers, the opportunity 
cost would be: 
tRtCt OCOCOC ,, +=                                                                                   (4.3.18);  
if OC C,t > OC R,t then OCt = additional portfolio profits                                (4.3.18a); 
If OC C,t < OC R,t then OCt = foregone  portfolio coverage against default  (4.3.18b); 
otherwise, it would not make a difference to use either profits or returns to rank 
customers. This analysis can be done for different acceptance rates and can be 
useful to choose between cumulative and average measures. 
 
4.3.3.2 Predictive methods  
This section first presents the effective data set used to produce direct and 
indirect models. This descriptive analysis was used to define training and 
holdout samples. Modelling techniques used to predict the probabilities of 
default at t=12, 30 and of repurchase in t=12, 30 are then presented. Modelling 
techniques used to produce direct and indirect profit and return scorecards are 
then explained.  
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4.3.3.2.1 Effective data set 
As explained in Section 4.3.1.5, the original dataset consisted of 35,530 
customers. In total, 4% of the customers were missing at t=12, 24 or 30 months; 
these were not considered for modelling purposes.  Intuitively, this was based 
on the fact that the objective of the models is to predict cumulative profits 
(returns) of customers that had an ongoing relationship with the lender, during 
the observation period. This was preferred to compounding figures from the last 
month a customer was in the sample to t=30 to calculate OPCASHcum30 and 
CASHROAcum30,  and therefore assuming that these customers remained in the 
data set without generating additional profits during the missing months. 
Another complication would have been the treatment of fixed overheads during 
missing periods; it would not make sense to charge them to these customers as 
they were “inactive”. As of CASHROAcum30, further assumptions would have 
to be made regarding the outstanding balance during the rest of the 
observation period. This would not correspond to reality as those customers 
did not have an outstanding balance during that period and hence it would 
not be possible to calculate cumulative returns at t=30.  
 
The aim was to produce the best possible model through OLS without 
making any assumptions regarding cumulative profits of missing 
observations. Excluding missing customers allowed as well the comparison 
of indirect models with probabilities of default and repurchase in the short 
and long term: t=12 and t=30, respectively. The dataset after exclusions 
consisted of 33,964 customers split randomly as 80/20 to configure training1 
and holdout1 samples, as shown on Table 4.3.5. 
 
Table 4.3.5: Training 1 and Holdout 1 sample sizes 
 
Training 1 Holdout 1 Total
27,157 6,807 33,964n  
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Prior to the modelling phase, descriptive measures of location and dispersion 
(Freedman and Pisani, 1998; Der and Everitt, 2009) and graphs were used to 
analyse the behaviour of OPCASHcum30 and CASHROAcum30 per customer. This 
provided a starting point to gain a better insight of the measures to predict and 
hence to define the effective data set to be used for modelling purposes. 
 
Table 4.3.6 includes the following descriptive statistics for each measure in 
training1 (label=1) and holdout1 (label=0) samples: number of observations, 
standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness and kurtosis. Standard 
deviations, minimum and maximum values are relative to the mean value of 
each measure due to confidentiality reasons. 
 
Minimum and maximum values in Table 4.3.6 show that both measures have 
extreme observations that result in high values of standard deviation and 
skewness in training1 (label=1) and holdout1 (label=0) samples.  Some customers 
are substantially more profitable than the rest; this results in heavy tails in the 
distributions of both measures. Loss makers are unusual but still present. 
Neither of the two measures follows a normal distribution.  
 
Figures 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 are box plots of OPCASHcum30 and CASHROAcum30, 
respectively. Values are not displayed for confidentiality reasons. It is evident 
that extreme values affect more substantially the distribution of 
CASHROAcum30; they are more dispersed and distant from the mean. Thirty 
(seven) customers from training1 (holdout1) sample had an outstanding balance 
less than £1.3 (£1). These values are not significant in monetary terms. They may 
result from the payment of instalments greater than those agreed or because of 
system errors. Given the responsiveness of relative measures to small values in 
the denominator, losses or profits can be magnified and hence affect the 
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distributions. Other outliers may arise from less critical cases that still affect the 
distributions of profits and returns.  
 
Table 4.3.6: Descriptive statistics, training 1 and holdout 1 samples 
LABEL N VARIABLE STD DEV MIN MAX SKEWNESS KURTOSIS
OPCASHCUM 30  0.39 -0.10 9.11 2.42 35.99
CASHROACUM 30 12.71 -1.46 1,024.44 77.16 6,181.44
OPCASHCUM 30  0.38 -0.20 7.24 1.21 11.41
CASHROACUM 30 59.69 -97.38 7,879.36 110.61 13,299.75
0 6,807
1 27,157  



















0= Holdout1    1= Training1 samples 
 









































Consequently, outliers from each measure were trimmed to visualise better the 
distributions. Initially, values that exceeded 1.5 times the interquartile range 
were considered outliers. This resulted in outliers that account for 5% and 16% 
of the observations for OPCASHcum30 and CASHROAcum30, respectively. The 
proportion is acceptable for the former but not for the latter.  
 
Alternatively, outliers were observations where CASHROAcum30 Є (-∞, -0.5] or 
[1.5, ∞). These are considered extreme outliers by the management team. 
Training1 and holdout1 samples were therefore trimmed by 5% according to 
cumulative profits and returns to configure training2 and holdout2 samples, as 
shown on Table 4.3.7. 
 




Table 4.3.8 includes descriptive statistics for training2 and holdout2 samples. 
Again, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values are relative to the 
mean value of each measure due to confidentiality reasons. As expected, 
training2 and holdout2 samples are less dispersed than training1 and holdout1 
samples, respectively. 
 
Figures 4.3.4 and 4.3.5 depict the distributions of OPCASHcum30 and 
CASHROAcum30, respectively. Values are not displayed for confidentiality 
reasons. OPCASHcum30 (CASHROAcum30) is left (right) skewed. Negative 
(positive) skewness values in Table 4.3.8 confirm this. Furthermore, 
CASHROAcum30 has a greater kurtosis than that of OPCASHcum30. This 
highlights the differences between both measures: More customers may yield 
Training 2 Holdout 2 Total
24,617 6,186 30,803n  
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higher profits whereas this may not be the case in terms of returns due to the 
scaling of profits by the outstanding balance.  
 
Table 4.3.8: Descriptive statistics, training 2 and holdout 2 samples 
LABEL N VARIABLE STD DEV MIN MAX SKEWNESS KURTOSIS
OPCASHCUM 30  0.28 0.21 1.77 -0.37 -0.001
CASHROACUM 30 0.32 0.11 2.01 0.71 1.19
OPCASHCUM 30  0.28 0.21 1.77 -0.39 0.02
CASHROACUM 30 0.33 0.09 2.01 0.66 1.08
0 6,186
1 24,617  
0= Holdout2    1= Training2   samples 
 



















0= Holdout2    1= Training2  samples 
 




















Finally, Figures 4.3.6 and 4.3.7 display the joint behaviour of OPCASHcum30 and 
CASHROAcum30 for training2 and holdout2 samples, respectively. Values are not 
displayed for confidentiality reasons. The plots suggest that in general, as 
cumulative profits increase, cumulative returns increase as well. However, the 
relationship is not linear as different customers with the same profits (returns) 
may have different returns (profits). This suggests that using return measures to 
rank customers can offer additional insight to that offered by profits. This 
justifies the separate modelling of each measure for scoring purposes. 
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4.3.3.2.2 Probabilities of default and repurchase  
Probabilities of default and repurchase were predicted from borrowers’ 
attributes in training1 sample; models were tested in holdout1 sample. A logit 









=                                                      (4.3.19),  
 
where:  
Yi = Default at t=12, 30; repurchase in t=12, 30;  
βm=1 to k  = Coefficients of significant attributes at a 1% significance level, estimated 
through the maximum likelihood method with a stepwise variable selection 
software; 
xim=1 to k  = Actual attributes of borrower i.  
 
A maximum variance inflation factor VIF of 5 was taken as a threshold to avoid 










=             (4.3.20);  
2
jR represents the coefficient of multiple determination resulting from regressing 
each attribute on the remaining (k-1) attributes. This was done to better identify 
the effects of each significant attribute on the predicted variable, as other 
unobserved variables may be affecting results. Furthermore, high 
multicollinearity leads to regression coefficients that lack precision (i.e.: their 
variance is artificially inflated). 
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Results were interpreted through the odds ratio, which quantifies how much 
more likely the event is to occur, when the attribute takes values different to the 










XX βϕ ==                                                                                  (4.3.21). 
 
This method is widely used in the banking industry and academia (Hand and 
Henley, 1997; Baesens et al., 2003; Anderson, 2007). Discrimination accuracy is 
tested through the area under the ROC curve (AUC), which compares (1-
specificity) (i.e.: false positive rate) against sensitivity (i.e.: true positive rate) for 
different cut-offs. Such area should be greater than 50% to perform better than a 
random guess (Anderson, 2007). 
 
4.3.3.2.3 Direct methods 
Prior to modelling profits and returns, extreme outliers discussed in Section 
4.3.3.2.1 had to be dealt with. Winsorizing or trimming (Barnett and Lewis 1994) 
those observations were initial alternatives. This was avoided, as the former 
requires assuming specific values for extreme observations, whereas the latter 
ignores cases that are still feasible to occur. Another option was using the 
natural logarithm of returns; this would require setting an arbitrary minimum 
value close to zero for negative returns and consequently different significant 
positions could be obtained, affecting the overall model.  
 
The approach taken was to exclude from training1 sample observations with 
outliers in either OPCASHcum30 or CASHROAcum30. These observations were 
then included in holdout1 sample to use original values and test models under 
extreme conditions. Consequently, models were developed using training2 
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sample; holdout3 sample was used to test such models. Table 4.3.9 shows sample 
sizes. 
 




A multiple linear regression was used to produce direct profit (return) scores, ,iγ  








βγ                                                                                                     (4.3.22), 
 
where:  
βn=1 to k  = Coefficients of significant attributes at a 1% significance level, estimated 
through OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) with a stepwise variable selection. 
Attributes with a VIF >5 were excluded from the models to avoid 
multicollinearity issues; 
xin=1 to k  = Application attributes of borrower i.  
 
This method has been used in previous studies (Andreeva et al., 2007; Finlay, 
2008; Finlay, 2010). No intercept was included in the models (Panik, 2009), as no 
profits or losses are generated by customers that have not taken loans through 
the credit programme. Fixed overheads can only be charged to existing 
customers; likewise, there are no a priori profits or returns when attributes=0. 
Coefficients are interpreted as the increase (decrease) in average profits or 
returns, compared with the reference group. 
 
Results from OLS regression can not be assessed in terms of classification 
accuracy, given that the predicted measure is continuous by definition (i.e.: 
Training 2 Holdout 3 Total
24,617 9,347 33,964n  
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profits or returns). An error measure similar to the mean absolute error (MAE) 














 | Y| iY
rateError                                                                            (4.3.23), 
 
where: 
Yi ( iŶ ) = actual (predicted) score for customer i. 
FBdef = Portfolio deflated and discounted outstanding balance at t=30. 
This overall measure compares the accuracy of prediction in relative terms to 
portfolio receivables, which is useful to scale and compare results in training 
and holdout samples. Ideally this measure should be 0% (i.e.: predicted and 
actual values coincide). In the case of CASHROAcum30, prior to calculating the 
error rate, absolute differences in returns were multiplied by the outstanding 
balance per customer. This is consistent with error rate calculations of 
OPCASHcum30. 
 
4.3.3.2.4 Indirect methods 
Predicted probabilities of default and repurchase were used as predictors to 






iijji exβ                                                                                                 (4.3.24),  
where: 
βj= Coefficients of significant attributes at a 1% significance level, estimated 
through OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) with a stepwise variable selection; 
xi1= Pr (default at t=12 or t=30) and xi2=Pr (repurchase in t=12 or t=30). Training2 
and holdout3 samples were used to develop and test indirect models 
respectively, in order to be consistent with the data set used to produce direct 
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models. The predictive accuracy of indirect models was assessed through the 
error rate according to (4.3.23). 
 
4.3.3.2.5 Scorecard comparison 
Since predicted values should be considered scores (Anderson, 2007) instead of 
predicted profits or returns, two additional criteria were used to compare 
models. First, the usefulness of models was assessed according to their impact 
on portfolio results. Portfolio profits and returns resulting from direct and 
indirect scorecards were compared for different acceptance rates, as explained in 
Section 4.3.3.1.2.2. This is the usual assessment criterion in profit scoring 
(Andreeva et al., 2007; Finlay 2008; Finlay 2010). Second, the best performing 
profit (return) model was assessed in terms of its marginal effect on portfolio 
profits (returns), per acceptance rate. 
 
4.3.3.3 Time-to-profit 
Time-to-profit was previously defined in Section 3.4 as the moment when a 
customer is totally covered against default. This is the event of interest, before 
clearing the outstanding balance; once the loan is paid off, it is pointless to 
analyse coverage against default.  Since the response variable is “time to”, this 
section presents various considerations regarding the survival techniques that 
were used for descriptive and predictive purposes (Hosmer et al., 2008). 
 
4.3.3.3.1 Discrete time 
Even though payments can occur at any time during each month, the event can 
only be recorded at the end of the month. This is because accounting records 
from paid interests and net commissions are produced monthly. Income is 
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matched accordingly with fixed overheads, which require the completion of 
each observation period (i.e.: month). Furthermore, the resulting outstanding 
balance can only be obtained once all the monthly payments have been made. 
These financial accounting considerations define the discrete nature of time-to-
profit, as it can only occur once each month has been completed and not at any 
point of time (i.e.: continuous case). This is a similar situation to that presented 
in a previous study where time was discrete due to the record of data from 
mortgage products on a monthly basis (Mc Donald et al., 2010). 
 
4.3.3.3.2 Sampling and time-to-first event 
All 35,530 customers were taken regardless if customers had left the sample at 
t=12, 24 and 30 because survival models allow for censoring.  Table 4.3.10 shows 
the composition of the total sample of customers in terms of the frequency and 
cumulative frequency (number of customers and as a percentage of the total 
sample) of customers which were covered or not against default during the 
observation period. Only the first event was considered because 77% of the 
customers had not experienced it by t=30 mostly because they took longer term 
loans (between 55 and 60 months). Furthermore, given the cumulative nature of 
CASHROAcumt, some customers could experience the event during various 
consecutive months. This is mostly a consequence of magnified ratios resulting 
from both a decreasing outstanding balance and marginally increasing 
cumulative profits, rather than as a result of further purchases. Customers were 












0=not covered against default by t=30; 1, otherwise. 
 
An 80/20 split in the complete data set was used to obtain training3 and holdout4 
samples, as shown in Table 4.3.11. 
 
 





4.3.3.3.3 Descriptive analysis 
A descriptive analysis was completed to gain an initial understanding of the 
event in terms of survivor and hazard functions (Jenkins, 2005; Hosmer et al., 
2008; Allison, 2010).  
 
T is the random variable that represents the event time. The survivor function, S 
(t), is defined as the probability of not being covered against default beyond t. If 
T is a continuous variable, then: 
 
)(1)Pr()( tFtTtS −=>=            (4.3.25), 
where: 
F(t) = Pr (T≤ t) is the cumulative distribution function of T. 
Training 3 Holdout 4 Total






0 27,495 77% 27,495 77%
1 8,035 23% 35,530 100%  
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On the other hand, the hazard function for continuous survival data is defined 










          (4.3.26). 
 
The life-table method was used to estimate survivor and hazard functions in 
order to gain an initial understanding of the data set. This method is useful for 
large data sets and when measures of event times are crude. Under this method, 
event times are grouped into intervals rather than presenting results per 
individual. It is assumed that censored cases occur at the midpoint of the 
interval (Allison, 2010).  
 
For interval i with starting time ti and qi conditional failure probability, then the 















q j =            (4.3.28). 
 
On the other hand, the estimate of the hazard function evaluated at the midpoint 

















th            (4.3.29), 
 
where: 
tim= midpoint of interval i 
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di= number of events 
bi= width of interval i 
ni= number of customers still at risk at the beginning of interval i 
wi= number of censored cases within interval i (Allison, 2010). 
 
4.3.3.3.4 Time-to-profit application scorecards 
The same covariates and coarse classifications used to produce profit and return 
scores were used to generate time-to-profit scorecards. Given the discrete nature 
of the event under analysis, the discrete version of semi parametric survival 
regression (Cox, 1972) was accordingly used to predict Pr (CASHROACUMt ≥ 1).  
This was preferred to choose an approximation method from the continuous to 
the discrete case. 
 
An initial step was to generate an observation per customer per month until 
censoring (Allison, 1982; Allison, 2010). Thus training3 and holdout4 samples 
resulted in 824,994 and 206,418 customer-months, respectively.  
 
Given that there were no time dependant covariates, each observation generated 
per customer had the same attributes at the time of the first purchase. The 
following logistic regression model was used for modelling purposes:  
 
Log [Pit/ (1-Pit)] = αt + ikkii xxx βββ +++ ...2211                                                                                     ( 4.3.30),  
 
where: 
Pit = Conditional probability that customer i is covered against default at time t 
given that this has not occurred in the previous month.  
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βs=1 to k = Coefficients of significant covariates at a 1% significance level, estimated 
through the maximum likelihood method by using a stepwise procedure. Again, 
a maximum VIF of 5 was defined to avoid multicollinearity issues. 
xis=1 to k  = Application attributes of borrower i.  
 
Different alternatives to include the effect of time on hazard αt were explored: 
 
• Constant hazard 
This model assumes that time does not have an effect on the hazard of 
occurrence of the event: 
αt  = α                                                                          ( 4.3.31). 
Intuitively, this rationale does not correspond to reality, as it is clear that as time 
goes on, the hazard of coverage against default either increases or decreases; it is 
not expected to remain constant throughout the observation period. This 
alternative was explored as a starting point as it is the most parsimonious option 
for modelling purposes. Additionally, it was useful to validate if time has an 
effect on the hazard of event through the model’s fit when compared against 
those that account for the effect of time. 
 
• Time dependent hazard  
The following alternatives account for the effect of time on hazard in different 
ways: 
 
αt = α + β1t                                                                                                             (4.3.32); 
this model assumes that the hazard changes at a constant rate β1. It is the most 
basic model to include the effect of time directly. 
 
αt = α + β1t + β2t2                                                                                                                                                       (4.3.33) and 
αt = α + β1t + β2t2 + β3t3                                                                                                                                                 (4.3.34) ; 
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the quadratic and cubic models assume that the hazard changes at rates: 
β1 + 2β2t   and β1 + 2β2t + 3β3t2 , respectively. The aim was to explore other 
alternatives to the shape of the hazard function throughout time. 
 
αt = α + β1ln(t)                                                                                                      (4.3.35) ; 
this alternative aims to smooth the effect of time in the long term by using its 
logarithmic transformation.  
 
Two final alternatives that used categorical (dummy variables for (n-1) months 
or quarters) were included, following the rationale of using solely dummy 
variables, in line with that used to produce profit and return scores: 
αt = α + βt                                                                                            (4.3.36), 
where:  t=1 to 29 months or t=1 to 9 quarters. 
 
Various methods were used to compare models. Models were assessed in terms 
of their fit and considering multicollinearity issues. The former was assessed 
according to Akaike’s information criterion (AIC): 
 
kLAIC 2log2 +−=             (4.3.37), 
where: 
log L= log-likelihood 
k= number of estimated parameters (Panik, 2009).  
The latter was assessed according to a model’s variance inflation factor (VIF), as 
shown in (4.3.20). 
 
The predictive accuracy of models was assessed in terms of their ability to 
discriminate goods from bads, mainly through the AUC. The H measure was 
also calculated to compare models using a different criterion. Compared with 
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AUC, this measure does not depend on the distribution of scores itself. It ranges 
from 0 to 1 and large values are preferred (Hand, 2009).  
 
Various approaches were taken to calculate AUC and H measure. Approach 1 
assessed the predictive accuracy at the last month when a customer either was 
covered against default (status=1) or was censored without experiencing such 
event (status=0).  The status of a customer was taken as it was in the original 
data set. Table 4.3.12 shows the number of customers, n, per status for training3 
and holdout4 samples, under approach 1. Predicted probabilities by each model 
at time to event were used to calculate the accuracy measures.  
 




0= customer is not covered against default; 1, otherwise. 
 
Approaches 2a, 2b and 2c assumed that customers stayed in the sample until 
tc=12, 24 and 30 months, respectively. Probabilities of the event at tc were 
predicted accordingly, using each of the models. This was based on the fact that 
at the application time one cannot know when customers will be censored until 
they actually do so.  Regarding the status of a customer, the following criteria 
were applied: 
 
• If status=1 and t>tc, then status at tc =0 (i.e.: the event had not occurred 
until tc) 
• If status=1 and  t≤tc, then status at tc = 1 (terminal state) 
• If status=0 and t≤tc, then status at tc=0 (i.e.: the event never occurred until 
tc) 
SAMPLE n status=0 status=1
TRAINING3 28,424 21,980 6,444
HOLDOUT4 7,106 5,515 1,591  
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Table 4.3.13 shows the number of customers, n, per status for training3 and 
holdout4 samples, under approaches 2a, 2b and 2c. 
 
 
Table 4.3.13: Customers per sample, approach 2  
 












0= customer is not covered against default; 1, otherwise. 
 
Under approach 3, an observation was generated per customer per month until 
they were either covered against default or left the sample; a customer-month 
had status=0 until coverage against default (status=1). Otherwise, status=0 
throughout the observation period. See Table 4.3.14 for details on the 





SAMPLE n status=0 status=1
TRAINING3 28,424 28,402 22
HOLDOUT4 7,106 7,095 11  
SAMPLE n status=0 status=1
TRAINING3 28,424 26,845 1,579
HOLDOUT4 7,106 6,696 410  
SAMPLE n status=0 status=1
TRAINING3 28,424 21,980 6,444
HOLDOUT4 7,106 5,515 1,591  
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0= customer is not covered against default; 1, otherwise. 
 
AUC results were complemented with a hypothesis test of difference between 
ROC curves (De Long et al., 1988) of the chosen model and some alternative 
models that yielded similar graphical results for the hazard function. 
 
Finally, accuracy of prediction of the chosen model was tested per ranks and 
deciles instead of using a sole measure of accuracy. It was calculated as a 
percentage of the customers that actually experienced the event and were 
identified per rank (decile). The majority of these customers should be included 
in top ranks (deciles). This approach has been used previously for discrete 
survival models (Schumway, 2001; Nam et al., 2008). 
 
Accuracy was assessed per rank and decile by calculating the probabilities of 
experiencing the event in t=12, 24 and 30. This assumes that customers survived 
until those points of time since at application time it is uncertain when a 
customer will censor from the sample. The accuracy per rank and decile was 
then calculated as a proportion out of the total customers that actually 
experienced the event at t ≤ 12, 24 and 30. 
 
4.3.3.3.5 Comparison of profit, return and time-to- profit application 
scorecards 
OLS models only considered customers with a continuing relationship with the 
lender at t=12, 24 and 30 months (i.e.: Training2, n=24,617). On the other hand, 
the complete sample of customers was used to develop time-to-profit 
SAMPLE n status=0 status=1
TRAINING3 824,994 818,550 6,444
HOLDOUT4 206,418 204,827 1,591  
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application scorecards (i.e.: Training3=28,424). In order to fairly compare results 
from both techniques, only customers used to develop OLS, those in Training2 
sample, were considered to produce another survival model. Portfolio profits 
and returns were then compared across various acceptance rates, as explained in 
Section 4.3.3.2.5. 
 
4.3.3.3.6 Predicting time-to-profit for investment planning objectives 
Another use of survival models is that they allow predicting time-to-profit, 
which is useful for investment planning purposes as explained in Section 3.4.2.  
Time-to-profit can be obtained through the use of (4.3.30) and one of the hazard 
formulae (4.3.31 to 4.3.36), depending on the chosen model.  It follows from 
(4.3.30) that instead of a single value for time-to-profit, a distribution of months 
when a customer might be covered against default given that this had not 
occurred previously, results from the probability distribution of occurrence of 
such event.  
 
In order to assess the predictive accuracy of the model, a choice was made 
regarding the optimal percentile to minimize the prediction error (Zhang and 













                                               (4.3.39),   
where: 
p=1,…, 100 
)(ˆ MM = predicted (actual) month and 
n = customers that were predicted to experience the event and either 
experienced it or not. 
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In particular: If status=1 then MMerrorp −= ˆ ; if status=0 and 30ˆ >M  then 
0=perror ; if status=0 and 30ˆ ≤M  then Merrorp ˆ31−= ; in this case, M̂ =31 
was taken as a common reference point for all customers, as it is outside of the 
observation period. The optimal percentile was then used to obtain a predicted 
value of time-to-profit in months, per borrower. This value was rounded to 
integer due to the discrete nature of time.    
 
4.3.3.3.6.1 Segmented models 
Intuitively, it made sense to segment borrowers according to loan duration. It is 
clear that there are different types of loan durations ranging from the shortest to 
the longest term: 12 and 61 months, respectively. By definition, the former are 
allowed to roll over faster than the latter in the short term. Given that the 
observation period was 30 months after the first purchase, customers with 
longer term loans still require a longer period of time to be covered against 
default.  
 
A decision tree was used, however, to gain a better insight of the data structure 
of training3 sample. It was useful to identify potential segments arising from 
subpopulations of customers. Customers that were covered against default were 
classified as goods. Figure 4.3.8 is a decision tree based on the event: Pr 
(CASHROAcum30 ≥ 1). It was confirmed that loan duration is a strong predictor, as 
it determines first level segments. Five segments of customers were identified: 
[12, 37], [42, 48], [55], [60, 61] and missing.  These segments correspond to 
categories “≤37”, “(37, 48]”, “(48, 55]”, “>55” and “missing”, respectively in 
Figure 4.3.8. In segment [12, 37], 68% of the customers were covered against 
default; in the other segments, they are a minority instead. At time t=30 months, 
customers with longer loan durations are less likely to experience the event, 
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compared with those with shorter loan durations. The majority of customers 
have loan durations of at least 55 months. Furthermore, some customers with 
loan duration=37 months accumulate enough profits as to be covered against 
default by month 30.  
 
A second variable that discriminates well goods from bads is credit limit usage. 
Three categories of customers were differentiated within segment [12, 37]: Those 
with low, medium, and high credit limit usage. Within those with low and 
medium credit limit usage, sub segments [12, 30] and [36, 37] were identified.  
 
The proportion of goods in the first sub segment was greater than that of the 
second sub segment. This was expected, as customers with shorter loan 
durations that coincide with the observation period are more likely to be 
covered against default.  Location and dependants discriminate goods from bads 
in the high usage range. In segment [42, 48], product discriminates goods from 
bads, followed by credit limit usage.  
 
Customers with missing loan durations exhibit a different behaviour, as it is a 
mixed group that may include customers with varied loan durations. 
 
Additional to the decision tree, other criteria were used to identify segments: 
The observations and events per segment and the definitions used in accounting 
for the short and long term. 
 
In accounting terms, the short term is usually understood as periods of at most 
12 months. Given that loan durations of less than 19 months were a minority, 
this category was collapsed with the following (i.e.: 24 and 25 months) to form 
the first segment. From the second segment onwards, different categories were 
built based on semi-annual increases of loan durations; if customers were to pay 
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on time their loans, this would match with accounting performance 
measurement periods prior to the end of each year. There is a clear long term 
oriented segment of customers: [48, 61], which are expected to take longer to be 
covered against default. Customers with missing loan durations were left in a 
separate segment given their mixed nature, as explained before. Tables 4.3.15 
and 4.3.16 show the composition of training3 and holdout4 samples, respectively 
in terms of loan-duration based segments. The number of customers per 
segment, n, the events per segment and the percentage of customers that were 
covered against default characterise each segment. 



















Loandur ≤37 Loandur >37, missing  

























Since observation period=30 months and given that for the majority of customers 
in segments 1 to 3 were covered against default by t=30 months, only these 
customers were considered to produce segmented models. Furthermore, it 
would not be possible to test the models’ predictive accuracy of the remaining 
segments as this would require a longer observation period. This data are not 
available at the moment. Customers with missing loan durations were not 
considered, as it was not possible to identify the required observation period to 
assess the model classification accuracy. 
 
Customer-month observations were generated per customer in segments 1 to 3 
until they were either covered against default or censored from the sample. A 
logistic regression model as shown in (4.3.30) was run using stepwise selection 
and 1% significance level (S.L.) and allowing for a maximum VIF of 5. 
ID SEGMENT n %/TOTAL events
% within 
segment
1 [12,25] 2,029 7% 1,303 64%
2 [30,31] 817 3% 640 78%
3 [36,37] 4,293 15% 2,941 69%
4 [42,43] 1,581 6% 582 37%
5 [48,61] 15,744 55% 180 1%
6 missing 3,960 14% 798 20%
TOTAL 28,424 100% 6,444 23%  
ID SEGMENT n %/TOTAL events
% within 
segment
1 [12,25] 483 7% 334 69%
2 [30,31] 203 3% 162 80%
3 [36,37] 1,026 14% 701 68%
4 [42,43] 379 5% 144 38%
5 [48,61] 4,039 57% 61 2%
6 missing 976 14% 189 19%




4.3.3.3.6.2 Generic model 
A generic model was also produced to predict time-to-profit, following a similar 
process to that explained for segmented models.  This was done to compare 
results from a single model with those of specific models that capture the 
specificity of each segment. Only customers from segments 1 to 3 in training3 
sample were considered to produce the generic model in order to use the same 
data set in both generic and segmented models. 
 
4.3.3.3.6.3 Model classification accuracy 
Generic and segmented models were compared per segment in terms of 
classification accuracy. Cumulative confusion matrices were used to compare 
actual versus predicted number of goods and bads (Thomas, 2009) for specific 
points of time (i.e.: investment periods). It made sense to use longer periods than 
months because strategic decisions usually require longer intervals. Such 
periods were defined after considering loan duration and median time-to-profit 
or censoring: tmedian=23, 25 and 29 for segments [12, 25], [30, 31] and [36, 37], 
respectively. Therefore:  
tinvestment=24 months if segment= [12, 25] and 
tinvestment =30 months if segment= [30, 31] or [36, 37]. In the specific case of 
segment [12, 25] t=12 months was not considered because loan durations ≤ 12 
months are a minority in this segment and there were not enough events.  
 
Table 4.3.17 shows the six categories of customers resulting from the 
classification accuracy of models per investment period. For illustration 
purposes, consider 6 customers. Customer 1 was predicted to be covered against 
default in t=29 and this actually occurred in t=27; therefore by t=30 she was 
correctly predicted. Customer 2 was predicted to be covered against default in 
t=27; however this actually occurred in t=21; therefore by t=24 she was 
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incorrectly predicted. Customer 3 was covered against default in t=22 but 
according to the model, this did not occur by t=30 (end of observation period). 
Customer 4 was covered against default in t=25, but by t=24 she was incorrectly 
predicted earlier (t=22). Customer 5 was incorrectly predicted as being covered 
against default in t=22 even though this did not occur during the whole 
observation period. Customer 6 was not covered against default during the 
observation period; predicted month (t=39) is outside of the observation period 
accordingly. 
 
 Usual classification accuracy measures were obtained per segment, per 
investment period. Categories 1 and 6 contribute to an increased accuracy of 
classification per period. One would expect to obtain high accuracy values for a 
model to be useful in an investment planning setting. Table 4.3.18 shows the 
confusion matrix resulting from the categories of customers explained above. 
 
Table 4.3.17: Customer categories 
CATEGORY DESCRIPTION COVERED AGAINST DEFAULT?
1 Correctly predicted within investment period 27 29 YES
2
Incorrectly predicted later in another 
investment period 21 27 YES
3 Not predicted at all 22 31 YES
4
Incorrectly predicted earlier in another 
investment period 25 22 YES
5 Incorrectly predicted - 22 NO
6 Correctly predicted within investment period - 39 NO
M̂M
 
Table 4.3.18: Confusion matrix, time-to-profit mode ls 
 Actual goods Actual bads Totals 
(predicted) 
Predicted goods 1 4,5 G 
Predicted bads 2,3 6 B 
Totals (actual) nG nB  
                                            Adapted table (Thomas, 2009) 
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4.3.3.3.6.4 Impact on investment scheme 
Monetary matrices were built per segment to quantify the impact of a model’s 
classification accuracy on the investment scheme of the credit programme. This 
is directly related to each of the six categories, as explained below. 
 
Profits generated by customers in Category 1 can be allocated on time to new 
customers and hence provide further opportunities for the organic growth of the 
credit programme per investment period. Conversely, customers in Category 6 
impose constraints to organic growth and set up the minimum investment in the 
credit programme if the strategy is to continue growing at the current level.  
 
Profits from customers in Categories 2 and 4 would be misallocated in specific 
investment periods even though they contribute as a whole to budgeting in the 
overall planning horizon.  
 
The foregone profits from customers in Category 3 result in a social opportunity 
cost attached to depriving other potential customers of being granted credit 
through funds that will actually be available. These customers would have to 
access informal lending sources that are ultimately more costly and hence 
deteriorate their wellbeing. From the Company’s perspective, this cost is 
relevant as the Company’s funding policies are more internally oriented or 
under external funding constraints. 
 
Finally, artificial profits from customers in Category 5 imply that a less 
conservative stance is adopted regarding coverage against default. The credit 
programme would continue to grow regardless of the complete coverage against 
default during the observation period. One would expect fewer customers 
within this category. As the Company’s strategy is more growth-oriented, given 
 104 
that it has and will continue to provision for bad debt, this type of error becomes 
less relevant. 
 
Various steps were completed to obtain monetary matrices. First, the value of 
the initial loan (i.e.: at time of the first purchase) was obtained. The Company 
expects to recover this value at some point of time to further reinvest it in new 
customers. Second, the identification of recovered funds (i.e.: profits) per 
investment period will depend on a model’s classification accuracy. Therefore, 
profits were totalised per category and then accumulated sequentially 
throughout the investment periods previously defined.  Third, total profits per 
category were divided by the total initial investment of the segment under 
analysis (i.e.: total value of the initial loans). This was done to compare results 
against the initial value invested per segment after the first purchase took place. 
It also facilitated the comparison of results across segments and models. Finally, 
the net organic funding per period was calculated as the difference between 
results from category 1 and other categories related to incorrect predictions (i.e.: 
2, 3, 4 and 5).  
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5. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the analysis of results from qualitative and quantitative 
research methods. Section 5.2 presents the data collection questionnaire and 
general results from the qualitative data analysis.  
 
Sections 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 present results obtained from quantitative methods to 
address the research questions stated in Chapter 2. Relevant results from 
qualitative data analysis were included to contextualise some of the findings 
obtained from quantitative methods, where applicable.  
 
5.2 Qualitative data  
5.2.1 Data collection questionnaire 
This section presents the protocol and questionnaire used to conduct semi-
structured interviews to collect qualitative data as explained in Section 4.2.1. The 
interviewees were asked additional questions if required. 
 
“Good morning (afternoon), many thanks for accepting being interviewed. I 
would be more than grateful if you could answer each of the questions I will ask 
you in the next hour or so. Please feel free to add as much detail as you need. 
 
1. Before granting the loan or offering additional services 
 Is the service you offer equally accessible by potential customers from all 
socio-economic levels? 
 What other options are available in the market?  
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 Mention the main three reasons that customers give for using your 
Company instead of other alternatives existing in the market.  
 If any, what criteria are being used to accept new customers? 
 
2. During the loan period 
 How does the Company define default? 
 Is the company aware of early signals of default? If applicable, what 
policies are defined? How do customers react to them? 
 Please mention at most 5 reasons that customers mention as being the 
main drivers for defaulting in their payments. 
 If any, what policies exist for: 
• Grace periods? How do customers react to them? 
• Prepayment or additional payments? How do customers react to 
them? 
• Non-default? How do customers react to them? 
• Refinancing? How do customers react to them? 
 If any, what measures are being used to assess the financial performance 
of customers? 
 In financial terms, how would you define an ideal customer? 
 If applicable, what policies exist in line with the financial performance of 
customers? How do customers react to them?” 
 
5.2.2 Data analysis 
A total of 53 codes (themes and subthemes) were initially defined. Five 
categories were identified: offer, customers’ preferences, competition, default 
and collection. Each category included themes and dimensions (i.e.: values 
depending on the Company under analysis) and was analysed as explained in 
Section 4.2.2.  
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Table A1.1 in the Appendix shows the final version of the themes and 
subthemes included in each category, after further reclassification of the original 
codes. The overall relevance of the categories was verified via the references per 
informant; no informant had categories in blank. The nomenclature used to 
identify each Company was as follows: CP=Credit programme under analysis, 
CO=Competitor, ED=Education, U(1,2,3) =Utility Company(1,2,3) and L(1,2,3,4)= 
Lending institution(1,2,3,4). 
 
Table A1.2 presents the definitions of dimensions 1 to 3 per category. Table A1.3 
is a graphical comparison of the credit programme under analysis with other 
Companies. Only relevant results are presented in Sections 5.2.2.1 to 5.2.2.4. 
Detailed results are presented in Appendix 1. 
 
5.2.2.1 Inclusiveness of the programme 
Compared with traditional lending institutions and similar programmes such as 
CO, CP is more inclusive; credit limit is defined per stratum and is restricted to 
buy specific products considered to improve customers’ quality of life. Ease of 
access (no previous credit history or evidence of income sources) and favourable 
credit conditions (i.e.: interest rates and long term loan duration, payment of the 
first instalment usually two months after the first purchase) are key features 
considered by customers to take the credit.  
 
Customers are accessed on a one-to-one basis, leveraging on the know-how of a 
market that is usually unexplored by other lending institutions. This is useful to 
verify in situm some of the customers’ characteristics and hence confirm their 
validity to design scoring models. It also facilitates the customised treatment of 
customers from application time throughout the collection process. This is a 
 108 
distinctive feature among microlending institutions that rely both on scorecards 
and personal observation of customers to grant credit (Van Gool et al., 2009). 
 
5.2.2.2 Programme results 
The bad rate of CP was considered low by the manager. An important reason for 
this is that only customers with a clean credit history in utility payment were 
granted credit.  
 
Permanent collection and refinancing strategies if full instalment payment is not 
possible contribute to reduce the bad rate. Penalties related to partial payments 
are also useful as customers can only do this at the central headquarters to 
“open” a consolidated bill (i.e.: partially paying the loan and/or instalment). This 
requires an additional effort from them, which is not usually embraced by locals 
in the Region.  
 
Finally, informal lending sources may also explain these results. They are 
readily accessible to customers but at lending rates that are extremely higher 
than those of CP. Customers are willing to start a formal credit history; therefore 
it is expected that they look after their payments.  
   
5.2.2.3 Default risk factors 
Customers served by CP are considered high risks by traditional lending 
institutions, regardless of the positive results explained above. This follows from 
the lack of previous credit history. Other factors such as: the lack of personal 
collaterals, a “pay until the end” culture, and overindebtness related to informal 
lending and lifestyle may account as well for defaulting.  
A downside of CP is that using a single bill to pay both the utility and loan 
results in more permissiveness that may foster delayed payments from 
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customers. Suspension of the service only occurs after two missed consecutive 
payments. This is used by some customers that might find it difficult to repay 
their loans on time.  
 
Finally, financial illiteracy was also mentioned as a reason behind default. 
Customers may not be fully aware of the duties deriving from taking credit 
since they do not have a basic knowledge of financial terms; they may lack as 
well financial planning skills (Colombian Treasury et al., 2010).  
 
5.2.2.4 Profitability assessment 
Customers are assessed solely in terms of default. Profits are measured in 
monetary terms at a portfolio level. 
 
The benefits of using profit scorecards have been discussed in previous chapters. 
Return scorecards could be particularly useful as they provide an alternative 
perspective for profit scoring purposes in high risk cases such as CP, where all 
loans are unsecured. The only guarantee that the borrower has in case of default 
is the cumulative profit that can be used to breakeven in case of default. This is 
even more critical when borrowers are untraceable after they leave their 
tenancy.  
 
The features presented above confirm that using profit and return scorecards is 
relevant for the case under analysis. It should be noted, however, that it can be 
equally applied in different lending contexts and to fixed loans as well as to 
revolving credits.  
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5.3 Profit and return measures 
5.3.1 Profit and return measures versus default cri terion 
5.3.1.1 Characterization of portfolio results 
Table 5.3.1 presents results of Stobachoff coefficient (STC) and vulnerability 
factor (VF) explained in section 4.3.3.1.1.1. These coefficients were calculated at 
t=12, 24 and 30 for each profit (i.e.: OPCASHcum and OPCASHav) and return 
measure (i.e.: CASHROAcum and CASHROAav). Each column presents results 
for the complete sample, non-defaulters and defaulters. 
 
STC results in Table 5.3.1 show that OPCASHcum at t=12 is more concentrated in 
defaulters than in non-defaulters (22.4% vs. 16.9%, respectively). A similar 
situation occurs at t=24 and 30 and for OPCASHav and CASHROAcum at all 
points of time. This is a result of a low bad rate, since few customers are 
defaulters and hence results for this segment depend more on few profitable 
customers. These customers have made partial payments but are still considered 
defaulters until they do not clear their outstanding balances. 
 
It is important to note that STC results for CASHROAav differ significantly from 
the rest. STC for non-defaulters is significantly greater than that of defaulters 
(e.g.: 90.7% vs. 19.3% at t=12, respectively). This is a result of a sharp decrease in 
portfolio returns because of the magnifying effect of losses compared with very 
low outstanding balances; this is a weakness of average measures with extreme 
values that cannot be diluted over the observation period. This is not the case for 
cumulative measures. 
 
Cumulative returns are less concentrated than cumulative profits in defaulters 
and non-defaulters. For instance, at t=12 STCnon-defaulters=9.4% and 16.9% for 
CASHROAcum and OPCASHcum, respectively. This occurs because return 
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measures scale profits by the investment made on receivables per customers. If 
the aim is to maximise portfolio profits, these would be more concentrated on 
specific customers than if the objective was to maximise portfolio returns. These 
results offer an initial insight to the implications of using each measure for 
scoring purposes.  There is a greater difference in values of STC for OPCASHcum 
and CASHROAcum for non-defaulters (e.g.: 16.4% vs. 1.7% at t=30, respectively) 
compared with that of defaulters (e.g.: 24.6% vs. 17.1% at t=30, respectively). 
This suggests that there is a greater discordance between profit and return 
measures in the former segment. 
 
On the other hand, VF results for all four measures show that more loss 
subsidisation occurs within defaulters, compared with non-defaulters at each 
point of time. For instance, at t=12 VFdefaulters=3.7% and VFnon-defaulters=0.2% for 
OPCASHcum. That is, profitable defaulters outperform unprofitable defaulters 
more noticeably compared with non-defaulters.  
 
Table 5.3.1: Profit concentration and loss subsidis ation: complete sample, 





5.3.1.2 Opportunity cost analysis 
Table 5.3.2 shows the impact ratio explained in Section 4.3.3.1.1.2. This ratio was 
calculated per profit (return) measure at t=12, 24 and 30. 
 













At t=12, in average the cumulative profit, OPCASHcum, yielded by some 
defaulters is 22 times greater than the losses yielded by some non-defaulters. 
This applies to cumulative (average) profits and cumulative returns, with 
slightly lower values in the latter as a result of the scaling effect of ratios. 
Receivables from profitable defaulters are high risk assets for the Company 
which yield better results than those of certain non-defaulters. The contrary 
occurs in terms of average returns. This is directly related to the magnified 
values of negative returns of loss making non-defaulters. This confirms the 
instability of average returns. 
 
These results confirm that defaulters are not always loss-makers and suggest 
that profit maximisation opportunities exist in that segment. Cumulative profits 
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and returns could be maximised if customers are assessed according to their 
profit profiles. This has been discussed in previous studies by using solely profit 
measures and risk bands (Andreeva  et al., 2007; Finlay,2008).   
 
5.3.2 Profit versus return measures 
5.3.2.1 Ranks analysis 
This section presents results from Spearman correlations and Chi-Square tests, 
as explained in Section 4.3.3.1.2.1. 
 
5.3.2.1.1 Chi square tests 
As explained in Section 4.3.3.1.2.1, the independence of distributions of monthly 
scores based on OPCASHcumt, OPCASHavt, CASHROAcumt and CASHROAavt 
was assessed through various hypotheses tests.  At a 0.01% S.L., profit and 
return scores are not independent. 
 
5.3.2.1.2 Spearman correlations: Profits versus ret urns in cumulative  
and average terms 
Figure 5.3.1 depicts Spearman correlations between ranks of (OPCASHcumt, 
CASHROAcumt) and (OPCASHavt,CASHROAavt) during the observation period. 







Figure 5.3.1: Spearman Correlations, Profits versus  returns (in cumulative 








Correlations between profits and returns ranks (in cumulative and average 
terms) are very similar during the first five months of the observation period. 
Therefore, it would not make a difference for scoring purposes to choose 
between both sets of measures.  
 
As time goes on the correlation between OPCASHavt and CASHROAavt stabilises 
at values close to 0.8. This suggests that minor differences may arise if customers 
were scored according to these measures; correlation is still high as both 
measures have a smoothing effect that results in similar ranks. Some of the 
differences could be due to values that were magnified after scaling profits by 
the outstanding balance. 
 
On the other hand, OPCASHcumt and CASHROAcumt are less correlated as time 
goes on. Values start at 0.7 at t=6 and decrease to 0.1 by t=30. This is a result of 
the cumulative nature of these measures. As time goes on, cumulative profits 
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depends not only on cumulative profits, but also on the outstanding balance 
which does not change in the same proportion throughout time. Consequently, 
customers well ranked according to profits are not necessarily ranked equally in 
terms of returns. Likewise, high coverage against default (i.e.: cumulative 
returns) does not imply that customers will be ranked equally in terms of 
cumulative profits. 
 
5.3.2.1.3 Spearman correlations: Cumulative versus average profits and 
cumulative versus average returns 
Figure 5.3.2 shows Spearman correlations between ranks of (OPCASHcumt, 
OPCASHavt) and (CASHROAcumt,CASHROAavt) during the observation period. 
See graphs with labels: “SPEARMANCORR(OPCASH)” and 
“SPEARMANCORR(CASHROA)”, respectively. 
 
OPCASHcumt and OPCASHavt are almost perfectly correlated throughout the 
observation period. An increase (decrease) in profits results in higher (lower) 
cumulative profits; changes in the same direction occur in average profits. Apart 
from the interpretation that might be given to each measure, either could be 
used for scoring purposes. 
 
The correlation between CASHROAcumt and CASHROAavt decreases as time 
goes on. At t=1 both measures are perfectly correlated; by month 30, it is as low 
as 0.2. This is a result of the definitions of these measures. Cumulative returns 
depend on cumulative profits and final balance, whereas average returns are a 
simple mean of returns. In cumulative terms a customer may yield high (low) 
returns but lower (higher) average returns if results from particular months are 
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deficient (good). It has been shown that average returns can be substantially 
affected by extreme negative values; this is not the case for cumulative returns; 
any losses from a particular month can be covered by cumulative profits from 
previous months.  
 
Figure 5.3.2: Spearman Correlations, Cumulative ver sus average profits, 















Results show that at a customer level it makes a difference to use alternative 
profit measures for scoring purposes. Average measures should be taken, 
however, as a benchmark to compare results from cumulative profits and 
returns, considering that average returns are particularly sensitive to extreme 
values. Furthermore, cumulative profits are more readily interpretable and have 
been used in previous studies. Cumulative returns offer an additional insight to 
cumulative profits, depending on the aim of the scorecard.  
Difference in results throughout time indicates that time has an essential role on 
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duration to build scorecards for certain types of revolving credit with defined 
loan duration as the case under analysis. Such loan duration can extend beyond 
the original loan duration if further purchases occur. 
 
5.3.2.2 Acceptance rate analysis 
Portfolio results were analysed through the acceptance rate analysis explained in 
Section 4.3.3.1.2.2. 
 
Figures 5.3.3 and 5.3.4 show portfolio OPCASHcumt and CASHROAcumt 
respectively, for different acceptance rates, when customers are ranked 
according to OPCASHcumt and CASHROAcumt at t=12,24 and 30 months. 
Portfolio OPCASHcum30 dominates  OPCASHcum24 and OPCASHcum12 when 
customers are ranked using either cumulative profits or returns. This is a result 
of the cumulative nature of these measures. The same applies to CASHROAcumt. 
 
The increasing trend of each curve in Figure 5.3.3 shows that portfolio 
OPCASHcumt increases as the acceptance rate increases. This occurs because 
figures are accumulated in monetary terms. In contrast, Figure 5.3.4 shows that 
when customers are ranked according to CASHROAcumt, portfolio 
CASHROAcumt decreases as the acceptance rate increases because customers 
with the highest returns are accepted first. The weight of returns from these 
customers decreases as more customers are accepted; portfolio returns decrease 
accordingly.  
 
At all points of time portfolio profits (returns) obtained from ranking customers 
according to OPCASHcumt (CASHROAcumt) were greater than results obtained 
from using CASHROAcumt (OPCASHcumt). This was the case for all acceptance 
rates. The difference between portfolio profits and returns decreases as more 
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customers are accepted (i.e.: curves coincide at acceptance rate=95). Therefore, if 
the policy is to accept almost everyone, there is no major difference between 
using profit or return measures for scoring purposes.  This would be equivalent 
to continue using the current criterion of granting credit to all customers that 
qualify based on non-default in the payment of utility bills.   
 
Figures 5.3.5 and 5.3.6 show portfolio OPCASHavt and CASHROAavt 
respectively, for different acceptance rates, when customers are ranked 
according to OPCASHavt and CASHROAavt at t=12, 24 and 30 months. Figure 
5.3.5 shows that portfolio OPCASHcum12 dominates OPCASHcum24 and 
OPCASHcum30 because in the long term monthly average profits are more 
diluted compared with the short term. 
 
The sharp decrease in portfolio returns in Figure 5.3.6 when OPCASHav is used 
instead of CASHROAav at t=12, 24 and 30 months occurs because the marginal 
average return forgone increases at acceptance rate=95 when customers are 
scored through profits instead of returns.  
 
When customers are scored according to average profits (returns), portfolio 
profits (returns) are improved accordingly. This is similar to results obtained if 
cumulative measures are used instead to rank customers. Portfolio profits and 
returns can therefore be improved if cumulative or average profits and 
cumulative or average returns are used as scores, respectively. However, it is not 
possible to improve both portfolio measures simultaneously with a single profit 
or return scorecard. This result highlights the fact that each measure offers a 
different insight for scoring purposes.  
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Figure 5.3.3: Portfolio OPCASHcumt per acceptance rate, scores based on 
cumulative measures 
 




















Figure 5.3.4: Portfolio CASHROAcumt per acceptance rate, scores based 
on cumulative measures 
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Figure 5.3.6: Portfolio CASHROAavt per acceptance rate, scores based on 
average measures 
 
Values are not displayed for confidentiality reasons 
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5.3.2.3 Opportunity cost analysis 
The opportunity cost, OCt in (4.3.18), of using profits instead of returns for 
scoring purposes was calculated as explained in Section 4.3.3.1.2.3. The aim was 
to choose between cumulative and average measures.  
 
5.3.2.3.1 OPCASHcumt vs. CASHROAcumt 
Table 5.3.3 shows OCt per acceptance rate (from 50 to 95) of using OPCASHcumt 
instead of CASHROAcumt at t=12, 24 and 30.  OCt values are relative to those of 
band 50 because of confidentiality reasons. This provides a meaningful 
comparison of figures. Bold cells stand for acceptance rates that maximise OCt. 
Yellow-coloured cells represent acceptance rates in which additional portfolio 
profits exceed the foregone coverage against default if customers are scored 
according to profit instead of return measures (i.e.: according to (4.3.18a) ). The 
opposite situation (i.e. according to (4.3.18b)) occurs otherwise. 
 
At t=12 the optimal acceptance rate is 50, which was obtained by scoring 
customers according to OPCASHcum12. Additional portfolio profits would be 
foregone if CASHROAcum12 was used instead. Consequently, in the short term 
monetary profits are more significant than coverage against default. This makes 
sense, as loan duration of more than half of the customers is between 48 and 61 
months and hence coverage against default is not feasible for the bulk of the 
portfolio in the short term.  See Table 4.3.2.  
 
At t=24, the situation is different. The optimal acceptance rate is 90. This resulted 
from scoring customers according to CASHROAcum24. The foregone coverage 
against default would exceed additional portfolio profits if OPCASHcum24 was 
used instead. This implies that a major proportion of current customers should 
continue to be accepted according to the sole criterion of not defaulting during 
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the previous two years of utility payment. Using such criterion would be almost 
as useful as using return measures for scoring purposes. This might be the result 
of positive payment habits for an equal period of time in the past, which 
increases reliance on the current credit granting system.  
 
At t=30, the optimal acceptance rate is 50, which resulted from using 
CASHROAcum30 to score customers. Consequently, the acceptance criterion 
should be stricter compared with a mid term standpoint. These results confirm 
that in the long term, profits should be scaled by the outstanding balance to 
account for the investment in receivables that are still at risk given that the 
portfolio is mainly composed of loans in the long term. Furthermore, at t=30 not 
all customers with loan duration ≤ 30 had censored from the sample, which 
suggests that additional purchases took place. This increases the portfolio’s 
outstanding balance and consequently the risk of not being covered against 
default. 
 
These results suggest that in the mid and long term coverage against default is 
more relevant than profits, especially taking into account that at those points of 
time most of the customers still have an outstanding balance to pay. 
 
Table 5.3.3:  Opportunity cost of using (cumulative ) profits instead of 
returns 
                                           






Values are relative to opportunity cost of acceptance rate 50 
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5.3.2.3.2 OPCASHavt vs. CASHROAavt 
Table 5.3.4 presents OCt per acceptance rate (from 50 to 95) of using OPCASHavt 
instead of CASHROAavt at t=12, 24 and 30.  Conventions are the same as those 
explained in the previous section. 
 
At t=12, 24 and 30 the optimal acceptance band is 95, which resulted from using 
CASHROAavt to score customers. This means that almost every current customer 
should be accepted by using return measures. Furthermore, it would almost not 
make a difference if return scorecards were used instead of the current default-
based acceptance criterion. If average figures are used instead of cumulative 
values, more customers (i.e.: higher acceptance rates) are accepted.  
 
Table 5.3.4:  Opportunity cost of using (average) p rofits instead of returns  
 






Values are relative to opportunity cost of acceptance rate 50 
 
5.3.2.4 Implications for scorecard design 
It was confirmed that it is useful to consider other alternatives to the traditional 
default criterion to score customers when the aim is to improve portfolio profits 
(returns). Defaulters should not be stereotyped as loss makers; this is 
particularly relevant in contexts were there is an ongoing relationship between 




Financially excluded segments can be profitable as well. An important feature of 
the credit programme under analysis is that borrowers have already been 
granted credit because of previous good performance in the payment of utility 
bills. However, this does not guarantee that they will not default in their loans.  
 
Profits and return scorecards aim to improve two conflicting objectives at a 
portfolio level. Rather than reconciling them through a single scorecard, 
decisions should be guided by the strategic priorities of the lender and its risk 
perception of the targeted customers.  
 
The opportunity cost analysis presented was useful to choose between 
cumulative and average profits (returns). Average measures failed to detect 
opportunities to improve portfolio results compared with cumulative measures.  
This validates using cumulative measures instead of averages to design 
scorecards. For illustration purposes, refer to Figure 5.3.7, which depicts OCt at 
t=12, 24 and 30. At t=30, portfolio coverage against default would be traded off if 
the acceptance rate changed from 50 (according to CASHROAcum30 scores) to 95 
(based on CASHROAav30 scores). The vertical distance between the curves is 
the cost that the lender would assume if the aim is to serve more customers, 
almost regardless of their return profiles.  
 
The differences obtained at a customer and portfolio levels when using 
CASHROAcumt show that it can be used as an alternative to usual profit 
scores. Conceptually, it goes beyond the traditional criterion of assigning 
higher ranks to customers based solely on their cumulative profits. It 
facilitates a fair comparison within customers for scoring purposes, as results 
are relative to their outstanding balance and hence to credit limit usage, 
payment behaviour, and ultimately to their socioeconomic stratum. 
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It offers a novel way of implicitly considering default through the inclusion 
of the outstanding balance, which is at risk of default until full repayment 
occurs.  This measure is particularly important for revolving credit, where 
monetary profits change throughout time and the scaling effect gains further 
relevance. 
 
Results indicate that time may have an important role in the design of profit 
scorecards. The selected observation period (t=30 months) not only agrees with 
the long term perspective suggested to design profit scorecards but also takes 
into account the revolving nature of the product under analysis.  
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Values are not displayed for confidentiality reasons 
 
5.4 Predictive methods 
This section includes results from the predictive methods explained in Section 
4.3.3.2. Results from models used to predict probabilities of default and 
repurchase are presented first. Results for direct and indirect profit and return 
models are then explained. Fonts in italics represent findings from the 





quantitative models.  Where applicable, results from default and repurchase 
models are used to provide further insight to results from direct models, as 
shown in Figure 3.3.3. Table 5.4.1 shows the variables considered to predict the 
various models presented in this section. These are the same variables presented 
in Table 4.3.4. 
 
Table 5.4.1: Reference categories and dummies per p redictor variable 
AGE 18<Age ≤ 35 years 
dumAGE3: 35< Age ≤ 43.5 years                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
dumAGE4: 43.5< Age ≤ 52 years                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
dumAGE5: 52< Age ≤ 60.5 years                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
dumAGE6: 60.5< Age ≤ 69 years                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
dumAGE7: 69< Age ≤ 103 years   
LOCATION rural (different to the capital city) dumCITUR : urban (capital city)
CONTRACT missing, other, or not applicable dumCONTCON : Any type of contract (permanent, temporary)
JOB employed
dumJOBRET : retired                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
dumJOBSELF: self-employed                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
dumJOBNOIN : housewife, student, unemployed, missing
MARITAL STATUS single
dumMARMAR : married                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
dumMARCOH :  cohabitators
dumMARWID :  widow(er)
dumMARDIV: divorced
dumMARMIS: missing
STRATUM stratum 1 (poor segments) dumSTRA35: stratum>1
EDUCATION missing
dumSTUPRI :   primary                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
dumSTUSEC:   secondary                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
dumSTUCOL : college
dumSTUHIG:   higher
DURATION FIRST LOAN durloan ≤ 31 months
dumLOAN3637: duration=36 or 37 months                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
dumLOAN4243: duration=42 or 43 months                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
dumLOAN4855: 48≤ duration ≤55 months                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
dumLOAN6061: duration=60 or 61 months                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
dumLOANMIS : missing loan duration 
YEARS AT ADDRESS YAH ≤ 8.5 years
dumYAH2 :    8.5< YAH ≤ 18 years                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
dumYAH3 :  18< YAH≤ 27.5 years                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
dumYAH4 :  27.5< YAH ≤ 37 years                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
dumYAH510 :  37< YAH ≤ 94 years      
DEPENDANTS No dependants
dumDEP1  : 1 dependants                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
dumDEP2  : 2 dependants                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
dumDEP3  : 3 dependants                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
dumDEP4  : 4 dependants                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
dumDEP510  : 5 or more dependants   
CREDIT LIMIT USAGE Low
dumLOANPR2     :  intermediate                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
dumLOANPR310 :  high
ACTIVITY Services
dumactNA       : Not applicable                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
dumactOTH     : Other industries                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
dumactPROD  : Manufacturing
FIRST PRODUCT PURCHASED traditional products 
dumprod1  : Non-traditional category 1                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
dumprod2  : Non-traditional category 2                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
dumprod3  : Non-traditional category 3                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
VARIABLE REFERENCE CATEGORY DUMMY VARIABLES
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5.4.1 Probabilities of default and repurchase 
Training1 sample (n=27,157) was used to model probabilities of default and 
repurchase; models were tested in holdout1 (n=6,807) sample. This was 
explained in Section 4.3.3.2.2. 
 
5.4.1.1 Default probability  
Defaulters were borrowers with three missed consecutive payments by the end 
of month. Prior to modelling the probability of default, it is important to 
understand the behaviour of the bad rate (i.e.: defaulters/active customers) 
during the observation period.  
 
Figure 5.4.1 shows the monthly bad rate for active customers from training1 
sample. The increasing trend until month 15 was a consequence of the lack of a 
collections department. The management team considered that given the 
positive utility payment record of customers, they would replicate such 
behaviour and pay on time their loans. Once the credit programme was 
launched, customers were given the option of paying the utility bill and/or the 
loan instalment. A good proportion of customers knew that missing the utility payment 
would lead to a service suspension, whereas missing the payment of the credit 
programme would not have major implications.  
 
The design and implementation of formal collection strategies took 
approximately 4 months. The company decided to consolidate in a single bill the 
utility and loan instalment charges. Even though by law the Company must 
receive payments associated with the utility, this requires an additional effort from 
the customer: Approaching the central headquarters of the gas company to open 
the bill, with additional transportation costs and time. It is evident that 
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collection results improved, as the bad rate decreased until month 25. The 
pattern was then stable until month 30.  
 
It is remarkable that by t=30 the bad rate reduced in approximately 40% of its 
value at t=12 months. It was confirmed that customers need to be penalised or 
regularly contacted to pay on time their obligations. This is particularly important in 
the case under analysis, as customers were not used to take formal loans.  
 
Therefore, it made sense to develop models for Pr (default at t=12 months) as 
usual banking practices suggest and for Pr (default at t=30 months) to allow for 
changes in default behaviour. The rationale behind identifying defaulters “at” 
t=12 and 30 months instead of “in” those periods of time is that borrowers are 
also customers of the utility core business provided by the lender; therefore a long term 
relationship has been already built with these customers, together with the fact 
that the Company is used to wait if customers recover from default. Defining the 
event in this way allows waiting for their eventual recovery from default.   
 



















5.4.1.1.1 Pr (default at t=12) 
Table 5.4.2 shows results of model DEF12 for Pr (default at t=12).  It includes 
estimates of significant variables, odds ratios and the area under the ROC curve 
(AUC) for training1 and holdout1 samples. The odd ratios presented are relative 
to the reference category per variable previously presented in Table 5.4.1. 
Results are discussed per significant variable or group of dummy variables, 
where possible. Dummy variables are explicitly stated in the latter case. 
 
Cohabitators are more likely to default than singles. These individuals are 
involved in informal relationships that may affect their partners’ commitment 
towards paying the loans.  
 
Those that completed secondary level studies are more likely to default than 
customers that did not report their education level because they actually did not 
complete a basic education level. This suggests that having some level of 
education does not ensure that default will not occur. It also shows that 
customers from least favoured segments in terms of education are more 
committed towards paying their first formal loan. It seems as well that formal 
education is not necessarily directly associated with financial literacy. 
 
Customers that buy products that are not associated with the utility provided by 
the lender (see results for dumprod3 and dumprod2) are more likely to default 
than those that do so. This might be related to the fact that the lender considers 
these products will improve borrowers’ quality of life, which not necessarily implies 
that they will actually pay on time the instalments. These products can be still 
considered luxury goods by them, hence paying the loan might not be a priority 
compared with paying the utility bill. Furthermore, it is an unsecured loan and hence 
the product can not be claimed as collateral.  
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Those that have an intermediate level of credit limit usage are less likely to 
default than those that have a lower usage level. These customers might be more 
committed towards paying their loans because of the greater financial impact 
that it has on monthly household finance, compared with lower instalments that 
are easier to ignore.   
 







5.4.1.1.2 Pr (default at t=30) 
Table 5.4.3 shows results of model DEF30 for Pr (default at t=30).This is 
presented in the format explained in the previous section. 
 
The informality associated with self-employed customers increases their 
probability of default, compared with those formally employed. Income sources 
for these customers are more unstable and so is their repayment capacity. This is 
associated with the high risk perception that traditional lenders have of the credit 
programme, due to its ease of access.  
 
Customers from age group 5 have less financial commitments in their 
households compared with those in the youngest age group. At that stage of 
their life cycle, they have already provided education to their children, acquired 
fixed assets and covered family needs. This increases their payment capacity and 
hence reduces the probability of default. 






dumprod2 0.5594 1.75 0.60 0.59  
T=Training1 sample, H=Holdout1 sample 
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Married customers are less likely to default than singles. This might be related to 
regular payment habits in the household, compared with singles that may 
continue to live with their parents until they get married and hence are not fully 
responsible of paying their own bills until they leave the household. Again, this 
might be associated with financial illiteracy. 
 
Living in urban areas reduces the probability of default, compared with rural 
areas. This might be a consequence of the income disparity between rural and 
urban areas in Colombia. These customers have more access to traditional 
financial services and hence may appreciate more the importance of having a 
positive credit history. 
 







5.4.1.1.3 Default in the short and long terms 
The type of product first purchased does not affect the probability of default in 
the long term. This suggests that the dual role that the Company has as utility 
provider and lender is more evident for customers as time goes on.  
 
First loan duration is not significant to predict the probability of default. Given 
that the effective data set included active customers at t=12, 24 and 30 months, it 
does not make a difference if  a loan was taken in the short, mid or long term as 
they had outstanding balances at those points of time. 





dummarmar -0.3802 0.684 0.61 0.65  
T=Training1 sample, H=Holdout1 sample 
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It is worthy noting that stratum and non-income generating jobs such as 
students and housewives were not significant in the short and long terms. This 
confirms that the inclusive lending nature of the credit programme goes beyond 
usual definitions used in microfinance associated exclusively with the poor 
(Sinha, 2011). It also shows that other individual features prevail when it comes 
to predicting default probability. 
 
5.4.1.2 Repurchase probability 
Figure 5.4.2 shows the monthly percentage rate of active customers from 
training1 sample that made further purchases after the first one. Most of the 
repurchases occur in month 2 (immediately after the first purchase). This is 
related to the various billing cycles of the utility Company, which allow for 
making further purchases before the first instalment has to be paid. As the 
second year of the observation period comes to an end, more customers make 
further purchases. This suggests that short and long term models should be 
designed, especially because of the revolving nature of the credit product under 
analysis. 
 
Figure 5.4.2:  Monthly percentage rate of customers  with repurchases 
















Repurchase status was defined “in” t=12 and t=30, instead of “at” those points of 
time. It would be unrealistic to identify the repurchase event at a particular 
point of time as it occurs instead during a specific time period. These two points 
of time were chosen to account for the short and long term as was done for 
default probability.  
 
5.4.1.2.1 Pr (repurchase in t=12) 
Table 5.4.4 shows results of model REP12 for Pr (repurchase in t=12) in the 
format explained before. 
 
Customers are more likely to repurchase as they belong to more socio 
economically favoured stratums. This is a consequence of a greater purchase 
capacity and of peer pressure expectations associated with life style.  A similar 
situation occurs with customers that have secondary education compared with 
those that did not report any education at all. 
 
As customers use more their credit limit (see results for dumloanpr2 and 
dumloanpr310), the probability of repurchase decreases. It is expected that less 
available credit limit prevents customers to make further purchases. 
 
Customers with loan duration of 36 months are less likely to repurchase 
compared with those that take loans of 12 or 31 months. This might be related to 
a longer term commitment that results in cash outflows for longer periods of 
time. 
 
The probability of repurchase decreases if the purchased product is a non-
traditional product, compared with that of products associated with the utility 
that the lender provides (see results for dumprod1 and dumprod3). These 
 134 
products are durables and hence do not need to be replaced in the short term; 
this might hinder customers from taking further credit. 
 











5.4.1.2.2 Pr (repurchase in t=30) 
Table 5.4.5 shows results of model REP30 for Pr (repurchase in t=30) in the 
format explained before. 
 
Customers’ aging increases the probability of repurchase perhaps as a result of 
more awareness of their perceived needs and a greater purchase capacity; both are 
associated with life cycle stages (see results for dumage4 to dumage6). In 
contrast, as dependants increase, repurchase propensity decreases (see results 
for dumdep2 to dumdep510). This is a direct consequence of further financial 
commitments for the household and hence less purchase capacity. 
 
Any loan duration greater than 31 months results in lower probabilities of 
repurchase (see results for dumloan3637 to dumloan6061). This suggests that the 
observation period plays an important role in the impact that loan duration has 
on the probability of repurchase. 
 









dumprod3 -0.9249 0.397 0.70 0.70  
T=Training1 sample, H=Holdout1 sample 
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Those living in urban areas or from higher socio economic stratums are more 
likely to repurchase than those in rural areas or from least favoured stratums, 
respectively. This can be related as well to their purchase capacity. Results for 
credit limit usage and type of product can be interpreted following a similar 
rationale to that explained in the previous section. 
 
Finally, customers that work in the production industry are less likely to 
repurchase compared with those in the services industry. This could be due to 
different economic conditions within specific sectors.   
 
 








































dumprod3 -1.1008 0.333 0.71 0.71  
T=Training1 sample, H=Holdout1 sample 
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5.4.1.2.3 Repurchase in the short and long terms  
In the long term, modelling repurchase is less parsimonious than in the short 
term. Almost all significant variables in the short term are also significant in the 
long term. Individuals rarely change their socioeconomic stratum in 18 months. 
Similarly, durable products are long term investments. First loan duration and 
credit limit usage depend on the first transaction, regardless of the time horizon. 
 
5.4.1.3 Profit and return scorecards  
Table 5.4.6 describes and presents the composition of direct and indirect models 
used to produce profit and return scores. Training2 (n=24,617) and holdout3 
(n=9,347) samples were used to produce and test direct and indirect models, 
respectively. As explained in Section 4.3.3.2.3, two direct models were obtained 
by using directly individual attributes in Table 5.4.1: P1 for profits and R1 for 
returns. Indirect models P2 to P5 (R2 to R5) resulted from using probabilities of 
default and repurchase to predict profits (returns); this was done as explained in 
Section 4.3.3.2.4. Results are discussed in detail in the following sections. 
 









Age, location, marital status, stratum, education, 
loan duration, years at address,credit limit usage and 
product
P2 INDIRECT, OPCASHcum30 Pr(default at t=12), Pr(repurchase in t=12)
P3 INDIRECT, OPCASHcum30 Pr(default at t=12), Pr(repurchase in t=30)
P4 INDIRECT, OPCASHcum30 Pr(default at t=30), Pr(repurchase in t=12)
P5 INDIRECT, OPCASHcum30 Pr(default at t=30), Pr(repurchase in t=30)
R1 DIRECT, CASHROAcum30
Location, type of contract, job, marital status, 
stratum,education, loan duration,dependants, credit 
limit usage and product
R2 INDIRECT, CASHROAcum30 Pr(default at t=12), Pr(repurchase in t=12)
R3 INDIRECT, CASHROAcum30 Pr(default at t=12), Pr(repurchase in t=30)
R4 INDIRECT, CASHROAcum30 Pr(default at t=30), Pr(repurchase in t=12)
R5 INDIRECT, CASHROAcum30 Pr(default at t=30), Pr(repurchase in t=30)
MODEL Description Model composition
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5.4.1.3.1 Direct scorecard, OPCASHcum30 
Table 5.4.7 shows significant variables, estimates and p-values of direct model 
P1 for OPCASHcum30. 
 
Older customers are more profitable as they are more likely to repurchase in the 
long term (see results for dumage3 to dumage7). Profits increase monotonically 
as loan duration increases (see dumloan4243 to dumloan6061). Even though 
customers with longer term loan durations are less likely to repurchase in the 
long term, more interests are accrued compared with shorter term loan 
durations; this evidently increases profits.  
 
Staying in the same address for more than 8.5 years increases profits (see results 
for dumyah2 to dumyah510). Even though borrowers are responsible for paying 
the instalments, loans are registered under the details of the occupied property. 
Customers that move less frequently are more stable in their payments than those that 
can potentially become frauds.  
 
Wealthier customers are more profitable than those that belong to least favoured 
socio economic stratums. This is associated with their income level, which 
allows them to repurchase more in the short and long terms.  
 
Profits decrease as customers have an intermediate credit limit usage, compared 
with those in the lowest segment. They are less likely to repurchase in the short 
and long term and to default in the short term; it can be considered a 
conservative segment from both points of view. 
  
Customers that are not singles are more profitable than singles (see results for 
dummarmar to dummarmis). There is no clear relationship between this overall 
pattern and results for default and repurchase. 
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As customers are more educated, they are more profitable (see results for 
dumstusec to dumstuhig). In particular, customers with secondary education 
are more profitable than those with missing education because they are more 
likely to default and repurchase in the short term. Customers that live in urban 
areas are more profitable than those located in rural areas even though they are 
less likely to default in the long term. However, they are more likely to 
repurchase in the short term. 
 
Finally, non-traditional products are more profitable than traditional products 
(see results for dumprod1 and dumprod2). In the former case, it may be a 
question of higher margins and sales commissions of the product per se; in the 
latter, it is related to a greater probability of default in the short term.  
 









































dumprod2 10,377 7.59458E-13  
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5.4.1.3.2 Indirect scorecards, OPCASHcum30 
Table 5.4.8 shows significant variables, estimates and p-values of indirect 
models P2 to P5 for OPCASHcum30. In general, an increase in the probabilities of 
default or repurchase in the short or long term leads to greater profits.  
 
Customers that are more likely to be at default have accumulated contractual 
and moratory interests calculated on the total outstanding balance. Permanent 
collection policies and refinancing strategies to cope with previous payment habits and 
cultural features that may be fostering default contribute to reduce default and 
eventually to recover from it. At the end of the day, customers have a previous and 
ongoing relationship with the lender given that it also provides a basic utility that no 
other Company can supply.  Therefore, the positive sign of this predictor makes 
sense. Its economic impact is substantially more significant than that of 
repurchase (between 32 and 69 times). This is understandable, as repurchase 
results in a one-off sales commission compared with the continuous accrual 
related to arrears and eventually default. 
 



























5.4.1.3.3 Direct scorecard, CASHROAcum30 
Table 5.4.9 shows significant variables, estimates and p-values of direct model 
R1 for CASHROAcum30. 
 
Results for loan duration contrast with those of direct profit scorecards; as loan 
duration increases, cumulative returns decrease sharply.  Missing loan duration 
is the segment with the highest increase in returns; this might be the result of it 
being a mixed category that includes various loan durations (see results for 
dumloan3637 to dumloanmis). These results are useful to justify the differences 
in scoring obtained in Section 5.3.2 when using profits or returns. It is clear that 
longer term durations result in greater profits; however those profits are 
balanced off by the outstanding receivable, which results in lower returns.  This 
has implications for scoring purposes depending on the measure used, given 
that accessing long term credit is a favourable condition for borrowers. 
 
Customers with intermediate credit limit usage are marginally less profitable in 
relative terms compared with those with low credit limit usage. Customers 
different to singles (see results for dummarmar to dummarmis), living in urban 
areas, non-traditional products (see results for dumprod1, dumprod3 and 
dumprod2), customers with secondary education level and wealthier customers 
are more profitable than those in the reference categories. These results are 
consistent in sign with those obtained for cumulative profits and can be equally 
related to default and repurchase, as explained before. It is therefore possible to 
identify segments that can increase simultaneously profits and returns where 
the dilemma of choosing between both measures does not exist.  
 
It is important to note, however, that stratum loses economic significance when 
returns are predicted instead of profits; this might be accounting for the scaling 
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effect of the outstanding balance and the relative consumption within each 
stratum.  
 
Finally, those that are self-employed are more profitable than those that are 
formally employed; a similar coefficient was obtained for customers with any 
type of contract. This justifies bearing a higher risk by granting credit to 
customers that do not have a stable source of income.  
 



















5.4.1.3.4 Indirect scorecards, CASHROAcum30 
Table 5.4.10 shows significant variables, estimates and p-values of indirect 
models R2 to R5 for CASHROAcum30. Results for indirect models R2 to R5 also 




















dumprod2 0.1680 5.4025E-253  
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repurchase increase. The economic impact of default is also greater than that of 
repurchase. These results can be interpreted in a similar way to the analysis 
presented for indirect profit models; both measures are based on cumulative 
profits.  
 









5.4.1.3.5 Scorecard comparison 
Table 5.4.11 shows the error rates of direct and indirect models for training2 and 
holdout3 samples, as explained in Section 4.3.3.2.3.  
 
Prior to comparing direct and indirect models for each measure, indirect models 
were chosen based on the lowest error rate. The best performing indirect models 
of OPCASHcum30 were P2 and P3, with probabilities of default at t=12 and 
repurchase in t=12 or 30 as predictors. Similarly, indirect models R2 and R3 for 
CASHROAcum30 outperformed other indirect models.  
 
In terms of default, these results agree with usual banking practices of following 
customers’ payment behaviour during the first year of the observation period. 
Additionally, this suggests that the current credit granting criterion based on 


















payment behaviour of customers during the first year once they take a loan is 
better for prediction purposes than taking a long term perspective. 
 
Table 5.4.11: Scorecard comparison 
TRAINING2 HOLDOUT3 
P1 DIRECT, OPCASHcum30
Age, location, marital status, stratum, education, 
loan duration, years at address,credit limit usage and 
product 12% 23%
P2 INDIRECT, OPCASHcum30 Pr(default at t=12), Pr(repurchase in t=12) 21% 35%
P3 INDIRECT, OPCASHcum30 Pr(default at t=12), Pr(repurchase in t=30) 21% 35%
P4 INDIRECT, OPCASHcum30 Pr(default at t=30), Pr(repurchase in t=12) 26% 40%
P5 INDIRECT, OPCASHcum30 Pr(default at t=30), Pr(repurchase in t=30) 25% 40%
R1 DIRECT, CASHROAcum30
Location, type of contract, job, marital status, 
stratum,education, loan duration,dependants, credit 
limit usage and product 17% 24%
R2 INDIRECT, CASHROAcum30 Pr(default at t=12), Pr(repurchase in t=12) 24% 31%
R3 INDIRECT, CASHROAcum30 Pr(default at t=12), Pr(repurchase in t=30) 24% 31%
R4 INDIRECT, CASHROAcum30 Pr(default at t=30), Pr(repurchase in t=12) 27% 34%
R5 INDIRECT, CASHROAcum30 Pr(default at t=30), Pr(repurchase in t=30) 26% 33%




Models were assessed also as of their impact on portfolio results, according to 
the process explained in Section 4.3.3.2.5. Figures 5.4.3 and 5.4.4 depict portfolio 
profits and returns respectively, per acceptance rate for holdout3 sample.  
 
Portfolio profits (returns) are improved when direct models P1 and R1 are used 
instead of indirect models per measure. This further confirms that direct models 
should be preferred to indirect models. Additionally, profit (return) scores 
improve portfolio profit (return) throughout acceptance rates. This is a result of 
the design of scorecards using profit (return) at a customer level. It is also 
consistent with results from Section 5.3.2.2. The difference in shapes of portfolio 
profits and returns confirms that each scorecard serves different purposes. Since 
the same number of customers is accepted if the same rate is adopted, choice 
will depend on corporate objectives (i.e.: profits or coverage against default). 
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Even though some segments can be profitable in monetary and relative terms, 
portfolio results show that the dilemma is still present. 
 
Figure 5.4.3: Impact of direct and indirect models on portfolio 
OPCASHcum30, holdout 3 sample 
Values are not displayed for confidentiality reasons 
 
 
Figure 5.4.4: Impact of direct and indirect models on portfolio 
CASHROAcum30, holdout 3 sample 




10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
P1 P2 P3 R1 R2 R3  
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
P1 P2 P3 R1 R2 R3  
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Finally, Figures 5.4.5 and 5.4.6 depict marginal portfolio profits and returns 
respectively per acceptance rate. If the objective is to maximise marginal 
portfolio profits, then a maximum is obtained at acceptance rate 40; as more 
customers are accepted, it decreases monotonically until no additional marginal 
profit is obtained. Alternatively, if the aim is to maximise marginal portfolio 
returns, acceptance rates 10 (holdout3) and 20 (training2) should be chosen, as it 
decreases monotonically from there onwards.  
 
These results show that profit scorecards would tend to accept more customers 
whereas return scorecards are stricter as the aim is coverage against default. If 
the former standpoint is adopted, the scope of the credit programme is increased 
at the expense of taking additional risk by accepting more customers that may 
be less covered against default. Conversely, fewer customers would be accepted 
if the latter stance is taken; the credit programme would be more exclusive. 
These results further confirm that return scores offer additional insight to profit 
scores. 
 
Figure 5.4.5: Marginal portfolio profits, model P1 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Holdout3 sample Training2 sample
 




Figure 5.4.6: Marginal portfolio returns, model R1 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Holdout3 sample Training2 sample
 
Values are not displayed for confidentiality reasons 
 
5.4.1.3.6 Direct vs. indirect methods 
Results show that direct methods should be preferred to indirect methods for 
modelling purposes. This might have occurred because indirect models use 
predicted probabilities of default and repurchase as predictors of profits and 
returns. In a scoring context, these values are used for ranking (scoring 
purposes).  Predicted probabilities include error terms that are further included 
in the prediction of profits and returns. 
 
Another possible reason of such performance is that default probability in the 
credit programme under analysis depends as well on collection policies, which 
were unstable during the first year of the observation period. Individual 
attributes used to predict direct models remain unaltered and could be better 
proxies of features that affect profits and returns.   
 
These results would discourage the prediction of default and repurchase for 
profit scoring purposes. This is not the case, as these are the main profit drivers 
for revolving credit. Instead of using these values as covariates for profit (return) 
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prediction, they could be jointly used to interpret significant variables in default, 
repurchase and profit scorecards and accordingly to define strategies to target 
specific segments if the aim is to improve profits or returns. 
 
Indirect models were also useful to highlight the relative economic importance 
that default has on profits and returns versus that of repurchase. This has major 
implications for collection policies and is implicitly related to the cross-sale 
nature of the credit programme, which fosters arrears and eventually default to 
a certain extent.  
 
5.5 Time-to-profit  
This section includes results from the exploratory analysis of survivor and 
hazard functions, modelling of time-to-profit to produce application scorecards 
and predicting time-to-profit for investment planning purposes. This was 
explained in Section 4.3.3.3. The modelled event was: 
 
Pr (CASHROAcumt ≥ 1)                                                     (5.5.1), 
which refers to a customer being profitable or being covered against default. 
Training3 (n=28,424) and holdout4 (n=7,106) samples were used to produce and 
test the models, respectively; see Section 4.3.3.3.2. 
 
5.5.1 Exploratory analysis  
This section presents results from the exploratory analysis conducted through 
survivor and hazard functions, as explained in Section 4.3.3.3.3. 
 
Figure 5.5.1 depicts the survivor function of training3 sample. The survivor 
function is stable during the first year of the observation period. Between 
months 12 and 24, some customers were covered against default. This is related 
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to loan durations and more specifically to the time it took the lender to stabilise 
its collection process (approximately 18-20 months, as explained in Section 
5.4.1.1).  
 
Figure 5.5.2 depicts the hazard function of training3 sample. Consistent with the 
results explained above, the hazard of CASHROACUMt ≥1 is very low during 
the first year. It increases at a faster pace from month 18 onwards. The hazard is 
monotonically increasing as time goes on. It should be noted that eventually 
customers should be covered against default for the first time and hence be 
censored from the sample. 
 
 
































5.5.2 Time-to-profit application scorecards  
This section presents results from models to produce time-to-profit scorecards 
according to the process presented in Sections 4.3.3.3.4 and 4.3.3.3.5. The 
covariates used for survival models are the same as those used for models P1 
and R1. See Table 5.4.1.  
 
5.5.2.1 Parameter estimates  
Seven models were obtained, namely: constant hazard, time direct, quadratic, 
cubic, logarithmic, monthly and quarterly time dummies. Table 5.5.1 shows the 
parameter estimates and odds ratios of each model. Given that results for all 
covariates different to the covariate time are very similar across models in terms 
of values and signs, a single interpretation is provided per covariate. This was 
expected, since the only difference among models in terms of variable definition 
was the treatment of time.  
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As customers take longer term loans (see results for dumloan3637 to 
dumloan6061), it is less likely that they will be covered against default compared 
with those that took shorter term loans. Customers that use more their credit 
limit (see results for dumloanpr2 and dumloanpr310) in their first purchase are 
more likely to reach the event. This is consistent with a lower probability of 
default in the short term, as discussed in Section 5.4.1.1.1. Furthermore, these 
customers have less available credit limit to repurchase and hence are more 
likely to be covered against default for the first time.  
 
Customers that live in urban areas, have any type of contract (i.e.: permanent or 
temporary) and belong to higher socioeconomic stratums are more likely to be 
completely covered against default than those that live in rural areas, do not 
have a contract and belong to poor stratums, respectively. Customers that 
purchase non-traditional products (see results for dumprod1 and dumprod2) 
are more likely to be covered against default than those that buy traditional 
products. These results are similar in signs to those obtained for model R1.  
 
As of the effect that time has on hazard, the odds ratios of time-related variables 
in all models different to the constant hazard model (see results for m, m2, m3, 
Ln (m), dum12 to dum30, dumq4 to dumq10) are greater than one. This confirms 
the general rationale that time does have an effect on the hazard of being 
covered against default, as expected.  
 
Table 5.5.2 shows performance measures of each model in terms of AIC and VIF. 
The constant hazard model was outperformed by time dependent hazard 
models in terms of the AIC criterion.  This further confirms the effect of time on 




Table 5.5.1 shows that parameter estimates of the quadratic and cubic terms are 
almost negligible numerically (see estimates for m2 and m3). Table 5.5.2 shows 
that a better fit in terms of AIC comes at the expense of an extremely high 
multicollinearity as more time-related terms are included in the model (see VIF 
results for quadratic and cubic models). This is a consequence of the high 
correlation between the various powers of time in these two models.  
 
On the other hand, Table 5.5.2 shows that models with monthly and quarterly 
dummies have high VIF values and hence multicollinearity issues as well. This 
might arise because of the interaction of particular months and some 
explanatory variables and/or as a result of a high correlation between time 
dummies (i.e.: these dummies can be directly predicted from other time-related 
dummies).  Even though it has been argued that multicollinearity should not be 
an issue (Allison 1982; Allison 2010), these models may be unstable as time goes 
on. This is a crucial feature particularly for revolving credits, which are long 
term oriented. 
 
A graphical comparison of the hazards obtained for the direct, logarithmic, 
quadratic and cubic models provides further insight to understand the results. 
Figure 5.5.3 shows that until month 18 (indifference point), model choice does 
make a difference in terms of the predicted hazard. The hazards predicted by 
alternative models almost coincide from that point until the end of the 
observation period. The increasing hazard may be understood as a consequence 
of censoring. Only the first event is being modelled (i.e.: being covered against 
default); consequently, the hazard increases until the event is reached and then 




























































dumprod2 0.09 1.10  
LN(M)














Ln(M) 8.06 >999.999  
QUADRATIC















m2 0.00 1.00  
CUBIC
















m3 0.00 1.00  
TIME DIRECT 














m 0.35 1.42  
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dumq10 8.34 >999.999  
MODEL AIC VIF
TIME DIRECT 45,397 4
LN (M) 45,466 4
QUADRATIC 45,385 82
CUBIC 45,385 5337
MONTHLY DUMMIES 45,184 76
QUARTERLY DUMMIES 45,635 196
CONSTANT HAZARD 63,957 4  
MONTHLY DUMMIES
































dum30 8.29 >999.999  
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5.5.2.2 Accuracy of prediction  
Table 5.5.3 shows predictive accuracy measures of time-dependent models in 
terms of AUC and H measure, per approach as explained in Section 4.3.3.3.4.  
 
Predictive accuracy values are very similar across models in terms of either the 
H measure or AUC, per approach. For instance, under approach 1, H measure 
varies between 0.31 and 0.35 whereas AUC varies between 0.83 and 0.86 for 
holdout4 sample.  
 
A cross-approach comparison shows that apart from approach 2a, results are 
similar in both training3 and holdout4 samples for all models (e.g.: under 
approach 2b,  H  measure and AUC were 0.29 and 0.91 , respectively in both 
training3 and holdout4 samples). Specifically, H measure and AUC of all models 










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
DIRECT LN CUBIC QUADRATIC CONSTANT
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sample, compared with results for training3 sample. These poor results may be a 
consequence of the irregular collection process during the first year of the 
observation period. This resulted in unstable performance in training3 and 
holdout4 samples. Such differences in results disappear at t=24 and 30 months.  
 
Among the models where hazard varies with time, apart from the logarithmic 
alternative and the model that uses time directly, all models have 
multicollinearity issues. Given its slightly better fit in terms of AIC compared 
with the logarithmic alternative (see Table 5.5.2), the model that uses time 
directly was preferred to produce time-to-profit scores.  
 
Because of the graphical similarity between the chosen model and the cubic and 
quadratic alternatives in Figure 5.5.3, the hypothesis of equality of ROC curves 
of these models was tested. Table 5.5.4 shows the estimates, standard errors and 
p-values of these tests. Under approach 2a, results are not significantly different 
between models (p-value=0.1641 for holdout4 sample). This is consistent with the 
lower predictive accuracy of all models if survival is assumed at t=12 months 
given the unstable collection process. A similar situation occurs under approach 
2c, which corresponds to t=30 (p-values are 0.2026 and 0.2365 for holdout4 
sample). This agrees with the convergence of the linear, quadratic and cubic 
curves at t=30 as shown in Figure 5.5.3. Conversely, results are significantly 
different under approach 2b (i.e.: at t=24); p-values are 0.0024 and 0.0002 for 
holdout4 sample. Furthermore, it does make a difference to test the accuracy of 
prediction if customers are observed until they left the sample (approach 1) or if 
customer months (approach 3) are used instead. In the former, results are 





Table 5.5.3: Models accuracy of prediction 
 
TRAINING3 SAMPLE HOLDOUT4 SAMPLE
MODEL H AUC MODEL H AUC
M 0.30 0.83 M 0.31 0.83
LN 0.33 0.84 LN 0.34 0.85
QUADRATIC 0.31 0.83 QUADRATIC 0.32 0.84
CUBIC 0.32 0.84 CUBIC 0.32 0.84
MONTHLY DUMMIES 0.35 0.85 MONTHLY DUMMIES 0.35 0.86
QUARTERLY DUMMIES 0.35 0.86 QUARTERLY DUMMIES 0.35 0.86
TRAINING3 SAMPLE HOLDOUT4 SAMPLE
MODEL H AUC MODEL H AUC
M 1.07E-05 0.80 M 5.70E-06 0.56
LN 1.09E-05 0.80 LN 5.70E-06 0.56
QUADRATIC 1.08E-05 0.80 QUADRATIC 5.70E-06 0.56
CUBIC 1.08E-05 0.80 CUBIC 5.70E-06 0.56
MONTHLY DUMMIES 1.09E-05 0.80 MONTHLY DUMMIES 5.76E-06 0.56
QUARTERLY DUMMIES 1.08E-05 0.80 QUARTERLY DUMMIES 5.70E-06 0.56
TRAINING3 SAMPLE HOLDOUT4 SAMPLE
MODEL H AUC MODEL H AUC
M 0.29 0.91 M 0.29 0.91
LN 0.29 0.91 LN 0.29 0.91
QUADRATIC 0.29 0.91 QUADRATIC 0.29 0.91
CUBIC 0.29 0.91 CUBIC 0.29 0.91
MONTHLY DUMMIES 0.29 0.91 MONTHLY DUMMIES 0.29 0.91
QUARTERLY DUMMIES 0.29 0.91 QUARTERLY DUMMIES 0.29 0.91
TRAINING3 SAMPLE HOLDOUT4 SAMPLE
MODEL H AUC MODEL H AUC
M 0.49 0.92 M 0.51 0.93
LN 0.49 0.92 LN 0.51 0.93
QUADRATIC 0.49 0.92 QUADRATIC 0.51 0.93
CUBIC 0.49 0.92 CUBIC 0.51 0.93
MONTHLY DUMMIES 0.49 0.92 MONTHLY DUMMIES 0.51 0.93
QUARTERLY DUMMIES 0.49 0.92 QUARTERLY DUMMIES 0.51 0.93
TRAINING3 SAMPLE HOLDOUT4 SAMPLE
MODEL H AUC MODEL H AUC
M 0.05 0.96 M 0.06 0.96
LN 0.05 0.96 LN 0.05 0.96
QUADRATIC 0.05 0.96 QUADRATIC 0.06 0.96
CUBIC 0.05 0.96 CUBIC 0.06 0.96
MONTHLY DUMMIES 0.05 0.97 MONTHLY DUMMIES 0.05 0.96
QUARTERLY DUMMIES 0.05 0.96 QUARTERLY 0.05 0.96
APPROACH 3: CUSTOMER-MONTHS
APPROACH 2b: ASSUMING SURVIVAL AT T=24 MONTHS
APPROACH 1: LAST OBSERVATION MONTH PER CUSTOMER
APPROACH 2a: ASSUMING SURVIVAL AT T=12 MONTHS
APPROACH 2c: ASSUMING SURVIVAL AT T=30 MONTHS
 

















TRAINING3 SAMPLE HOLDOUT4 SAMPLE
MODELS Estimate Std Error Pr > ChiSq MODELS Estimate Std Error Pr > ChiSq
TIME DIRECT VS 
QUADRATIC -0.0046 0.0001 <.0001
TIME DIRECT VS 
QUADRATIC -0.0042 0.0002 <.0001
TIME DIRECT VS CUBIC -0.006 0.0002 <.0001 TIME DIRECT VS CUBIC -0.0055 0.0003 <.0001
TRAINING3 SAMPLE HOLDOUT4 SAMPLE
MODELS Estimate Std Error Pr > ChiSq MODELS Estimate Std Error Pr > ChiSq
TIME DIRECT VS 
QUADRATIC -0.0002 0.0001 0.0326
TIME DIRECT VS 
QUADRATIC -0.0002 0.0001 0.1641
TIME DIRECT VS CUBIC -0.0002 0.0001 0.1995 TIME DIRECT VS CUBIC -0.0002 0.0001 0.1641
TRAINING3 SAMPLE HOLDOUT4 SAMPLE
MODELS Estimate Std Error Pr > ChiSq MODELS Estimate Std Error Pr > ChiSq
TIME DIRECT VS 
QUADRATIC 0 0 0.0002
TIME DIRECT VS 
QUADRATIC -0.0001 0 0.0024
TIME DIRECT VS CUBIC -0.0001 0 <.0001 TIME DIRECT VS CUBIC -0.0001 0 0.0002
TRAINING3 SAMPLE HOLDOUT4 SAMPLE
MODELS Estimate Std Error Pr > ChiSq MODELS Estimate Std Error Pr > ChiSq
TIME DIRECT VS 
QUADRATIC 0 0 0.0157
TIME DIRECT VS 
QUADRATIC 0 0 0.2026
TIME DIRECT VS CUBIC 0 0 0.9601 TIME DIRECT VS CUBIC 0 0 0.2365
TRAINING3 SAMPLE HOLDOUT4 SAMPLE
MODELS Estimate Std Error Pr > ChiSq MODELS Estimate Std Error Pr > ChiSq
TIME DIRECT VS 
QUADRATIC -0.0001 0 0.0171
TIME DIRECT VS 
QUADRATIC -0.0001 0.0001 0.2393
TIME DIRECT VS CUBIC 0 0 0.3962 TIME DIRECT VS CUBIC 0.0001 0.0001 0.1864
APPROACH 3: CUSTOMER-MONTHS
APPROACH 1: LAST OBSERVATION MONTH PER CUSTOMER
APPROACH 2a: ASSUMING SURVIVAL AT T=12 MONTHS
APPROACH 2b: ASSUMING SURVIVAL AT T=24 MONTHS
APPROACH 2c: ASSUMING SURVIVAL AT T=30 MONTHS
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Finally, the accuracy of the model that uses time directly was calculated per rank 
and decile. Table 5.5.5 shows the ranks, customers that were covered against 
default identified per rank (n), n as a percentage of the total customers covered 
against default (%) and the cumulative percentage of customers identified per 
rank (cum%) for holdout4 sample.  Similarly, Table 5.5.6 shows results per 
decile. Results were very similar in both cases. The model identifies better 
customers in top bands than in the lower categories, which is a positive feature 
for scoring purposes. 
 
Up to t=12 months, results were poor for both ranks and deciles; the model only 
placed 36% of customers that were covered against default in the top 4 ranks 
and deciles. This is consistent with results obtained when using overall accuracy 
measures. 
 
Accuracy results improve up to t=24 and t=30; cum%= 87% and 85%, 
respectively. This proportion of customers was included in the top three ranks 
(deciles).  The difference in results for the top two deciles in t=24 and 30 months 
is a consequence of the lower number of customers that actually were covered 
against default up to t=24 months (410) versus t=30 months (1591), which 
magnifies the accuracy effect in the top two deciles (ranks). Given the 
inclusiveness nature of the credit programme, such difference in results is not 
critical, as in practical terms the Company would use at least the third decile to 
select customers.  
 
Overall, the scores obtained from the model place 94% of the customers that 
were covered against default in the top 4 deciles up to t=24 and 30 months. 
Therefore, the accuracy of prediction of the model that uses time directly 










UP TO T=12 UP TO T=24 UP TO T=30
RANK n % cum% RANK n % cum% RANK n % cum%
1 0 0% 0% 1 264 64% 64% 1 575 36% 36%
2 4 36% 36% 2 77 19% 83% 2 453 28% 65%
3 0 0% 36% 3 17 4% 87% 3 319 20% 85%
4 0 0% 36% 4 29 7% 94% 4 155 10% 94%
5 4 36% 73% 5 17 4% 99% 5 60 4% 98%
6 0 0% 73% 6 0 0% 99% 6 4 0% 98%
7 0 0% 73% 7 2 0% 99% 7 10 1% 99%
8 1 9% 82% 8 1 0% 99% 8 6 0% 99%
9 1 9% 91% 9 2 0% 100% 9 4 0% 100%






Table 5.5.6: Accuracy deciles, direct model, holdou t4 sample 
 
 
UP TO T=12 UP TO T=24 UP TO T=30
DECILE n % cum% DECILE n % cum% DECILE n % cum%
1 0 0% 0% 1 264 64% 64% 1 577 36% 36%
2 4 36% 36% 2 77 19% 83% 2 496 31% 67%
3 0 0% 36% 3 17 4% 87% 3 284 18% 85%
4 0 0% 36% 4 29 7% 94% 4 145 9% 94%
5 4 36% 73% 5 17 4% 99% 5 60 4% 98%
6 0 0% 73% 6 0 0% 99% 6 4 0% 98%
7 1 9% 82% 7 3 1% 99% 7 14 1% 99%
8 0 0% 82% 8 0 0% 99% 8 2 0% 99%
9 1 9% 91% 9 2 0% 100% 9 5 0% 100%
10 1 9% 100% 10 1 0% 100% 10 4 0% 100%
TIME DIRECT
 
5.5.2.3 Comparison of profit, return and time-to-pr ofit application 
scorecards  
This section compares the overall impact on portfolio profits and returns if 
either OLS or survival models are used to score customers.  As explained in 
Section 4.3.3.3.5, Model S1 was produced using training3 and was tested on 
holdout4 sample. Therefore, in order to compare the impact of a time-to-profit 
scorecard on portfolio profits (returns) with that of models P1 and R1, model S2 
was produced using training2 and tested on holdout3 sample. Table 5.5.7 shows 
the estimates and odds ratios per significant variable in model S2. Results are 
similar to those of model S1. 
 
The predicted probability of being completely covered against default by t=30 
according to model S2 was taken as the survival score. 
 










Figures 5.5.4 and 5.5.5 depict portfolio profits per acceptance rate for training2 
and holdout3 samples, respectively. Profit scorecard P1 outperforms both R1 and 
S2 as of the obtained portfolio profits. This was expected, as profit scorecards by 
definition maximise portfolio profits.  
















Figures 5.5.6 and 5.5.7 show portfolio returns per acceptance rate for training2 
and holdout3 samples, respectively. P1 is always dominated by R1 and S2 in 
terms of portfolio returns. 
 
It is clear that S2 yields better results than R1 in holdout3 sample. This follows 
from the fact that survival scorecards perform better at higher bands as the 
model focuses on the occurrence of being completely covered against default 
(i.e.: CASHROACUMt ≥ 1); emphasis is given to customers that clearly 
outperform the rest.  This was not the case for the training sample. These results 
are understandable, since training2 sample does not include outliers, whereas 
under more extreme conditions survival models outperform the OLS model. 
This is an advantage of using survival scorecards, since it is unrealistic to 
assume that return measures will be free of outliers under real circumstances. 
 
 
Figure 5.5.4: Impact of models P1, R1 and S2 on por tfolio OPCASHcum30, 



















Values are not displayed for confidentiality reasons 
 
 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
P1: OLS (PROFITS) R1: OLS (RETURNS) S2: SURVIVAL
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Figure 5.5.5: Impact of models P1, R1 and S2 on por tfolio OPCASHcum30, 





















Values are not displayed for confidentiality reasons 
 
 
Figure 5.5.6: Impact of models P1, R1 and S2 on por tfolio 





















Values are not displayed for confidentiality reasons 
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P1: OLS (PROFITS) R1: OLS (RETURNS) S2: SURVIVAL
 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
P1: OLS (PROFITS) R1: OLS (RETURNS) S2: SURVIVAL
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Figure 5.5.7: Impact of models P1, R1 and S2 on por tfolio 














Values are not displayed for confidentiality reasons 
 
 
5.5.2.4 Results per loan duration  
Table 5.5.8 shows the number of customers in holdout4 sample per loan duration 
and decile according to time-to-profit scorecard S1. This was done because of the 
significance that loan duration has on time-to-profit. An analysis of scores based 
on the probability of being covered against default assuming customers 
survived until t=30 months shows that shorter term loans (i.e..: up to 43 months) 
are scored in the top 4 deciles. This makes sense, since these loans are by their 
own nature expected to be covered against default for the first time before 
longer term loans. These results confirm the importance of loan duration on 
time-to-profit for the credit programme under analysis and justify the use of 
segmented models according to that variable, as explained in Section 4.3.3.3.6.1. 
This was the approach taken in the next section. 
 
 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
P1: OLS (PROFITS) R1: OLS (RETURNS) S2: SURVIVAL
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Table 5.5.8: Holdout 4 sample, based on Pr (Event for t ≤30 months) 
 
-1=missing loan duration 
 
5.5.3 Time-to-profit prediction  
This section presents time-to-profit predictions for investment planning 
purposes, as explained in Section 4.3.3.3.6. Apart from loan duration, the same 
coarse classified covariates were used to predict time-to-profit. The objective 
was to compare results of specific models for segments [12, 25], [30, 31] and [36, 
37] with those of a generic model in training3 and holdout4 samples. In the 
generic model, results for dummy variables related to loan duration are relative 
to category [12, 13].  
 
The linear hazard alternative that includes the variable time directly was used to 





ik )x -  - P))]-(1/ (P [Log 
β
βα '
=                                                    (6.5.1), 
where xi’s are significant covariates at application time and m is the month in 
which customer i can be covered against default at various probability levels. 
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5.5.3.1 Segmented models 
Table 5.5.9 shows parameters, estimates and odds ratios for each segmented 
model: Models S3, S4 and S5 correspond to segments [12, 25], [30, 31] and [36, 
37], respectively. Results show common and distinctive features per segment.  
 
As customers use more their credit limit, it is more likely they will be covered 
against default for the first time regardless of their segment (see results for 
dumloanpr2 and dumloanpr310). This makes sense, since these customers are 
less likely to default in the short term.  As loan duration increases from [12, 25] 
to [36,37], the impact of credit limit usage increases.  
 
Regarding the effect of time (e.g.: variable m), as it increases there is a greater 
probability of being covered against default, regardless of loan duration. This is 
a result of the linear increasing hazard throughout time. It is evident that as loan 
duration increases, the impact of time is more pronounced as more interests are 
paid for longer periods of time (i.e.: the odds ratio of variable m increases). 
 
In particular, socioeconomic stratum is a significant covariate in segments [12, 
25] and [36, 37]. Customers with any type of contract in segment [30, 31] are 
more likely to be covered against default than those that lack it; this results from 
more financial stability in the former group. Finally, customers in segment [36, 
37] that do not work in traditional industries are more likely to be covered 






















Optimal percentiles for segments [12, 25], [30, 31] and [36, 37] were 9, 13 and 32, 
respectively. The increasing trend in the percentiles as loan duration increases is 
related to the fact that shorter term loans experience the event earlier and hence 
lower percentiles reflect this feature. These percentiles were used to obtain a 
predicted value for time-to-profit (rounded to zero decimal places) per 
customer.  
 
5.5.3.2 Generic model 
Table 5.5.10 shows parameters, estimates and odds ratios for generic model S6. 
Significant covariates are similar to those obtained in model S1. This was 
expected; S1 was also generic and was also based on the probability of 
occurrence of coverage against default throughout time. Even though training3 
sample in model S1 included all segments, the majority of customers that were 
excluded to produce the models in this section did not experience the event; this 
explains the similarity between results.  
MODEL S3 SEGMENT [12,25]






m 0.19 1.21  
MODEL S4 SEGMENT [30,31]





m 0.34 1.40  
MODEL S5 SEGMENT [36,37]







m 0.62 1.87  
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This survival model yielded a probability distribution of occurrence of the event 
and accordingly a probability distribution of time-to-profit (m). The optimal 
percentiles that minimized the prediction error for segments [12, 25], [30, 31] and 
[36, 37] were 93, 93 and 97, respectively. These percentiles are almost identical 
and show that the minimum MAEp is obtained when it is very likely that a 
customer is covered against default at later stages. This is a direct consequence 
of the generic nature of the model, which only acknowledges the differences in 
loan duration across segments through the use of dummy variables instead of 
accounting for the specificity of each segment via separate models. These 
percentiles were then used to obtain a predicted value for time-to-profit per 
customer. Values were rounded to zero decimal places to ensure discrete time 
values. 
 
5.5.3.3 Model classification accuracy 
As explained in Section 4.3.3.3.6.3, confusion matrices were used to assess the 
classification accuracy of models. Tables 5.5.11, 5.5.12 and 5.5.13 show results of 
confusion matrices for segments [12, 25], [30, 31] and [36, 37], respectively. 
 
MODEL S6












m 0.35 1.41  
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Total classification accuracy results in each segment show that segmented 
models outperform the generic model: 63% vs. 6%, 49% vs. 20% and 73% vs. 32% 
for segments [12, 25], [30, 31] and [36, 37], respectively. These models by 
definition capture the particularities of loan duration, which has been an 
important predictor in the various scorecards developed in previous sections. 
An important feature of the generic model is that regardless of its poor accuracy 
results across segments, its sensitivity always exceeds that of segmented models; 
it is 100% in the three segments. Conversely, specificity of generic model is 0% in 
the three segments. The generic model is more efficient in identifying customers 
type 6 which are not covered against default during the observation period. 
However, it fails to identify those that actually generate organic funds (i.e.: 
customers type 1).  
 
Even though the classification accuracy of segmented models for segments [12, 
25] and [36, 37] was good, that of segmented model for [30, 31] was marginally 
lower than 50%. These results follow from the fact that tmedian=25 months for this 
segment, which is 5 months earlier to tinvestment=30 months. In the other two cases, 
the median time is just a month earlier than the control point: (tmedian=23 and 29 
for segments {12, 25] and [36, 37], respectively). This suggests that application 
covariates become less relevant to predict time to event as the investment period 
is further apart from the median time to event. Behavioural features may be 
more relevant to predict time to event.  
 
The above results suggest that the generic model is very conservative compared 
with the segmented models; according to it no customer will be covered against 
default in the observation period. This does not reflect the reality of the inclusive 
lending programme under analysis. Therefore, it was confirmed that loan 
duration is an important variable to predict time-to-profit and hence that 
segmented models are more adequate than a single generic model. 
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Table 5.5.11: Confusion matrices: Generic vs. segme nted models, 
 Segment [12, 25] in Holdout 4 sample 
 
Generic model S6 up to t=24 
Actual goods Actual bads Total predicted
Predicted goods 0 0 0
Predicted bads 281 17 298
Total actual 281 17 298
Specificity 0%
Type I error 100%
Sensitivity 100%





Segmented model S3 up to t=24 
Actual goods Actual bads Total predicted
Predicted goods 189 17 206
Predicted bads 92 0 92
Total actual 281 17 298
Specificity 67%
Type I error 33%
Sensitivity 0%














Table 5.5.12: Confusion matrices: Generic vs. segme nted models, 
Segment [30, 31] in Holdout 4 sample 
 
Generic model S6 up to t=30 
Actual goods Actual bads Total predicted
Predicted goods 0 0 0
Predicted bads 162 41 203
Total actual 162 41 203
Specificity 0%
Type I error 100%
Sensitivity 100%






Segmented model S4 up to t=30 
Actual goods Actual bads Total predicted
Predicted goods 100 56 156
Predicted bads 47 0 47
Total actual 147 56 203
Specificity 68%
Type I error 32%
Sensitivity 0%











Table 5.5.13: Confusion matrices: Generic vs. segme nted models, 
Segment [36, 37] in Holdout 4 sample 
 
Generic model S6 up to t=30 
Actual goods Actual bads Total predicted
Predicted goods 0 0 0
Predicted bads 701 325 1026
Total actual 701 325 1026
Specificity 0%
Type I error 100%
Sensitivity 100%






Segmented model S5 up to t=30 
Actual goods Actual bads Total predicted
Predicted goods 682 253 935
Predicted bads 19 72 91
Total actual 701 325 1026
Specificity 97%
Type I error 3%
Sensitivity 22%











5.5.3.4 Impact on investment scheme 
As presented in Table 4.3.17, six categories of customers were identified: 
category 1 includes customers that were covered against default and were 
correctly predicted within an investment period, category 2 refers to customers 
incorrectly predicted later, category 3 includes customers that were not 
predicted at all even though they were covered against default, category 4 refers 
to customers incorrectly predicted earlier, customers in category 5 were  
incorrectly predicted even though they were not covered against default and 
customers in category 6 were not covered against default and were predicted as 
so. 
 
Tables 5.5.14, 5.5.15 and 5.5.16 show results of the impact on investment scheme 
of generic and segmented models for segments [12, 25], [30, 31] and [36, 37], 
respectively in holdout4 sample.  Each cell represents the cumulative profits 
(losses) generated per customer category, per investment period (i.e.: t=12, 24 
and 30), expressed as a percentage of portfolio outstanding balance resulting 
from the first purchase. The last column includes the cumulative net organic 
funding per investment period. This was explained in Section 4.3.3.3.6.4.  
 
Poor classification accuracy of the generic model across segments is reflected in 
poor monetary results in the investment scheme, accordingly. It fails to capture 
organic funding opportunities and hence the growth potential of the credit 
programme. Tables 5.5.14, 5.5.15 and 5.5.16 show that net organic funding 
detected by the generic model was -68%, -83% and -73% in the last investment 
period of segments [12, 25], [30, 31] and [36, 37], respectively. If the Company 
relies on organic funding, using the generic model would hinder its growth by 
the rates mentioned above. Furthermore, the risk perception of shareholders and 
third parties that fund it might be affected, increasing as well their opportunity 
cost. Additionally, implementing the generic model would imply a social cost. 
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Foregone profits from customers in category 3 which were actually covered 
against default but were not predicted as so by the generic model represent 
between 68% and 83% of the total funds invested in the portfolio. These 
customers have to bear additional costs as they would have to obtain loans from 
more costly and informal lending sources.  
 
On the other hand, the generic model identifies customers in category 6 that 
account for 2% to 27% of the initial investment. These funds would therefore not 
be allocated in new loans if the Company adopts the conservative perspective 
implicit by the generic model. Overall, results for the generic model in Tables 
5.5.14 to 5.5.16 show that “lost” funds implicit by profits from customers in 
category 3 significantly exceed the “benefits” obtained from identifying 
customers in category 6 across segments (see categories 3 and 6).  
 
Results for segmented models in Tables 5.5.14 to 5.5.16 show that the 
misclassification of customers at lagged periods (category 2) is a distinctive 
feature of segmented models, compared with the generic model. Only 
segmented model S4 for [30, 31] produced predictions at earlier periods of time 
(8% of initial portfolio of loans in category 4). In contrast with the generic model, 
all segmented models predict customers in category 5. These results occurred 
because the generic model does not predict at all the occurrence of the event.   
 
None of the segmented models entails a social opportunity cost (see category 3 
in results for segmented models). This implies as well that segmented models do 
not impose growth constraints to the credit programme. All segmented models 
outperformed the generic model as they identify organic funding opportunities 
(34%, 1% and 47% of the initial investment for segments [12, 25], [30, 31] and [36, 
37], respectively).  
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Consistent with poor classification accuracy results, segmented model for [30, 
31] in Table 5.5.15 is barely useful to identify organic funding opportunities.  
 
Finally, a longitudinal analysis sheds light on the growth strategy per segment 
and the related funding scheme resulting from the implementation of 
segmented scorecards. Segmented models in Tables 5.5.14 and 5.5.16 show that 
the earliest points of time in which segments [12, 25] and [36, 37] can grow 
organically are t=24 and 30, respectively; before those investment periods net 
organic funding is zero and/or negative. An improved model for segment [30, 
31] is required to identify its growth opportunities.  
 
The results presented above show that inclusive lending programmes are 
profitable and generate organic funds to foster their growth. It was further 
confirmed that loan duration has a major effect on time-to-profit. In general, 
loans reach the event earlier than the anticipated time as a result of profit 
accumulation throughout time. The investment plan presented in this section 
per loan duration allows for the efficient allocation of cash surpluses among new 













Table 5.5.14: Impact on investment scheme: Generic vs. segmented 
models, Segment [12, 25] in Holdout 4 sample 
 
Generic model S6 
1 2 3 4 5 6
UP TO T=12 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 1% -1%
UP TO T=24 0% 0% 68% 0% 0% 2% -68%
CATEGORY








Segmented model S3 
1 2 3 4 5 6
UP TO T=12 0% 1% 0% 0% 1% 0% -1%












Table 5.5.15: Impact on investment scheme: Generic vs. segmented 
models, Segment [30, 31] in Holdout 4 sample 
 












1 2 3 4 5 6
UP TO T=12 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
UP TO T=24 0% 0% 32% 0% 0% 1% -32%










1 2 3 4 5 6
UP TO T=12 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
UP TO T=24 7% 25% 0% 0% 1% 0% -19%











Table 5.5.16: Impact on investment scheme: Generic vs. segmented 
models, Segment [36, 37] in Holdout 4 sample 
 
Generic model S6 
1 2 3 4 5 6
UP TO T=12 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
UP TO T=24 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% -1%
UP TO T=30 0% 0% 73% 0% 0% 27% -73%
CATEGORY









Segmented model S5 
1 2 3 4 5 6
UP TO T=12 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
UP TO T=24 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% -1%











5.5.4 Overall implications of time-to-profit 
An immediate result of using return measures is that it facilitated the 
implementation of a concept as time-to-profit has been not defined before in a 
scoring context. The natural threshold of zero considered in previous studies for 
cumulative profits has been redefined in order to provide a scaled and more 
relative profit scorecard. 
 
In terms of model performance, results for time-to-profit scorecard showed that 
it is possible to obtain good results both in terms of classification accuracy and 
according to their impact on portfolio results for a survival model based on the 
prediction of a binary measure. 
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Time-to-profit goes beyond recovering the initial investment made by a lender 
when a customer makes her first purchase. Revolving credit by definition is an 
open-ended product in which profits and returns change as a result of default 
and/or repurchase. It is a conservative measure that acknowledges when the 
cumulative profits generated by a customer is enough to cover the outstanding 
balance.  This does not mean that a particular lender may not consider a 
threshold different to 1 when defining the event. Choice will depend on risk 
considerations and even on regulatory frameworks.  
 
It is clear that segmented models outperform a generic model in terms of 
identifying and scheduling organic growth opportunities. This is related to the 
role that loan duration has on the calculation of instalments and eventually of 
payment behaviour.  
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6. CONCLUSIONS  
 
This chapter presents the conclusions resulting from this research project. Each 
subsection corresponds to a research question stated in Chapter 2.  
 
6.1 Return scorecards 
The first contribution of this study is that it presents for the first time return 
scores for revolving credit. It was shown that it is possible to define and 
implement a relative profit measure for scoring purposes as an alternative to 
traditional profit scores used in previous studies.  
 
The implementation of return scorecards entails tackling similar challenges to 
those faced when defining profit measures: identifying income and expenses per 
customer and allocating fixed overheads through an agreed costing system. The 
outstanding balance per customer is also required; this figure should be readily 
available for receivables collection purposes. Therefore the implementation of 
return scorecards does not pose major data requirements compared with 
traditional profit scorecards. 
 
The opportunity cost analysis conducted to compare average versus cumulative 
measures showed that the latter offered additional insight to the credit granting 
policy in place at the moment for the credit programme under analysis. 
Cumulative measures are adequate to calculate monetary profits and returns as 
both embrace the concept of value creation per customer through the use of 
compounded cash flows. Therefore, profit and return scorecards are useful to 
select customers that can contribute to increase a lending institution’s value in 
either monetary or relative terms. 
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On the other hand, return measures are by definition more susceptible to 
outliers than monetary profits. Minimum profits (losses) can be magnified in 
terms of returns if the outstanding balance is very low. This is an additional 
feature of using continuous cumulative return measures compared to traditional 
default scoring. Such outliers should not be excluded for model testing 
purposes. 
 
Conceptually, the suggested cumulative return measure offers additional insight 
to traditional cumulative profit measures.  It scales monetary profits and hence 
facilitates the fair comparison of customers for scoring purposes. This transcends 
the traditional criterion of monetary profits which ignores the invested amount 
per customer; it focuses on profitability rather than on profits. It takes into 
account both monetary profits and the outstanding balance which can be 
potentially at default. This measure provides an additional perspective to 
monetary profits; it entails a more conservative standpoint compared with 
monetary profits.  
 
It is evident that customers are scored differently if either cumulative returns or 
profits are used. This follows from Spearman rank correlations and Chi-square 
significance tests. Time has an essential role when scoring customers according 
to profits or returns; differences are more evident as time goes on. This confirms 
that a long term perspective should be taken in the design of profit and return 
scorecards for revolving credit, a product that is dynamic by definition. 
 
At a portfolio level, profits and returns can not be simultaneously improved 
through either profit or return scorecards. This dilemma between profits and 
returns holds as well at a customer level. Therefore, return scorecards should be 
considered an alternative to rather than a substitute for monetary profit 
 181 
scorecards. Choosing between return and profit scorecards will depend on 
corporate objectives in terms of risk perception, scope and liquidity needs. 
 
In the case of the credit programme under analysis, a profit scorecard would be 
preferred to a return scorecard if the lender considers as low a bad rate of at 
most 3.15% during the observation period. In that case, portfolio returns (i.e.: 
coverage against default) would not be a priority to the lender; monetary profits 
would be priorised instead. Such bad rate is a result of strict credit granting 
decisions based on utility payment during the previous two years. Furthermore, 
in general these customers have continued to pay loan instalments regardless of 
adverse weather conditions that mainly affect low income segments. 
Consequently, these customers might not be considered high risks as would be 
the case of inclusive lending programmes. 
 
Increasing the scope of the credit programme would also justify adopting profit 
scorecards, as these would favour accepting more customers to maximise 
marginal portfolio profits. This would further support the inclusive lending 
nature of the credit programme, which aims to serve more people that are not 
being served by traditional lending institutions. Additional liquidity needs 
further justify using profit scorecards, as these rank in top deciles customers 
with the highest profits regardless of the funds invested per customer via the 
outstanding balance. 
 
Conversely, return scorecards would be preferred if portfolio coverage against 
default was prioritised. This could be the result of financial authorities’ 
regulations that may perceive inclusive lending a high risk business and hence 
would require a “healthy” portfolio of receivables. This would prevent an 
increase in the cost of capital of the lending institution and potentially a decrease 
in its corporate value.  
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Potential socioeconomic and/or political instability might also justify 
implementing return scorecards, particularly in this case as loans are unsecured 
and the risk of losses is high. 
 
Under liquidity constraints, credit granting policies would be stricter and hence 
fewer customers would be granted credit in order to maximise portfolio 
marginal returns. This strategy would reduce the scope of the credit programme 
and hence, its inclusiveness. It makes sense to adopt return scorecards when 
credit units/banks are assessed as investment centres that are accountable for 
maximising profits relative to the amount invested per customer. 
 
Finally, it was confirmed in the case under analysis that not all defaulters are 
loss-makers; similarly not all non-defaulters are profitable. These results justify 
the use of both profit and return scorecards instead of default scorecards if the 
aim is to improve portfolio profits and returns, respectively. An advantage of 
using return scorecards is that portfolio returns are less concentrated in specific 
customers, which reduces the dependency of overall results and hence 
diversifies the risk more compared with monetary profit scorecards.  
 
6.2 Direct and indirect profit and return scorecard s 
The second contribution of this study is to show how direct and indirect models 
can be used to model profit and return scores for revolving credit. This has not 
been done before for monetary and relative profit scorecards for revolving 
credit. 
 
The dilemma of improving either profits or returns through the use of profit and 
return scorecards still holds. This makes sense, given that each scorecard was 
designed to rank and hence select customers according to either measure.  Direct 
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models were useful, however, to shed light on specific individual attributes that 
simultaneously improve profits and returns. This justifies lending to segments 
that would usually be excluded by traditional commercial banks. If the 
Company targets customers that are not single, live in urban areas, buy non-
traditional products, have secondary education and belong to wealthier 
stratums, the trade-off between portfolio profits and returns could be decreased. 
The dilemma will continue to exist, however, as monetary and relative profits 
entail two related but distinctive concepts on their own. 
 
A feature that was distinctively different in direct profit and return models was 
loan duration. Longer term loan durations increase monetary profits but 
decrease returns instead. These modelling results confirm descriptive findings 
from the previous section. This highlights the usefulness of using return 
scorecards, as profits received during longer periods of time come at the expense 
of holding receivables from customers. Therefore, return scorecards provide 
additional insight regarding the role that loan duration has on profits and 
returns. This variable is directly related to time, which is an essential feature in 
the revolving credit under analysis. 
 
Direct models should be preferred in terms of model predictive accuracy and 
impact on portfolio results. These models consistently outperformed indirect 
models both for profit and return scorecards.  
 
A reason behind the better performance of direct models versus indirect models 
might be that predicted probabilities of default and repurchase were used as 
predictors of profits and returns in the latter. These predicted probabilities 
include errors that ultimately affect prediction errors of profits and returns. On 
the other hand, attributes used to predict directly profits and returns might be 
capturing additional customer features that are not completely reflected in 
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simpler indirect models based on default and repurchase. Moreover, there might 
be issues of double counting resulting from some correlation between default 
and repurchase. 
 
Other practical reasons such as unstable collection policies and hence varying 
default especially during the first year of the observation period might justify 
the inferior performance of indirect models.  In particular, AUC of default 
models was lower than that of repurchase models. Unless major changes occur 
to individuals, basic attributes such as those used in direct models remain in the 
long term and hence should result in more stable models.  
 
The reasons stated above do not justify, however, overlooking the economic 
significance of default and repurchase on profit and return scorecards 
throughout time.  
 
First, it is clear that the probability of default in the short term has an important 
economic significance for both profits and returns. This reflects specific features 
of the credit programme under analysis, in which delaying payments and taking 
advantage of a mixed utility-loan instalment results in arrears status before the 
utility is suspended. Predictions in the short and long term of the probability of 
repurchase are required, in contrast, given the revolving and hence dynamic 
nature of revolving credit. This will depend on credit limit availability and loan 
duration, among other variables. Therefore, indirect models were useful to shed 
light on profit and return drivers such as default and repurchase in the short 
and long terms; this has not been done before for revolving credit.   
 
Second, regardless of the inferior results obtained from indirect models, they are 
useful to identify individual attributes behind probabilities of default and 
repurchase. This allows implementing joint strategies that consider default, 
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repurchase and profit (return) scorecards to maximise portfolio profits or 
returns. As shown on Figure 3.3.3, where possible, attributes can be related to 
default and repurchase. This analysis scheme was particularly useful, for 
instance, to understand the relationship between socioeconomic stratum and 
profits (returns). Customers from less favoured segments are usually referred as 
high risks in terms of default.  Direct models showed that these customers are 
less profitable than those in wealthier stratums because of their lower purchase 
capacity and hence lower probability of repurchase. Default is not an issue to be 
tackled, as these customers were granted credit limits based on their positive 
utility payment similarly to customers in wealthier stratums.  
 
Consequently, direct models should be used in conjunction with indirect 
models, but for different purposes. Direct scorecards should be used to score 
credit applicants. Indirect scorecards per se are useful for information purposes 
as to understand the role that default and repurchase have on profits and 
returns. Predicted probabilities of default and repurchase used in indirect 
scorecards are useful to make informed decisions regarding the joint use of 
default and repurchase scorecards together with profit (return) scorecards.  
 
Finally, it was shown that qualitative data provide useful insight for direct and 
indirect scorecards.  In particular, data related to payment habits, collection 
strategies, penalties, motivations for taking formal credit for the first time and 
default risk factors were useful to interpret significant variables in the models. 
This shows that mixed methods are useful for profit scoring. It also provides 
further evidence of the relevance that qualitative data such as analyst’s criterion 
has on credit granting of microcredit programmes. 
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6.3 Time-to-profit  
The third contribution of this study is that it defines time-to-profit for the first 
time and presents two alternative applications: one to grant revolving credit and 
another to plan investment schemes of lending institutions. 
 
Time-to-profit can be defined as the time it takes a customer to be profitable. 
This can be understood as the time it takes a customer to break even (i.e.: being 
fully covered against default). This occurs when actual returns exceed a 
predefined threshold. This definition can be easily implemented once periodic 
data has been gathered.  
 
The use of a cumulative measure such as CASHROAcumt is more appropriate 
than return on investment as it accounts for the dynamic nature of revolving 
credit. The outstanding balance may increase as a result of repurchase. This is 
not the case for fixed term loans. The event definition used in this study further 
expands the application of return scorecards introduced previously to use a 
clearly defined status that makes practical sense in the lending industry. Such 
definition goes beyond the definition of goods and bads based on the minimum 
threshold of zero, used in previous studies to compare scorecards based on 
binary and continuous profit measures.  
 
In terms of significant variables in predictive time-to-profit scorecards, results 
were similar to those obtained for return scorecards. This was expected, given 
that both scorecards are based on the same measure. Two variables were 
particularly significant for customers to breakeven: loan duration and credit 
limit usage. Once again, the relevance that time has on the returns of revolving 
credit was confirmed. Customers with longer loan durations require more time 
to be completely covered against default. This makes sense, given that 
instalments are lower compared with those of shorter term loans and hence the 
 187 
outstanding balance is at risk of default for longer periods of time. Customers 
that use more of their credit limit in the first purchase are more likely to be 
covered against default for the first time;  these customers are less likely to 
repurchase in the short and long terms and to default in the short term. 
 
Portfolio results in terms of profits and returns obtained when using time-to-
profit scorecards contribute to the debate regarding the use of either continuous 
modelling or binary classification for profit scoring purposes. Profit scorecards 
outperformed both return and time-to-profit scorecards in terms of their impact 
on portfolio profits. This agrees with the rationale explained before regarding 
the use of scorecards to assess “same-to-same” objectives per customer and at a 
portfolio level. Portfolio returns were improved when time-to-profit scorecards 
were used instead of returns and profit scorecards in the holdout sample. These 
results show that scorecards based on binary classification measures can 
outperform those that use continuous measures instead. Furthermore, it does 
make a difference in portfolio returns to develop models that account for the 
effect of time. This is consistent with the relevance that loan duration has on 
profits and returns throughout this study.  
 
Time-to-profit scorecards are stricter and hence more conservative than return 
and profit scorecards. This is a consequence of using a criterion that identifies 
customers that outperform sooner than the rest in relative terms. This explains 
why customers that took shorter term loan durations (i.e. less than 60 months) 
were ranked in the top 4 deciles; these segments are covered against default 
sooner than those that took longer term loans as they exceed the threshold for 
the first time earlier. It would make sense to adopt time-to-profit scorecards 
instead of return scorecards under more stringent socioeconomic conditions or 
when the perceived risk of targeted customers increases. 
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The relevance of loan duration on time-to-profit was further explored through 
the comparison of generic and segmented models. It was confirmed for 
segments [12, 25], [30, 31] and [36, 37] that specific models outperformed a single 
generic model as of models’ classification accuracy.  Loan duration is a key 
feature for time-to-profit and hence segmented models are more accurate than a 
single model based on a “mixed” revolving credit portfolio. An attribute that 
gained more significance in segmented models was credit limit usage as loan 
duration increases. 
 
Another contribution of this study is that it presents for the first time a 
framework to translate model classification accuracy of time-to-profit scorecards 
to monetary terms. This was based on the time-to-event nature of these 
scorecards, compared with return scorecards. They are useful to identify organic 
growth opportunities through funds liberated from existing customers to be 
allocated among new customers and/or to further grant credit among existing 
customers. Funding schemes based on internal and/or external funding can be 
defined accordingly.  
 
Consistent with classification accuracy results, the generic model failed to 
identify customers that are covered against default. Apart from the limitations 
that such model would impose to the credit programme under analysis, this has 
implicit social costs. Customers that could be covered against default but that 
are not identified by a generic scorecard would take loans at higher rates. This 
has negative social and economic implications. Therefore, from a customer 
perspective segmented models are more beneficial as well. 
 
Results for the case under analysis shed light on the sustainability potential of 
this inclusive lending programme. This is a positive feature for similar 
programmes that might bear a higher risk but that might generate cash flows to 
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contribute towards their continuity. In general customers were covered against 
default in the case under analysis, before the initial loan duration was due.   
 
Finally, time-to-profit scorecards further justify using measures based on 
liquidity rather than on accrued profits such as the worth per customer. Profits 
might only exist in accounting books, whereas cash flows adequately reflect the 





7. LIMITATIONS AND EXTENSIONS  
This chapter presents the limitations and extensions of this research project.  
 
7.1 Limitations 
This section presents various limitations of this study regarding the calculation 
of profit (return) measures, the observation period, model design and validation 
samples. 
 
First, the definition of default is standardised to some extent in banking (i.e.: 
three or more missed consecutive payments). In contrast, the design of profit 
(return) scorecards implies agreeing on the treatment of variable income and 
expenses. In the case of profit (return) calculations to design scorecards, variable 
income and expenses vary across lending institutions and are not necessarily 
constant in the long term. In the credit programme under analysis, commercial 
agreements between the lending institution and partner retailers should be fairly 
stable in the coming periods for the designed scorecards to hold; net sales 
commissions vary with products and in some cases with sales channels. Even 
though profit (return) measures are scores rather than actually predicted values 
for budgeting purposes, the scorecards produced in this study should be 
reviewed and recalibrated periodically, if necessary. 
 
Second, fixed overheads were allocated using the total active customers of the 
lending institution. This is not constant throughout different observation 
periods. This does not have implications in terms of scoring customers as all 
customers were equally allocated fixed overheads; consistency across 
individuals is what matters. A limitation is, however, that results are based on 
the use of a fixed overheads allocation system instead of another fully customer-
focused (e.g.: activity based costing).  Some customers might be unprofitable as a 
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result of fixed cost allocation rather than as a consequence of their own 
costs/expenses. Obtaining more detailed customer data is a usual issue in profit 
scorecards; this is also the case for return scorecards. 
 
Third, regarding OLS models for OPCASHCUM30 and CASHROAcum30, it was 
not possible to clearly differentiate outliers from the rest of observations in terms 
of customer, product or credit attributes.  Even though these customers were 
included in the holdout sample, additional insight could have been gained from 
a segment where most of them are extremely positive. This would be useful to 
further improve portfolio profits (returns), compared with the designed 
scorecards. 
 
Fourth, data was available for 30 months since the credit programme was 
launched. This is appropriate given the long term perspective associated with 
profit scoring, compared with default scoring. Yet the majority of first loan 
durations in the sample were of at least 55 months, it would have been more 
convenient to use a longer observation period. This would have given shorter 
term accounts more time to revolve. Longer term accounts would exhibit full 
profit (return) behaviour; hence value created per customer in the long term 
would have been better captured. Therefore, the profit (return) scorecards 
developed in this study are not definitive in the longer term (periods greater 
than 30 months); they are useful to score customers according to their 
contribution towards customer lifetime value in monetary (relative) terms 
during the observation period. Provided that additional data is available, they 
might need to be validated and if required, recalibrated.  
 
Finally, in line with the length of the observation period, time-to-profit 
scorecards could not account for repeated events resulting from a large sample 
of customers with repurchases. Furthermore, the various models used showed 
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that the hazard of being covered against default increases with time rather than 
being constant. This might be the case at the initial stages (before first time to 
profit); in the longer term one would expect such hazard to be constant when 
customers have accumulated enough interests as to outweigh any outstanding 
balance. For illustration purposes, consider Figure 7.1.1.  A linear model might 
not necessarily hold in the longer term, compared with a more conservative 
logarithmic model. Consequently, these scorecards are useful to design 
investment schedules of at most 30 months. Longer term planning activities 
require further data.  
 


































Cumulative return is by no means the only measure that can be used to design 
return and time-to-profit scorecards. Some customers might be more profitable 
as a result of margin and/or turnover. Therefore, margin and/or turnover return 
scorecards could be designed to improve portfolio returns, following a rationale 










CASHROAcum ×=                                   (7.1). 
 
 
This would build on the findings of this and previous studies, where the 
probability of repurchase is a profit (return) driver. This approach could also 
further enhance the joint use of return and repurchase scorecards, as higher 
turnover results from repurchase. 
 
Other performance measures such as cash return on equity could also be used to 
design return scorecards. These scorecards account for the effect that external 
funding has on the return available to shareholders. Therefore, not every 
customer that is profitable in operational cash terms (i.e.: based on 
CASHROAcumt scores) is necessarily profitable from a shareholder’s 
perspective. Alternative scorecards based on customer profitability at both levels 
could be designed using multinomial regression techniques. 
 
Depending on data availability, creditworthiness scorecards (Quirini and 
Vannucci 2009) based on CASHROAcumt could be designed. These scorecards 
would assess actual versus anticipated coverage against default per customer.  
 
It was shown that CASHROAcumt is more susceptible to outliers than 
OPCASHcumt given its relative nature by definition. An alternative to testing 
Margin Turnover 
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predictive models in holdout samples under more extreme conditions (i.e.: 
through the inclusion of all outliers in such sample) would be to explore the 
sensitivity of scorecards to winsorized outliers by using different decimal 
significant digits.  
 
Regarding return predictors, additional variables could improve the predictive 
accuracy and the effect on portfolio results. Provided such data is available, 
other predictors in indirect models could include arrears/default/refinancing 
status in the payment of utility, service cross-selling and the length of the 
previous relationship with the lender as a utility provider.  
 
Given the relevance of qualitative data in scorecard design, qualitative variables 
could be included to produce in-context scorecards. This could enrich 
quantitative scorecards to take into account individual features such as 
customers’ values, preferences and financial illiteracy, which ultimately affect 
customer behaviour and hence their returns. This will require the use of scales 
and other tools that have been validated in a consumer behaviour context.  
 
The predictors mentioned above can be gathered once the first purchase occurs 
and as time goes on. This will facilitate the design of behavioural scorecards that 
include time dependant attributes and hence agree with the long term dynamic 
nature of revolving credit. Once again, this could contribute towards improving 
the predictive accuracy of return scorecards. 
 
Finally, the time-to-profit scorecards presented in this study were based on the 
event that customers were profitable, that is, when CASHROAcumt exceeds 1 for 
the first time. This is not the only alternative, as views regarding coverage 
against default can be stricter or more relaxed depending on industry 
regulations and corporate strategies. Further research could explore the impact 
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of redefining the threshold on scorecards and ultimately on portfolio coverage 
against default. Similarly, events could be defined for each ratio in (7.1) 
according to industry standards regarding profit margins and turnover. That is, 
time-to-margin and time-to-turnover scorecards could be defined with the aim 
of improving portfolio results. 
 
Strictly speaking, customer life time value is based on the discounted values of 
future cash flows expected per customer in the long term. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to develop time-to-profit scorecards that account for repeated events, 
provided the length of observation period allows doing so. This is different to 
high returns during consecutive months resulting from marginal outstanding 
balances due to collection/payment behaviour.  
 
Further avenues of research regarding time-to-profit scorecards could include 
the design of behavioural scorecards to enhance the usefulness of survival 
techniques. From a practitioners view, this facilitates the proactive management 
of individual accounts based on profit (return) profiles. 
 
Alternative time-to-profit scorecards could be produced by taking into account 
the effect of frailty on being covered against default. This would expand the 
initial models presented in this study and would reflect better the particularity 
of individuals.  
 
The results, conclusions, limitations and extensions presented in Chapters 5, 6 
and 7 show that return scoring is an emerging research theme despite the use of 
both monetary and relative measures to assess the performance of lending 
institutions at a portfolio level. A challenging and fascinating research agenda 





This chapter presents the detailed results obtained from qualitative data analysis 
(Sections A1.1 to A1.5). Bold fonts highlight findings from qualitative data 
analysis. Categories, themes and subthemes obtained from the interviews (Table 
A1.1), the definitions of dimensions per category (Table A1.2) and the cross-
company comparison of categories and themes (Table A1.3) are presented at the 
end of this chapter. Each Company was identified as follows: CP=Credit 
programme under analysis, CO=Competitor, ED=Education, U(1,2,3) =Utility 
Company(1,2,3) and L(1,2,3,4)= Lending institution(1,2,3,4). 
 
A1.1 Offer 
This category includes various features of each financing service (i.e.: access to 
service, product portfolio and channels). 
 
A1.1.1 Access to service 
It reflects the scope of the financing service in terms of the individuals that can 
actually access it. The manager of CP stated that it is equally accessible by 
anyone, provided specific conditions are met: 
“Given that one is a customer of the utility company, there are no geographical 
restrictions. Basic connection services need to be already paid and two years of good 
payment behaviour. Neither the stratum nor the neighbourhood are relevant if 
those requisites are met. Credit limit is defined per stratum”. 
 
Even though CP serves customers excluded by traditional banking services, it is 
neither as accessible to everyone (e.g.: Companies such as U2 and U3 must 
provide as utilities by law) nor limited to individuals with certain income and a 
clean credit history as occurs in lending institutions. L1 does not require credit 
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records for a specific segment of customers; it requires instead a minimum job 
permanency. U1 reviews credit records of individuals for credit granting 
purposes; the service it provides is not public and hence it can be more selective 
than other utility companies. Even though ED grants credits to those that would 
usually be financially excluded because of the lack of credit records, it requires a 
guarantor for the credit.  
 
CO is mainly owned by a financial conglomerate; hence access to credit is more 
restrictive than CP as credit bureau records are a requirement for credit granting 
purposes. This has not been embraced by traditional financial institutions, which 
consider CP a high risk business, as inferred from a statement of the manager of 
CP: 
“When I talk with people of the financial industry about the credit programme, they 
consider it madness”. 
 
A1.1.2 Product portfolio 
The credit limit granted by CP can only be used to purchase products that 
improve customer’ quality of life. CO finances similar products, but the product 
portfolio is wider than that of CP: 
“We finance everything that is a need such as: construction materials, property 
renovations, electrical hardware, technology, furniture, plastic surgeries and dental 
treatments, among others”. 
 
U2 offers financing to hire maintenance services and to purchase insurance; U3 
offers a credit limit and insurance in partnership with CP. At the other end of 
the spectrum are the lending institutions, which have defined specific financing 
services for different purposes.  This is possible through a customised offer for 
different customers, as stated by the manager of L3: 
“The Bank analyses each segment under a different perspective”. 
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EDU and U1 have the least diversified portfolios; customers can only finance the 
service traditionally offered by them. More inclusive credit programmes offer 
less variety of uses of the credit. The common aim is to cover a perceived basic 
need (i.e.: either a utility or a product). As the credit granting decision is more 
informed in terms of using credit bureau records and supporting application 
documents, customers can access a wider variety of services, usually customised 
to their own needs. This is mainly based on a segmented approach towards 
serving customers, rather than on offering commoditised services. 
 
A1.1.3 Channels 
CP and the other companies use both inbound and outbound channels to serve 
their customers. Lending institutions mostly rely on their network of branches; 
this is not the case of lenders such as CP and CO, which rely on outbound 
strategies such as door-to-door visits to offer financing services. According to 
the manager of CO this strategy is useful to reach low income segments: 
“Banks do not have the infrastructure to visit these customers and tell them about 
the service and they are very rigid as well; it is very expensive for them to allocate these 
resources. Banks do not set a sales force for a customer that takes low credits”. 
 
This is an advantage of credit programmes such as those offered by CP and CO. 
The utility companies they work in partnership with already manage large data 
sets of customers and reach them regardless of their location. Lending 
institutions would need to explore and penetrate those markets that might be 
unknown to them. This might explain as well the financial exclusion of those 
segments. 
A1.2 Customer preferences 
This category includes various reasons behind customers’ choice of a particular 
financing alternative.  
In particular, the manager of CP highlighted the easy access to the credit 
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programme and favourable payment conditions as the main reasons for 
choosing this alternative: 
“The most important reason is that the credit limit is preapproved. Customers are 
scared to submit the documents for a credit analysis and find out that they are 
rejected. 85% of our customers do not have a formal employment; they are informally 
employed therefore it is difficult for them to justify their income”. 
 
“Customers do not ask for the interest rate; they want to know the instalment value. 
When you can defer payments to 60 months, the instalment is low; this is a great 
aid for them”. 
 
The lack of inquiry regarding interest rates suggests some level of financial 
illiteracy regarding lending services. This is a major concern for the Colombian 
Government (Colombian Treasury et al., 2010). Customers seem to prioritise the 
impact that a loan’s repayment has on monthly cash flows rather than on its 
long term effect (i.e.: the number of times they end up paying the initial loan). 
 
Another reason mentioned by the manager of CO is the convenience of paying 
in a single bill both the loan and the utility: 
“They consider our payment scheme convenient, given they pay through the utility bill 
and it is easier, since they do not have to go to a bank branch to pay the 
instalment; they use a single utility bill”. 
 
Excluding L4 and U2, prices, payment conditions and interest rates (where 
applicable) are common drivers for customers to choose among alternatives. 
This is understandable, as L4 offers a very specific, differentiated product and it 
focuses more on service quality. The industry to which U2 belongs is heavily 
regulated; therefore there are no major price differences among the service 
providers. Service quality, promptness and access are distinctive features to 
choose utility companies and lending services. Other reasons mentioned to 
choose utility companies are the local relatedness and the Company’s credibility.  
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Consequently, customers seem to prefer credit programmes such as CP because 
of its unique access and payment conditions. 
 
A1.3 Competition 
This category refers to the acknowledgment of the overall competitive arena in 
which Companies operate (i.e.: formal and informal competitors and overall 
competitive strategies). 
 
A1.3.1 Alternative formal sources 
CP and CO face competition from stores that offer direct financing through their 
own credit cards. According to the manager of CO: 
“There are stores in the city centre that sell electrical hardware and furniture; I am not 
going to mention them, because it is all of them”. 
 
In the financial industry arena, there are plenty of alternatives to choose from, 
provided that customers fulfil the minimum requirements. The manager of L3 
stated: 
“I think that all financial institutions offer the same products but under different 
names; but the product base is the same”. 
 
Given the inclusive characteristics of CP, traditional lending institutions cannot 
be considered direct competitors. CP would be only competing with CO and 
other retailers that review credit records for part of the remaining 15% of 
customers that actually have credit bureau records (i.e.: not all customers with 




A1.3.2 Alternative informal sources 
This was the first source mentioned by the manager of CP: 
“Research has shown us that they use informal credit. They talk in terms of relatives and 
friends, but we know they are loan sharks”. 
 
Managers from CP, CO, ED and lending institutions acknowledged that 
customers use of alternative informal sources. Such sources include relatives, 
friends and according to CP, loan sharks, which are not always acknowledged 
by people.  
 
Almost all lending institutions acknowledged the use of such informal sources. 
Utility companies did not mention them. This makes sense, as they finance a 
utility that can not be financed by such sources.  
 
Pay day informal lenders are relatively easy to access in Colombia, where still 
the majority of the population remains unbanked. This alternative is embedded 
in the national culture and even though they are subject to legal prosecution, 
they still operate especially in low income segments. 
 
A1.3.3 Strategies 
In general, companies design various strategies to increase their scope of 
operations. Smaller scale lenders such as CP and CO are embedded in utility 
companies and establish strategic alliances with retailers to increase the access of 
customers. ED works together with lending institutions to offer joint solutions to 
credit applicants. Lending institutions take advantage of the network of 
branches of the financial conglomerates to which they belong. According to the 
manager of L2: 
“One of our strengths is that different services from various lending institutions of our 
group are offered through the joint network of branches. As a customer I don’t 
consider them separate companies; they are rather a portfolio of alternatives”. 
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A1.4 Default 
This category includes various aspects related to default such as: its definition, 




CP defines default as three missed consecutive payments onwards. So did CO, 
ED, U3 and the lending institutions. This definition agrees with the standards 
usually adopted in the banking industry. The match between the definitions of 
default implemented by CP and CO and those of the utility companies they 
work in partnership with is aligned with the easiness of payment of the credit 
through the utility bill, as explained before.  
 
U1 and U2 define default as 120 and 30 days, respectively. This is 
understandable, since customers of CP have a clean payment history prior to 
being offered a credit limit, whereas anyone that by law is entitled to access the 
service can be a customer of U2. This justifies adopting a stricter criterion for 
default definition. According to its credit manager: 
“In this type of companies, credit risk is not contemplated by regulating authorities. We 
have to collect 100% of the receivables; what is not collected is lost”. 
 
On the other hand, commercial reasons guide U1 in the decision of adopting a 
more lax definition of default, as inferred from its credit manager’s statement: 
 
“The limit to reach a stage where the service is cancelled is 120 days. The objective is 
that billing does not stop”. 
 
Therefore, even though the definition of default varies across service industries, 
some of them follow the usual definition adopted by the banking industry. This 
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sends a common message in terms of guidelines to those customers that have 
taken credit through programmes such as CP. 
 
A1.4.2 Assessment 
All companies assess their credit programmes based on payment punctuality. 
Lending institutions are required to do so by the Financial Superintendence. For 
utility companies that provide a public service, it is logical to use arrears as a 
key assessment criterion given the variety of customers that they serve. Even 
though financing services offered by ED, CP and CO are not regulated by the 
Financial Superintendence, they assess customers solely based on their arrear 
status. In the case of CP: 
“We assess arrears and default at a customer level. Total profits of the credit programme 
are assessed as well”.  
 
U1 and the lending companies also assess customers based on product usage 
and profit profiles. This is understandable, as the competitive arena in those 
industries is strong and profitability supports their continuity in the long term.  
 
A1.4.3 Customised treatment  
A common feature among all companies is the importance they give to 
customised treatment throughout their relationship with customers. Personal 
lending requires that banks know their customers and offer them products to 
fulfil their needs. The manager of L2 stated:  
“We offer advice and are very close to our customers’ needs and expectations. We inquire 
a lot of information very often not only to sell a product but also to truly identify 
their needs”. 
 
This was not a major feature for U2 and U3, as they provide public services that 
are commodities by nature. It is evident that the collection process requires a 
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continuous interaction with customers. This includes contacting them and 
reviewing payment conditions on a personal basis. Customers are contacted 
through various means from their first day at arrears onwards. Companies treat 
each case individually and try to reach an agreement once customers are at 
arrears. The manager of CP simulated a conversation with a customer at arrears 
as follows: 
“Ok, pay something, how much do you have? Why aren’t you paying? Because I 
don’t have the full amount. Well, then how much do you have? We aim for the user at 
least to pay something and then the debt can be restructured”. 
 
This suggests that even though the objective is to collect the full instalment, 
partial payments are allowed, which highlights the importance given by the 
Company to generate a commitment from the customer in terms of payment 
behaviour. This is an important feature for customers that are new to inclusive 
lending programmes such as CP. 
 
A1.4.4 Collaterals 
Lending institutions require evidence of income and equity (if applicable) to 
grant credit. Personal loans usually are backed up with personal guarantees. 
Customers are fully responsible of loan repayment. In the case of ED, a co-
guarantor is required to support the credit application: 
“The only condition is a co-guarantor different to the student’s parents. She must 
provide evidence of income, either as employees or self-employed. Parents do not care if 
they are reported to credit bureaus, but if a third party is involved, it is better”. 
 
This is not the case of U2 and U3, which provide public utilities and any 
outstanding balance not only affects a customer’s record but also the property. 
Legal action is required to demonstrate that the owner and hence, the property 
is not liable for debts taken by previous tenants or property owners. Therefore, 
fraud can occur because of this, compared with traditional lending services. 
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Credit programmes such as CP and CO that are jointly offered with utility 
companies have to cope with this situation too. The manager of CP cited an 
answer from a customer that was asked about an outstanding debt of the 
property she occupied at the moment: 
“That loan is not mine. The loan was taken by someone else that used to live here and 
left”.  
 
These findings offer further insight to the high risk nature of CP, given that it 
does not have any personal guarantee attached to it; only a good reputation in 
the payment of utility bills supports the loans. Unless proven, there is no 
guarantee that the property’s owner will repay the loan in the event of fraud. 
 
A1.4.5 Reasons  
The most relevant features mentioned by companies that lead customers to 
default are liquidity problems and culture. 
 
A1.4.5.1 Liquidity problems 
Liquidity problems may derive from unfavourable economic conditions, 
weather conditions and/or overindebtness.  In particular, floods affect rural 
communities and hence their payment behaviour. At the time when the 
interview was conducted, CP implemented a temporary measure to prevent a 
rise in those at arrears that live in the affected areas: 
“For those whose payment behaviour could be affected because of the floods, we are only 
collecting interests and no payment to principal to help them during difficult times”. 
 
Excluding L3, lending institutions identified overindebtness as a reason given 
by customers for being at arrears: 
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“We have customers that are employees with income of £5000 and financial 
expenses of £6000. How do they live? It is like a snow ball, with continuous use of cash 
advance until they lose their jobs and they go bankrupt”. 
 
Lending institutions can track the credit record of customers by accessing credit 
bureau data bases. However, those records do not include informal lending and 
hence the situation is not completely clear. Customers of more inclusive 
programmes are exposed to those informal sources, which potentially leads to 
overindebtness and ultimately, to arrears and default.  
 
Another reason for overindebtness is lifestyle, which is mostly based on peer 
pressure. The manager of U1 stated: 
“They did not need the service and they were not using it. They took the service because 
their son insisted; everyone else in the neighbourhood had the service”. 
 
A1.4.5.2 Culture 
Another common feature cited by companies is cultural aspects. In general, 
customers make their payments close to monthly deadlines. The manager of ED 
identified culture as a cause of being at arrears: 
“Culture. They take credits and say they will pay when they get additional employee 
benefits or they are just used to pay at the end of the academic period”.  
 
Consequently, companies permanently remind customers about their payment. 
According to the manager of L1: 
“If you don’t call them, it becomes messy”. 
 
A private service such as that provided by U1 may not be considered essential, 
whereas public services provided by U2 and U3 are perceived as natural rights 
that should not be paid for. The manager of U2 stated: 
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“In some cases, customers believe or think that they are not obliged to pay the service; 
they think it is a right they have and that the Government is responsible to fulfil 
such right”. 
 
A distinctive feature of credit programmes offered by utility companies is that 
since customers pay their utility and loan instalment in the same bill, previous 
payment patterns of utility bills can be extended to the payment of the loan. 
According to the manager of CP: 
 
“It is a cultural thing that people accumulate two bills before they pay; it is 
more expensive for them to pay for public transportation to pay monthly. The utility 
company does not cancel the service until the second missed payment; they do not do 
anything during the first month; there is no pressure on paying”.  
 
Furthermore, customers that make partial payments prioritise the payment of 
the utility bill instead of paying their loan instalment. The manager of CP stated 
that:  
 
“An evident sign of arrears is when the customer pays the utility and does not pay 
the loan instalment. By law, we must receive the utility payment and open the bill”. 
 
These findings are understandable, since utility is more essential than credit 
payment, especially for customers that are new to using financing services.  
 
A1.5 Collection 
This category includes the strategies implemented by the Company to improve 
the collection process and ultimately to reduce the bad rate.  
 
A1.5.1 Retention strategies  
Customers from lending institutions with good previous payment behaviour are 
offered additional services and in some cases, better. Payment on time is 
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rewarded by U1 and U2 with gifts, points and other incentives. The main 
reward for customers of U3 that pay on time is access to the credit programme 
CP. A similar situation occurs with CO through a different utility company. 
Accessing formal credit and having a clean credit record is enough for some 
customers, as stated by the manager of CO:  
“Some customers say that they want to take the loan to start a credit history. That is 
their best cover letter. We do not give out gifts”. 
 
None of the companies grant grace periods for personal loan repayment. Those 
that offer productive loans (i.e.: CO, L1 and L3) grant grace periods depending 
on the type of project. Even though such grace periods are not implemented in 
the credit programme of CP, some customers may benefit from the fact that the 
utility company has various billing cycles, according to the manager: 
 
“The utility company has various billing cycles over the month. When a customer 
purchases a product, we allow for 20 days to generate the bill and guarantee that they 
are paying for a full month of financing. Therefore we do not have an explicit grace 
period but we allow some time so that the customer does not receive immediately a 
bill after the first purchase”.  
 
A common strategy among all financing services is to offer refinancing options 
when customers are at arrears. This is understandable, as it is better to refinance 
than to write off receivables that are unlikely to be repaid. Again, the manager of 
CP highlights the cultural features associated with the payment of the utility 
bill, which are further extended to the payment of the loan repayment:  
 
“We have particular cases of refinancing; we inherited this from the utility 
payment. Refinancing is a common alternative in the gas service”. 
 
The findings cited above suggest that access to formal lending is a privilege on 
its own for financially excluded communities. An opportunity cost that CP is 
taking originates from the various billing cycles, which allows some customers 
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for almost an additional month to start repaying their loans. On the customer 
side, this is a positive feature as it is free financing for the first month, where 
applicable.  
 
A1.5.2 Penalties  
Lending institutions report customers at arrears to credit bureaus. Utility 
companies cancel the service even before customers are at default; reconnection 
payments are applied as well. ED restricts some services such as lending books 
from the library. In the case of CP, if customers want to make a partial payment 
of their bill (i.e.: paying only the outstanding utility balance and not the loan), 
they have to make an additional effort; according to the manager of CP: 
 
“Those customers must go to our headquarter offices; they cannot go to any of our 
payment facilities to do that. They must do something additional to the regular 
practice of each month”. 
 
Inclusive programmes such as CP and ED implement penalties that are more 
meaningful to customers than reporting them to credit bureaus. The 
inconvenience and additional expenses for the household because of visiting the 
central headquarters penalises customers at arrears that are more likely to be in 
default. 
 
A1.5.3 Bad rate 
The bad rate was considered low in all cases excluding U1. It should be noted, 
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PREFERENCES Company image Service features
Favourable 
conditions
Alternative formal sources No acknowledgment Acknowledgment
Alternative informal 






Definition More lax than Basel II
Same as Basel II (i.e.: 
from 90 days onwards, 
assuming monthly 
billing)
Stricter than Basel 
II
Assessment Default based Product/profit based
Customised treatment At application time During collection phase
At application time 
and during the 
collections process
Collaterals
Only individual is 
affected if at arrears
The property could be 
affected as well if at 
arrears
Reasons (from the most to 
the least obvious)   Liquidity problems   Payment culture
Retention strategies Not being at arrears Grace period Refinancing options
Penalties No penalties Penalties









Table A1.3:  Cross-company comparison of categories  and themes 
CATEGORY/Themes
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